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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-3(2)(k) 
(Supp. 1992), which grants the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction over cases transferred to 
it by the Utah Supreme Court. This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court. The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1992). The supreme court transferred the case to this court on 
September 30, 1992. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review in this brief: 
1. The statute of limitations barred Doms' counterclaim against both voluntary and 
involuntary plaintiffs. 
2. The district court erroneously allowed Doms' counterclaim to proceed despite the 
fact that it did not relate back to the date that the plaintiffs filed their foreclosure action. 
3. The trial court's finding that Doms was not entitled to rescission of the warranty 
deed should have precluded the subsequent trial on the issue of damages. 
4. The trial court should have found that the deed issued by Domcoy to Doms was 
void and therefore Doms had no interest in the property at the time of this action. 
5. The trial court should have dismissed Dom's counterclaim because Doms was not 
the real party in interest in the action. 
6. Because the covenant against encumbrances is a personal covenant, a remote 
grantee, such as Doms, may not bring an action based on the violation of the covenant. 
7. The trial court found that Doms had actual knowledge of the encumbrances before 
he purchased the property, this knowledge should have barred Doms counterclaim which alleged 
a violation of the covenant against encumbrances. 
8. The trial court found that Doms' claim against the estate of one of the plaintiffs 
was barred by the nonclaim statute, however the trial court did then erroneously setoff Doms' 
damages against the estate. 
9. The trial court erroneously joined Ellen Anderson and Jeanne Scott as involuntary 
plaintiffs. 
10. The trial court erroneously constructed a remedy for the foreclosure of the trust 
deed and trust deed note rather than following the statutorily prescribed remedy which was set 
2 
forth in the contract between the parties. 
11. The trial court erroneously modified the terms of the agreement between the 
parties and awarded damages against the plaintiffs which should not have been allowed. 
12. The trial court failed to award the plaintiffs all of the attorney fees which they 
were due under the trust deed and the trust deed note. 
Many of the issues presented, specifically issues 1,2,4,5,6,7,8,10,11,12, involve 
conclusions of law made or not made by the trial court or an erroneous application of the law 
by the trial court. A trial court's conclusions of law and legal interpretations are afforded no 
deference by a reviewing court and are reviewed for correctness. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 
464, 465 (Utah 1991); Scharfv. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
In some instances the issues presented for review concern the trial court's failure to make 
findings of fact (for example, issues 1,2,3,4,5,6). A trial court must make findings on all 
material facts and failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Ashton v. Ashton, 804 P.2d 540 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Erwin v. Erwin. 773 P.2d 847 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). A trial court has 
committed clear error if it ignores uncontested, proven facts. Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 809 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Issues concerning the joinder of indispensable parties, such as that raised by the ninth 
question above, are reviewed by the appellate court using an abuse of discretion standard. Seftel 
v. Capital Citv Bank. 767 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd sub nom Landes v. Capital 
Citv Bank. 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990). 
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STATUTES. RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes, rules, or constitutional provisions relevant to the disposition of 
this appeal are set forth in the text or addenda of this brief: Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898 
§1116; Utah Code Ann. §16-10-74, §75-3-803; Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15, 17, 19. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs Dan Scott and D.C. Anderson each owned an undivided one-half interest in a 
trust deed note in the amount of $194,250.00 dated June 10, 1982. The note, secured by a trust 
deed on real property known as Rossi Hills in Summit County, was executed by defendants 
Eugene Doms and Michael McCoy. Doms and McCoy failed to make payments required by the 
note. 
On June 6, 1985, Scott and the Estate of D. C. Anderson filed an action to foreclose the 
trust deed as a mortgage. (R. 1-9) Jurisdiction was obtained over the defendants and a default 
against McCoy was entered on December 4, 1985. (R. 12) Negotiations for payment of the debt 
proceeded for approximately two years after commencement of the action between plaintiffs and 
defendant Doms. After negotiations failed and on motion of the plaintiffs, a default judgment 
was entered against both defendants on January 21, 1988. (R. 34-40) Four months later, on 
April 22, 1988, defendant Doms moved the court to set aside the judgment against himself only. 
(R. 49-52) The court granted Doms' motion and on June 20, 1988, entered an order setting aside 
the judgment with respect to Doms.1 (R. 126,7) 
1
 On October 21, 1988, the court issued an order of sale directing the sale of McCoy's 
interest. After timely notice and publication, McCoy's one-half interest was sold on 
December 12, 1988. After a hearing, an amended deficiency judgment was entered against 
McCoy on January 24, 1991. (R. 5146-7) McCoy did not contest the default judgment or 
the deficiency judgment and is not a party to this appeal. 
4 
Before the motion to set aside the default judgment had been filed, Doms filed an answer 
and counterclaim on January 29, 1988, (R 41) However, to comply with the default judgment , 
] ' * *•!,-"* rmliance ^ • » 
i-o; -^Ticially accepted" bv me trial u ::;: m M June 1 : * June Lx 1988, 
] ) 
Subsequently, Doms recer .-<* permission on July 5, 1988, to file a second amended 
counterclaim. (.% _. - . , J seconded amended counterclaim contained causes of action for 
rescission, lost profits and fraud.2 (R. 237) 
On June 15, 1988, Doms filed a motion to join both Ellen Anderson and Jeanne Scott 
(R. 97-100) Doms claimed that they were indispensable to his countei claim for rescission. 
Involuntary plaintiffs Anderson and Scott contested, the trial court 's jurisdiction over them.. 
(R. 307-19) After a hearing on the matter on June 23 , 1988, the trial court ordered that both 
appear as involuntary plaintiffs. T ]r~ CA ~4^-50) After --.-!: motion** to dismiss for lack 
44 , 816-37) 
Following motions fc i dismissal and summary judgment . ;•... \ were d L _ . . , 
plaintiffs demanded that Doms elect his remedy. The demand was supported b^ a j u c i on 
election of remedies (R 4124-39) and a seven page supplemental brief to which, were attached 
44 pages of supporting cases. (R 4 2 5 9 - 4 3 n ; mcieafter , at the commencement of the trial on 
2
 Significantly, Doms ' second amended counterclaim did not seek damages for breach of 
the covenants contained in the deed but referred to the alleged breach only as a ground for 
rescission. 
April 17, 1990, and during the trial the motion was renewed and Doms elected to proceed on 
rescission.3 (R. 7087, 7759) On April 30, 1990, Judge Rokich issued a memorandum decision 
in which he held that rescission was not available to Doms. (R. 4244 et seq., Addendum 16) 
Over the objection of plaintiffs, the trial court reconvened for the purpose of determining 
if a violation of the covenant against encumbrances existed and, if one was found, determining 
damages even though Doms had not pleaded the contract action. (R 7753 et seq.) The bench 
trial was held on August 21, 1990. On October 4, 1990, the court issued the first of five 
memorandum decisions involving the contract claims. (R. 4348 et seq.) Finally, on June 23, 
1992, the court issued its final Second Amended Findings and Conclusions and Second Amended 
Judgment. (R. 6874 et seq.; Addendum 16) Appropriate objections to the findings and 
conclusions were made and accompanied by requests for additional findings and conclusions. 
(R. 5449-59; 6853-65; Addendum 17) Final judgment was entered on June 23, 1992. (R. 6900-
6907) 
FACTS 
This case involves undeveloped real estate situated in Park City, Summit County, referred 
to as Rossi Hills. The property was owned by Dan Scott and D.C. Anderson as tenants in 
common. ( Exhibit 27)4 
Eugene Doms, through real estate agent Michael Sloan, made offers on behalf of himself 
3
 On December 19, 1988, the plaintiffs filed a related action against the defendants and 
Summit County seeking to set aside a tax sale, Case #10066 (Supp.R. 1-66) The court 
consolidated the case and determined the tax sale was void. 
4
 All exhibits referred to in this brief were admitted at trial. Exhibit lists are contained 
in R7081-82 and R437-38. 
6 
and Michael R. McCoy to purchase Rossi Hills. (Exhibit 63) Negotiations proceeded and in 
due course the property was sold for a purchase price of $276,750.00 on terms and involving 
parties differing from ' • Exhibits 1 S 69) I 'he sale was 
consummated and a deed v, as executed by Dan Scott and his wife, Jeanne Scott, and I), C. 
Anderson and his wih\ I'lKii ; uitlnsoii, as v : • • ' "in ml Dnins iiiiill I vli( '"o) , .i". I'luiilccs, 
each with an undivided one -half interest.
 v^, „ *, .* *,*Jum l) 'I he sale was completed 
pursuant to a buyers' statement from,, the title company showing the purchase price and the 
allocution thereof, ill L " J • Il "I """ill III I1"1'"'1 " I i mini McCoy executed a trust 
deed note in the amount ol * uu in ravor of "D. C. Anderson as to an undivided one-half 
Interest, , and Dan S ::: e 
note called for interest at tlu TAIZ of i4 ,. unless Doms and McCoy defaulted, in which case the 
interest rate would be 18%. I he note was secured by a, trust deed executed b> 1 Joins and 
McCoy on 'the same date in favor of Scott and Anderson, (UAIUDIL 2; Addendum 3) Neither 
Ellen Anderson, nor Jeanne Scott held an interest in the property, or was named as beneficiary 
< 
Michael Sloan, a real estate agent, testified that he and Doms walked the property in 
advance of the sale and ot -set \ ed the loop road and the othei features latei claimed to be 
undisclosed encumbrances. (R.6883) Sloan testified that the property was not covered by snow 
and that all the claimed encroachments were plainly visible, «'l«'', - <>>,.L, - (>>,!'">!"", H>bl, '(»<»,.!, i (>(>.*, 
7664, 7667, 7686; Addendum 18) 
On, October 30, 1981 , five months before their purchase of Rossi Hills, Doms and 
7 
first meeting of directors was held on November 5, 1981, where stock certificates were issued 
to Doms and McCoy. (Exhibit 32; Addendum 6) The corporation held annual meetings for 
the years 1983 (Exhibit 35), 1984 (Exhibit 36), 1985 (Exhibit 37). Doms and McCoy, through 
Domcoy, conducted a substantial amount of real estate business in of Utah as indicated by their 
attorney. (R. 7539-41; 7560) 
On August 30, 1983, Doms and McCoy conveyed Rossi Hills to Domcoy Enterprises. 
(Exhibit 16; Addendum 4) Shortly thereafter, Domcoy developed a joint venture agreement for 
the development of Rossi Hills and other adjacent properties. (Exhibits 81, 82) 
From 1982 Domcoy failed to pay the real estate taxes on the Rossi Hills property, and 
in due course a tax sale was conducted. (Notice of Final Tax Sale Exhibit 5 to the Complaint 
in consolidated case #10066.) 
D. C. Anderson subsequently died, his estate was admitted to probate, and his widow, 
Ellen Anderson, was appointed personal representative on November 30, 1982. She filed and 
published the required notice to creditors. Doms did not file any claim against the estate and 
the time for filing claims expired long before this action was instituted. (R. 7988; Addendum 
13) 
Doms, McCoy and Domcoy failed to make payments required by the trust deed note and 
thus, defaulted under the note. (Exhibit 6) 
On June 5, 1985, Anderson's estate and Scott instituted an action to foreclose their trust 
deed. (R. 1-9) Pursuant to the trust deed and provisions of the Utah Code, plaintiffs elected to 
foreclose the trust deed note and trust deed as a mortgage. After considerable negotiation 
between the attorneys for both sides, defaults were taken and default judgment entered. (R. 34-
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40) Subsequently, 'the default and judgment against Doms were set aside. (R. 64-6) 
After entry of the default judgment and before it was set aside, Doms filed an answer and 
a counterclaim for rescission only on January 29, 1988. (R. 41-44) In Doms' Certificate of 
Compliance to the Order Setting Aside the Judgment, he agreed that all filings by him,, were 
set aside, on June 15, 1,988, Doms filed an amended c : i int s i :laim requesting rescission, only. 
(R 1 02 1 ) Doms thereafter filed a second, amended counterclaim requesting rescission and 
damages for loss of profits and fraud. (R. 237 et seq.) 
On August 24, 1,988, Summit. County sold Rossi, Hills in a tax, sale to Domcoy. On 
Augusl """('I, I""'"' "I! I , i i i i i i i ) ! e (III) i l l ) il II mi mi IM im vrfiis iil'lu illllii inmpliiml i i filed iiiiiil nuur Iliiiii M\ vejirs 
after the original deed * ; >> is and MeCov, Doms obtained a ucc . IK/ \ Exhibit 17) 
nerefc i: the fill some 
type of ownership or color of title in the Rossi Hills propert) At 'the time Doms asked for 
rescission, July 6, 1,988, he owned, no interest, in the subject p-operty and did not acquire even 
col :)! ;:: f title i intil 26. 1,988, c < * 21 one month " - ' *nded amended 
counterclaim. 
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Addendum oproximatc * c :* IK* * the deed in favor o! I »oms was executed. 
(Exhibit 1 7; Addendum© -. . ..ting 
only as an officer (not a director) of 'the corporation despite die fact that the charter had been 
terminated and the deed was in favor of Doms himself. (Exhibit, I*7- ^ e n d u m 8) 
I loin". I I Jin in in Inn iirMi iisMOii W.T. tnwl to lliir di'ilnrt i ml I III mint held that the 
J" 
contract could not be rescinded. (R. 4244-50; Addendum 15) The court further determined that 
the election to pursue rescission did not constitute an election of remedies and a trial would 
proceed at a later date to determine damages for violating the deed covenant against 
encumbrances. (R. 7757) Six years and four months had expired before these unrelated causes 
of action were pled; therefore, plaintiffs argued that the statute of limitations had expired. (R. 
3421-25) Nevertheless, the district court held that under U.R.C.P. Rule 15(c), Doms' unpled 
cause of action for breach of contract related back to the filing of the complaint. (R. 4328.) 
After trial, the district court concluded that "the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed Note and Trust 
Deed do not constitute a single contract" contradicting the basis for its earlier ruling relating 
to the transactions and applying Rule 15(c) U.R.C.P. (R. 6890) The court also determined that 
Doms, who was a remote grantee of the property by reason of the purported purchase of the 
Rossi Hills from Domcoy, was entitled to damages for breach of the covenant against 
encumbrances contained in the prior deed to Doms and McCoy who had divested themselves of 
Rossi Hills. (R. 6902) The court held that such damages could be setoff in total against the 
purchase price of the property that was sold ten years prior to the determination of damages and 
all of the purchase and financing contracts should be revised to reflect this setoff, though Doms 
only acquired a one-half interest. 
Plaintiffs were required to institute an action against Summit County to set aside the tax 
sale and determine its invalidity. If the sale was valid, then plaintiffs' rights to foreclose the 
trust deed would be eliminated as title would vest in Summit County free of any claim of prior 
owners or encumbrancers. The tax case, #10066, was consolidated into this case. The court, 
on hearing the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, determined that the tax sale was invalid, 
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thereby reconfirming the title to Rossi Hills in Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. subject to the trust 
deed in favor of Anderson and Scott. (R. 6896, 7069) The action was instituted and conducted 
f i llii iillomi V'I 1 HI lin plaintiffs in onin lu |iiiuln I Ihnnsrlvcs .mil Poms ;m<] MCCOY Inmi 
being divested of all interest in the property by reason of the failure of the defendants to pay the 
t i i \ < ' 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appropriate and timely application of law would have saved the courts, the taxpayers, 
and the parties to this action substantial time and expense. 
Plaintiffs first assert that Doms' counterclaim was barred by flic statute of limitations. 
I • r t l v 1 r K p n a l i i m ill illllii Mh, -
year limitations period, Ho'i ever, default judgment agai list Doms had been entered before the 
answer and counterclaim, and his Cei tificate of Compliance * itii the order setting aside the 
default judgment specifically stated that the answer and counterclaim would not be officially 
accepted until a date which was after the expiration of the limitations period, Subsequent 
Plaintiffs allege that the trial court's implied holding that Doms' counterclaim, related 
btiii Ho (ilttiiiiili1' original i iimplaiul is t/iioitt:oii Ihniiii niLlnikiiui uuiceined a diiicrenl 
transaction than plaintiffs' oi iginal complaint. Furthermore, 'the counterclaim involved parties 
not engaged in the original action, The trial court did. not apply the correct, standards in 
determining whether the counterclaim related back to the original complaint. 
Plaintiffs contest the trial court's proceeding with, a second trial on the issue of damages 
at'tei I »inuts had (in Ini lln" rnnnlv of IVSI issnm .iiiiinl diili ill I In iItK Innr nl nirt lion nf irmnlirs 
forecloses pursuit of a second remedy when a party has knowingly chosen a primary remedy and 
failed in his attempt to attain that remedy. 
Plaintiffs contend that at the time Doms filed his counterclaim he had no interest in the 
property. Doms did not receive an interest in the property until after the counterclaim had been 
filed and the deed which he then received was void. Domcoy Enterprises, which owned the 
property, did not meet the statutory requirements imposed upon a dissolved corporation for the 
transfer of property. Therefore, the transfer to Doms was a nullity. 
Plaintiffs claim that Doms was not the real party in interest to this action. The original 
transactions were between plaintiffs and Doms and McCoy as partners. However, Doms did 
not include either McCoy or the partnership in his counterclaim as named parties. Case law 
from the Utah Supreme Court clearly states that an action must be brought by the real party in 
interest. 
Plaintiffs argue that as a remote grantee, Doms could not enforce the covenants against 
encumbrances contained in the original warranty deed from plaintiffs. While the issue has never 
been directly decided by an appellate court of this State, but dicta in Utah cases and many 
authorities support the proposition that the covenant against encumbrances contained in the 
warranty deed is a personal covenant, not one which runs with the land. Because the covenant 
does not run with the land, it does not run to remote grantees such as Doms. 
Doms had actual knowledge of any and all encumbrances on the property before he 
entered into the transaction which conveyed Rossi Hills to the Doms/McCoy partnership. The 
trial court specifically found that Doms possessed such knowledge before entering into the 
transaction. This court should hold that it is nonsensical to allow a person, knowing he is 
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buying property with an open and obvious encumbrance, to purchase the property and then sue 
the seller for the defect of which the buyer had knowledge. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court, after ruling that no claim had been filed against the 
estate of D. C Anderson and therefore, that judgment could not be entered against Anderson's 
pel son il reprrsnilrtlh'i iiii SSCIKC JSMn M"«l ILIUM^CS a^auisl il I in rliili Ilir rnnil s ruling 
effectively reduced the amount due the estate from Doms even though his claim against the estate 
had been barred by the 110:11. claim statute. 
Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erroneously joined Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson as 
involuntary plaintiffs. Neither Mrs. Scott nor Mrs. Anderson had any interest in the trust deed 
«Mi Iiiiiih! 1 I in ill IIII nil! * IIIIIII III 1. 1 illllii nli|iil nil lllllii niiii'ttiai nuii|ihml (illnil h pliiintilf^ Hie 
appellate courts of this state have develop • 2 • :i sp ;:  cific tests which must be met before persons can 
been, 'the conclusion would have been reached that Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson should not 
have been joined in this action as involuntary plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs allege that "the trial court ignored the statutorily provided methods for 
foreclosure of a trust deed which were reiterated in the trust deed in this case Doms' default 
• f 
foreclosure to be used for that provided by the statute and the contract between the parties. 
Plaintiffs conic... . ., e 
parties and awarded damages which should not have been allowed, The trial court's conclusions 
of law are internally inconsistent. Furthermore, requested fin lings and* or conclusions were not 
ni.i ii f'lim 1 xample Donr; w.is 110I entitled to a setoff for his counterclaim, against "the trust 
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deed note because the action which Doms maintained did not involve the trust deed note but 
rather the warranty deed. 
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the trial court should have awarded them attorney fees for 
the defense of Doms' counterclaim. Most of the attorneys' fees incurred by the plaintiffs were 
a direct result of the defensive postures taken by Doms. The trust deed and trust deed note 
provided for an award of attorney fees should Doms default. Plaintiffs were required to defend 
against Doms' counterclaim in order to preserve the value of the trust deed and the trust deed 
note. Therefore, plaintiffs should have been awarded attorney fees pursuant to those documents. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARRED DOMS' 
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST BOTH VOLUNTARY AND 
INVOLUNTARY PLAINTIFFS. 
Financing documents in this case were executed on March 10, 1982, and the sale 
document, the warranty deed, was executed on March 10, 1982, and recorded on March 23, 
1982. (Exhibits 1,2,3; Addenda 1, 2, & 3) Prior to executing the documents, Doms inspected 
the property in the presence of a realtor. Doms and the realtor entered the property using the 
loop road which Doms later claimed to be an encumbrance in violation of the covenant against 
encumbrances. (R. 7761,2; Addendum 18) Furthermore, the preliminary title report on the 
property indicated that the policy did not insure the right of access to and from the land over 
existing roads and accepted easements, claims of easements, or encumbrances not shown on the 
record. (Exhibit 27) At the time of the execution of both the financial transaction and the sales 
transaction Doms was aware of all easements or encumbrances of which he later complained. 
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Indeed, the trial court found that in the Fall of 1981, Doms "knew that there were roads and 
sheds on. the property" and also found that Doms had "actual notice of the easement 
encroachments for the first time sometime between, 'October 22. , .11 981 ;iml NovHiibn 7 1081 " 
(R. 6883; Addendum 16) 
that the applicable limitations period was four years as defined by §7842-25(2). (R. 3422-25). 
The court never ruled what, the applicable limitation was, however, the proposed, order, never 
signed by the trial court, states that the six-year limitations period of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-
23(2) is the correct, limitations period Brrause the trial court,, never issued a. formal ruling on 
tins isMiiii illllii i iiHiiiil in vi mi ill iiilniiiiiiinl llln iippliriihlr Imulahim period Howes er, .is plaintiffs 
previously argued, c hmn - od is the four-year period or the six-year period, 
Doms . . J outside the limitations period 
In Baker v. Pattee. 684 P.2d 682, 686, (Utah 1984), die Utah Supreme Court stated that 
an action for rescission ;" ~n equitable action nnc1 is governed by the four-year statute of 
limitations defined , . - . . - , 
party claiming rescission is aware o\ the problems and tau the deed before the deed is 
r r c o r d u l llu ill llii, ih lr nil I I I I I M ' M i>l 11 ir I L IU stln llln p i i i m l nil II i i 111IL11 in nil«» in mi l l ion " 
684 P,2d at 637»38. 
Ihims /willed illicit lilt \t\ ycai limitation penod described in Utah Code ; UIH §/K I,'-
23(2) is the applicable limi'tations period. Indeed, claims of breach of a written contract or 
breach of a warranty would be governed by the six-year limitations period. 
In this case Dnnv.' ' ii nrul i oiititnvliiiii riTmlnl III liiiiiiiiiiliiliinis. prmwl whrtfini lltr 
correct limitation period is four years or six years. Doms first answer and counterclaim, filed 
January 29, 1988, only sets forth a claim for rescission. Rescission actions would be governed 
by the four-year statute of limitations, thus Doms' counterclaim filed five years and ten months 
after the warranty deed was recorded when all of the conditions of the encumbrances were 
known to Doms at the time of the recording of the warranty deed, would govern and this first 
counterclaim would be outside that four-year period of limitations. 
Doms' amended counterclaim was not filed until June 15, 1988. (R. 102-05) Finally, 
in this document, Doms claimed something more than rescission. However, this counterclaim 
was filed six years and three months after the warranty deed which was the basis for the action 
was recorded. Therefore, Doms was again outside the limitations period for filing an action 
based on breach of warranty. 
Finally, if Doms claims that the counterclaim filed on January 29,1988, effectively stated 
a cause of action for breach of warranty, he ignores his Certificate of Compliance filed to meet 
the requirements to aside the default judgment. On January 21, 1988, the trial court entered 
default judgment against Doms. (R. 20) On June 1, 1988, Doms filed a Certificate of 
Compliance with the trial court which stated in pertinent part: 
Defendant Doms understands that this Certificate of 
Compliance triggers the actual date the default judgment is set 
aside, and therefore defendant's answer and counterclaim are 
officially accepted by the Court. Defendant Doms understands that 
all attorneys involved in the case should work from this date in 
complying with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(R. 76-78; Addendum 21) Doms had not filed an answer or counterclaim prior to the entry of 
the default judgment on January 21, 1988. Doms ignores the fact that June 1, 1988, was six 
years and two and one-half months after the deed was recorded, two and one-half months after 
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the limitations period described by §78-12-23(2) expired. 
Furthermore, as noted below, Doms cannot salvage his counterclaim by arguing that Rule 
15(c) allows him to relate those claims back to the original complaint filed by the plaintiffs. As 
noted in Point II below, Doms cannot meet the conditions imposed by the case law of this state 
original complaint and in Doms ^.n;rrcrelaim ^rmore >oms did not file the necessary 
opening claim within - w^icr. r^ was precluded, from, arguing that 
Rule 15(c) applied in this case. 
For the reasons set forth above, the trial court erroneously allowed Doms to proceed on 
his counterclaim when his i'tuiiiirrrLiini was h.iinni In tin st.tiniii of limitations ThtrMbn-, lliis 
court should reverse those portions of the ji _ _ its which, are based on Doms' 
c 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED 
DOMS5 COUNTERCLAIM TO PROCEED DESPITE THE 
FACT THAT IT DID NOT RELATE BACK TO THE DATE 
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS FILED THEIR FORECLOSURE 
ACTION. 
1 
and Mrs. Scott and Mr and Mrs, Anderson; however, the trust deed anil trust deed note named 
c ill I In Vndcisoii and esiludwl llitii IAIRS (Inhibit 4, Addendum 2) The trial 
court found that the transaction involving the warranty deed was an entirely separate transaction 
from that involving the trust deed and the trust deed " ^ / D ^QOA. ^ H - T ^ — i<> np^ e 
original claim of Anderson and Scott was to foreclose Ub ' -
plaintiffs' original complaint related only to the financing transaction and not to the sales 
transaction. Nothing concerning the sales transaction (the warranty deed) was a basis for relief 
in plaintiffs' original complaint. The documents for the sales transaction were signed on March 
10, 1982. (Exhibits 2 & 3) The warranty deed was executed on March 10, 1982, and recorded 
on March 23, 1982. (Exhibit 1) 
Doms' answer and counterclaim were filed on January 29, 1988, but pursuant to his 
certificate of compliance, the answer and counterclaim were not "officially accepted" until June 
1, 1988. Doms' amended counterclaim was not filed until June 15, 1988. (R. 102-05) In the 
memorandum of points and authorities in support of the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs 
argued that Doms' counterclaim could not relate back pursuant to Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. (R. 3420-21) Doms argued that his counterclaim did relate back to the 
original complaint filed by plaintiff in this case. 
The minute entry of the hearing held on this issue states merely, "The court rules as to 
the statute of limitations, as having no standing." (R. 4327) Doms subsequently submitted an 
"Order Regarding August 13, 1990 Hearing" which stated in pertinent part: 
5. Plaintiffs' argument that Defendant Doms' cause of action for 
plaintiffs' breach of the statutory covenant in the Warranty Deed is barred 
by the six year statute of limitations in U.C.A. §78-12-23(2) is rejected; 
and the Court rules that Defendant Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim 
relates back to the date Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed and is therefore 
within the period of time established by the statute of limitations 
aforementioned. 
(R. 4331) However, despite Doms' request for a ruling on this order (R. 4463-66), the trial 
court never entered a ruling on the August 13, 1990 hearing with respect to the statute of 
limitations and whether the counterclaim by Doms in fact did relate back to the original 
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complaint filed by the plaintiffs. 
A. This Court Should Not Consider Whether the Second Amended Counterclaim 
Filed by Doms Relates Back to Plaintiffs' Original Complaint. 
As previously noted, the trial court never issued a ruling concerning whether Doms' 
second amended counterclaim related back to plaintiffs' original complaint. Therefore, the trial 
court's implied conclusion that the second amended counterclaim was within the statue of 
limitations is without record support. This court should not consider an argument by Doms that 
the second amended counterclaim relates back because the trial court never issued a ruling on 
this issue. Rather, this court should merely consider whether Doms' second amended 
counterclaim was filed within the limitations period; if it was not, this court should overturn any 
portion of the final judgment which would be derived from Doms' claims in the second amended 
counterclaim. 
B. Even if This Court Considers Doms' Argument concerning Rule 15(c), Doms' 
Second Amended Counterclaim Does Not Relate Back to Plaintiffs' Original Complaint. 
Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: 
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleadings 
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment 
relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
This court has stated that Rule 15(c) generally "does not apply to amendments which substitute 
or add new parties to those brought before the court by the original pleadings, because such 
amendments amount to assertion of a new cause of action and defeat the purpose of the statute 
of limitations." Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York. 761 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), citine Doxev-Lavton Co. v. Clark. 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). The court noted 
however that an exception to the rule exists "'where there is a relation back, as to both plaintiff 
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and defendant, when new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can be assumed or 
proved the relation back is not prejudicial.'" Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited 
with approval a United States Supreme Court case which set forth the criteria to determine if 
the new party which has been brought in under the relation back theory would be prejudiced. 
In that case, Schiavone v. Fortune. 477 U.S. 21, 29 (1986), the Court set forth the criteria to 
make the determination under the rule: 
Relation back is dependent upon four factors, all of which must be satisfied: 
(1) the basic claim must have arisen out of the context set forth 
in the original pleading; (2) the party to be brought in must have 
received such notice that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining 
its defense; (3) that party must or should have known that, but for 
a mistake concerning identity, the action would have been brought 
against it; and (4) the second and third requirements must have 
been fulfilled within the prescribed limitations period. 
In this case, Doms did not meet the criteria set forth in Vina as it concerned Mrs. Scott 
and Mrs. Anderson so as to relate back Doms' new claims to plaintiffs' original complaint. 
Plaintiffs' original complaint concerned the finance transaction, not the sales transaction. Mrs. 
Scott and Mrs. Anderson were not parties to the finance transaction. Therefore, Doms' 
counterclaim which concerned only the sales transaction to which Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson 
were parties, did not arise out of the same basic conduct set forth in plaintiffs' original 
complaint. The first part of the Schiavone test, that the basic claim must have arisen in the 
context of the original pleading, was therefore not met. Furthermore, the second and third parts 
of the Schiavone test were also not met. Those portions of the test can be invoked when, due 
to a mistake in identity, the plaintiff has named a wrong party. However, here Doms knew the 
identity of Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson from the instant they signed the warranty deed. 
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Finally, Schiavone dictates that the second and third requirements will have been fulfilled within 
the prescribed limitations period. In this case, Doms moved to name Mrs. Scott and Mrs. 
Anderson six years and three months after the warranty deed had been recorded. (R. 97 et seq.) 
Doms therefore failed to fulfill the second and third requirements within the prescribed 
limitations period. 
In short, Doms simply did not meet the requirements set forth by this court in Vina to 
successfully invoke the relation back doctrine of Rule 15(c). Therefore, the action against Mrs. 
Scott and Mrs. Anderson should have been dismissed by the trial court and the trial court should 
not have considered any of Doms' claims against either. Additionally, because the claim against 
Mr. Scott and Mr. Anderson did not arise out of the same transaction but a different transaction, 
it also could not relate back to the original complaint. 
POINT ffl 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT DOMS WAS NOT 
ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OF THE WARRANTY DEED 
SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED SUBSEQUENT TRIAL ON 
THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY. 
Doms' final second amended counterclaim requested both rescission and damages for loss 
of profits as a result of the alleged breach of warranty against encumbrances in the warranty 
deed. (R. 237-42) Because both of these remedies were based on the same cause of action, 
plaintiffs requested the trial court to order Doms to elect which remedy he chose to pursue. (R. 
4124-39; Addendum 19). Before the trial on the issue of rescission, the trial court required 
Doms to elect his remedy. (R. 7087) Doms elected rescission as the appropriate remedy. (R. 
7087) The trial court affirmed this decision when it stated, "You can't have it both ways, you 
want a rescission and you want in the alternative. On the other hand, you want this court to 
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proceed on damages and on the other hand, I ruled against you so you want it both ways. You 
can't have it both ways." (R. 7759; Addendum 10) However, after Doms lost on the remedy 
of rescission under his allegation of breach of warranty, the trial court allowed him to proceed 
on the issue of damages under the same breach of warranty allegations. 
In Roval Resources. Inc. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp.. 603 P.2d 793 (Utah 1979), the 
Utah Supreme Court defined the doctrine of election of remedies: 
The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of 
procedure and its purpose is not to prevent recourse to any 
remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong. Said 
doctrine presupposes a choice between inconsistent remedies, a 
knowledgeable selection of one thereof, free of fraud or 
imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy evincing a purpose 
to forego all others. 
603 P.2d at 796 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted). In Cook v. Covev-Ballard Motor 
Co.. 253 P. 196 (Utah 1927), the Utah Supreme Court defined when a party who elects his 
remedy and fails in his action is foreclosed from pursuing the alternative remedy. The court 
stated: 
The true rule seems to be (1) that there must be, in fact, 
two or more coexistent remedies upon which the party has the 
right to elect; (2) the remedies thus open to him must be 
alternative and inconsistent; and (3) he must by actually bringing 
an action or by some other decisive act, with knowledge of the 
facts, indicate his choice between these inconsistent remedies .... 
With such elements present, an election once deliberately made by 
the institution of a suit, by which the remedy is sought to be 
recovered, is final, and his failure to secure satisfaction by means 
of the remedy which he adopted furnishes no legal reason to 
permit him to resort to the other. And this court has held, where 
there is a duty of election as a particular remedy, the bringing of 
an action based on one remedy constitutes irrevocable election, 
except in case of mistake of fact or other legal excuse. 
253 P. at 199-200. Thus, the pursuit of a remedy to an adjudication forecloses pursuit of the 
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other remedy even if the pursuit of the first remedy proves futile. Mendenhall v. Kingston. 610 
P.2d 1287, 1289 (Utah, 1980); Cook. 253 P. at 200. 
In this case Doms tried breach of warranty allegation seeking a rescission remedy. The 
trial court held that Doms was not entitled to rescission. (R. 4244-50; Addendum 15) Once the 
trial court reached this conclusion, it should not have proceeded to trial to determine whether 
Doms was entitled to damages. All of the factors listed in Cook were satisfied. Doms had two 
coexisting remedies on which he had a right to elect. The remedies open to Doms were 
alternative and inconsistent since both requested different remedies based on the same underlying 
cause of action, breach of the covenant against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed. 
Finally, in open court, Doms elected rescission as his remedy, a decisive act which indicated 
his choice between the inconsistent remedies. Therefore, his failure on the breach of warranty 
claim when he requested rescission as the remedy should have foreclosed the subsequent action 
seeking damages. When the trial court allowed him to proceed seeking damages based on the 
breach of warranty, it effectively gutted the election of remedies doctrine. Because Doms 
elected his remedy and failed to convince the court that it was appropriate, the subsequent 
judgment by the trial court which held that damages against the plaintiffs based on breach of 
warranty should be reversed and remanded for dismissal. 
POINT IV 
DOMS COULD NOT MAINTAIN HIS COUNTERCLAIM 
BECAUSE THE DEED WHICH HE OBTAINED FROM 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES WAS VOID. 
Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. was terminated by a certificate of dissolution filed on 
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December 31, 1986.5 (Exhibit 39; Addendum 7) At the time of the dissolution, Domcoy had 
several creditors. (R. 519) One year and eight months after the dissolution, the corporation 
received funds from Doms which it used to reclaim Rossi Hills from Summit County. Shortly 
thereafter, Doms, acting as the secretary/treasurer of Domcoy, deeded Rossi Hills to himself. 
(Exhibits 17, 66) In the trial court, plaintiffs raised this issue via motion for summary judgment 
(R. 3430-32, 3974), introduction of the Certificate of Dissolution (Exhibit 7) and objections to 
findings and conclusions. (R. 6853, 6865; Addendum 17) 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-101 (1991) allows a corporation to continue after dissolution for 
the purpose of winding up its affairs with respect to "any property and assets which have not 
been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to such dissolution." However, the statute does 
not authorize deviation from the statutorily required procedure. In Houston v. Utah Lake Land. 
Water & Power Co.. 187 P. 174 (Utah 1919), the Utah Supreme Court stated the actions that 
a dissolved corporation is allowed after dissolution: 
Where a corporation's charter is forfeited in this state, it is 
the duty of the directors, who are trustees for the stockholders and 
creditors, to assemble its assets, liquidate its indebtedness, and 
generally conduct its affairs in such a manner as will properly 
expedite the winding up of the corporation's business. 
187 P. at 177. Houston imposes an obligation on the directors to wind up the corporation's 
business in compliance with the statutory requirements. 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-74 (1991) (Addendum 20) governs the sale of corporate assets 
outside the regular course of business. That provision has three requirements: (1) the board of 
5Domcoy, a Utah corporation, was involuntarily dissolved on December 31, 1986, 
because it failed to file the required annual report. (Exhibit 39) 
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directors must adopt a resolution recommending the sale of corporate assets and directing the 
submission of the recommendation to a vote at a meeting of shareholders, (2) written or printed 
notice must be given to each shareholder entitled to vote, and (3) the shareholders must authorize 
the sale or disposition of corporate assets by a majority vote at the required meeting. In Fair 
v. Brinkerhoff. 829 P.2d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this court stated that where a corporation 
proposes to sell all of its corporate assets, there must be an attempt to comply with §16-10-74 
in order to render the contract for sale of the assets enforceable. 829 P.2d at 121 citing Davis 
v. Heath Dev. Co.. 558 P.2d 594, 596 (Utah 1976). The court's opinion cited other cases 
which recognized the importance of complying with the statutory requirement to affect the legal 
transfer of corporate property. Lack of compliance with the statutory requirement renders the 
transfer void because it is without proper corporate authority. In Fan;, the court held that 
because the president of a corporation undertook to unilaterally convey an entire parcel of 
corporate property without even an attempt to comply with the statutory requirements, the 
conveyance was void. 829 P.2d at 121-22. 
In this case, just as in Fair. Domcoy, through its directors, failed to comply with any of 
the requirements of §16-10-74 in executing the transfer of Rossi Hills from Domcoy to Doms. 
First, the corporation's board of directors never adopted a resolution recommending the 
conveyance of the corporation property to Doms. Second, there is no evidence directors called 
for or provided notice to Domcoy's shareholders of a meeting wherein the resolution would be 
considered. Finally, there was never a vote by the shareholders of Domcoy to authorize the 
conveyance. Rather, Doms, acting only as secretary/treasurer and not as a director or 
shareholder, authorized the conveyance from Domcoy to himself. As such, the conveyance was 
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without any corporate authority and was void. Therefore, because Doms was not a grantee, he 
had no interest in Rossi Hills and could not bring an action on his own behalf to enforce breach 
of covenants against encumbrances. The trial court should have dismissed his counterclaim. 
See also Sharp v. Eagle Gate Lumber Co.. 212 P. 933 (Cal. 1923); James v. Unknown 
Trustees. 220 P.2d 831, 835 (Okla. 1950); Klorfme v. Cole. 254 P. 200 (Or. 1924). 
Finally, even if the conveyance of Rossi Hills from Domcoy to Doms was legitimate, 
Doms could only assert ownership of one-half interest in Rossi Hills. The district court had 
previously sold McCoy's one-half interest in the property. That interest had been reacquired by 
plaintiffs. The sale of McCoy's one-half interest had the effect of merging that interest in the 
title and uniting the ownership such that the covenant against encumbrance was extinguished. 
See e.g. 5 R. Powell The Law of Real Property §679 (1993). At most, Doms could assert a 
breach of the covenant against encumbrances for only one-half of the property. However, the 
trial court awarded damages was based on Doms' assertion that he owned the entire property. 
Because this clearly could not be the case, the trial court's award of damages should be 
reversed. 
POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO 
DISMISS THE COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE DOMS WAS 
NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IN RELATION TO 
THE COUNTERCLAIM. 
At trial Doms testified that he and McCoy were partners in the acquisition of Rossi Hills. 
(R. 7627-28; Addendum 11). Plaintiffs moved the trial court to dismiss the counterclaim on the 
basis that Doms had failed to join his partner in the counterclaim. The trial court denied 
plaintiffs' motion and ignored plaintiffs' objections to the findings of fact which requested that 
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a finding be made concerning Doms' failure to include McCoy on the counterclaim. (Addendum 
17) Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action shall be prosecuted 
in the name of the real party in interest. (Addendum 20) The requirement imposed by the rule 
is not a mere formality. The purpose of the rule is to allow a defendant to have a cause of 
action prosecuted by the real party in interest so that a judgment against the defendant will 
preclude any action on the same cause of action by another plaintiff and also so that the 
defendant may assert all available defenses and counterclaims against the real party in interest 
of the cause of action. Shaw v. Jeppson. 239 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1952). 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a single partner can maintain 
an action in his own name when property was procured by a partnership. In Kemp v. Murray. 
680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984), the court held that the plaintiff, who was a partner in a joint venture, 
could not bring an action in his own name without joining his copartner and without naming the 
partnership. 680 P.2d at 759. The court stated: 
Courts universally hold that an individual partner may not 
bring suit in his own name to enforce a liability owed to a 
partnership. One partner's failure to join all partners as plaintiffs 
is grounds for dismissal for lack of necessary parties. 
Under the law of some states a partnership is empowered 
to sue in the partnership name. That question has not been 
decided in this state, . . . and may not be decided in this case. If 
a partnership can sue in its own name, the partnership is obviously 
an indispensable party in an action to enforce a partnership claim, 
since it is the real party in interest. If a partnership cannot sue in 
its own name, it must sue in the name of the partners, and all are 
necessary parties, as explained above. In either event, this 
plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable party and his complaint 
was properly dismissed on that basis. 
680 P.2d at 759-60. The court then explained that the interests involved in rule 17(a), judicial 
27 
economy and "fairness to the parties in litigation," protect "the interest of parties who are 
present by precluding multiple litigation and contradictory claims over the same subject matter 
as the original litigation." 680 P.2d at 760. 
In this case, just as in Shaw, the real party in interest was not Doms but rather the 
Doms/McCoy partnership. The partnership, not Doms individually, acquired Rossi Hills.6 If 
a cause of action could be maintained on the original warranty deed, see Point VI infra, it could 
only be maintained by the partnership, not one of the individual partners. Indeed, pursuant to 
the warranty deed, Doms could not show that he had suffered a direct individual injury as 
distinguished from the injury suffered by the partnership under the warranty deed. Additionally, 
as in Kemp, "[allowing [Doms] to go forward individually could subject defendants to multiple 
liability and could spawn multiple litigation among the partnership, the individual partners, and 
defendants. This would be unfair to absent partners, unfair to defendants, and contrary to 
judicial economy." 680 P.2d at 761. Indeed, only the statute of limitations now prevents 
McCoy from maintaining the same sort of action which Doms maintained against Anderson and 
6The question arises whether Doms could be the real party in interest because at the time 
he filed a counterclaim he had no interest in Rossi Hills. The property at the time of the 
counterclaim was owned either by Domcoy Enterprises (Exhibits 16 & 31) or Summit 
County by reason of the tax sale. Therefore, as is argued in Point VI infra, at the time of 
filing of the counterclaim, Doms was a remote grantee and had no basis for bringing an 
action against plaintiffs. If the court decides that Doms was not a remote grantee and that an 
action could be maintained under the original warranty deed, then the court must address the 
issue of whether Doms' counterclaim should fail because it was not brought in the name of 
the real party in interest. Even if the court ignores Doms' failure to bring the action for the 
benefit of the partnership, the court should address the fact that Doms had only an undivided 
one-half interest as a tenant in common under the terms of the warranty deed and had 
divested himself of that interest by his deed to Domcoy. (Exhibit 16). No evidence 
indicates that Domcoy, as Doms' grantee, has made any claim against Doms or the plaintiffs 
in this case and therefore there is no showing of damages as a result of the claims of Doms' 
grantees, and the counterclaim should have been dismissed. 
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Scott. This is precisely the type of unfairness which Rule 17(a) seeks to avoid. The trial court 
erroneously allowed the counterclaim to proceed even though it was not brought in the name of 
the real party in interest. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO DISMISS 
DOMS' CASE BECAUSE THE COVENANT AGAINST 
ENCUMBRANCES IS A PERSONAL COVENANT AND 
DOMS, AS A REMOTE GRANTEE, HAD NO CLAIM 
UNDER THE DEED FROM PLAINTIFFS. 
Plaintiffs originally conveyed Rossi Hills to Doms and McCoy as partners. Doms and 
McCoy in turn conveyed the property to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. After the original 
counterclaim had been filed, Domcoy then conveyed the property to Doms. As such, Doms was 
a remote grantee. Doms did not file any action for breach of the covenant against encumbrances 
against Domcoy which filed no action against the Doms/McCoy partnership. 
Plaintiffs argued to the trial court that as a remote grantee, Doms could not bring a claim 
that the covenant against encumbrances had been breached by plaintiffs. (R. 6864; Addendum 
17) The trial court did not rule on this issue despite plaintiffs' objections to the contrary. 
Plaintiffs asserted in the trial court, as they do on appeal, that the covenant against 
encumbrances is a personal covenant and does not run with the land. Plaintiffs also argue that 
even if the covenant against encumbrances does run with the land, Mrs. Scott should have been 
dismissed as a plaintiff because she lacked privity of estate, an essential requirement in a claim 
when a covenant does run with the land. 
A. Mrs. Scott Should Have Been Dismissed Because She Lacked Privity of Estate. 
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Mrs. Scott had no interest in Rossi Hills and signed the warranty deed merely as an 
accommodation to her husband. (Exhibit 5) Doms claimed his title in this action by reason of 
a deed from Domcoy Enterprises. (Exhibit 17; Addendum 8) 
Plaintiffs now assert, as they did in the trial court, that the covenant against 
encumbrances is a personal covenant and does not run with the land. However, even if this 
court were to find that the covenant against encumbrances does run with the land in this case, 
plaintiffs assert that a requirement for a covenant to run with the land is privity of estate. Flying 
Diamond Oil Co. v. Newton Sheep Co.. 776 P.2d 618, 628 (Utah 1989). In Flying Diamond. 
the Utah Supreme Court clearly established that one of the requirements for a covenant to run 
with the land is that there be privity of estate between the grantor and the grantee. In this case, 
because Mrs. Scott owned nothing, there was no privity of estate and Doms' claim against her 
must fail for that reason. 
B. The Covenant Against Encumbrances is a Personal Covenant Which Doms Could 
Not Enforce as a Remote Grantee. 
Neither this court nor the Utah Supreme Court has directly addressed the issue of whether 
a covenant against encumbrances is a personal covenant or a covenant which runs with the land. 
If the covenant against encumbrances is a personal covenant, it runs only to the direct grantee, 
and not to remote grantees. 
The most complete discussion of this problem is found in Soderberg v. Holt. 46 P.2d 
428 (Utah 1935). In Soderberg. the property which had been conveyed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff had been subject to a tax lien. The plaintiff brought the action which was the object 
of the case to recover the amount paid to extinguish the lien claiming that the lien constituted 
a violation of the covenant against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed given him by 
30 
the defendant. 46 P.2d at 428. The defendant claimed that the statute of limitations lapsed 
between the time the plaintiff obtained his deed from the defendant and the time when the action 
was brought. The plaintiff countered by alleging that the covenant against encumbrances was 
a covenant which runs with the land and therefore could be sued upon when the holder of the 
land was damaged. 46 P.2d at 429. The supreme court resolved the issue by holding that the 
covenant against encumbrances, at least as far as money charges, a remediable encumbrance, 
is concerned, is to be deemed "an indemnity agreement. . . ." 46 P.2d at 434. In reaching this 
resolution, the court carefully distinguished between encumbrances which involved rights of 
way, irremediable encumbrances, as opposed to encumbrances which involve merely the 
payment of money. In making the distinction, the court seemed to indicate that permanent, 
irremediable encumbrances which were present at the time the covenant was entered into were 
personal covenants between the grantor and the original grantee and could not be enforced by 
remote grantees. After citing several cases which held that the covenant against encumbrances 
does not run with the land, the court stated: 
In the opinion of [Judge Cooley], a covenant consisting of a right 
of way would not run with the land, "but a covenant against the 
money charge must attach itself to the title conveyed, and 
accompany it, not only for the protection of the covenantee, but 
for the protection of his assigns, whom the encumbrance may 
eventually indemnify." . . . We believe that there has been more 
of a swing to Judge Cooley's view, and that today many respected 
authorities consider a covenant against encumbrances, when it 
applies to money charges or liens against lands which can be 
removed by payment, is to be considered as a covenant to 
indemnify. . . . 
In the case of a violation of a covenant against 
encumbrances, . . . breach really is committed at the time of 
conveyance if there is a lien on the premises which the covenantor 
covenanted was not there. The damage suffered by the buyer 
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because of the necessity to extinguish the charge against the land 
was a damage suffered because of the failure of the covenantor to 
convey the property without the said charge, and thus arose from 
the breach of the covenant, which breach occurred eo instanti at 
the time of the conveyance. 
46 P.2d at 431, 433 (quoting Post v. Campau. 3 N.W. 272, 275 (Mich. 1879)). The only other 
time that the Utah Supreme Court has had occasion to address whether the covenant against 
encumbrances is personal or runs with the land was in Beeslev v. Badger, 240 P. 458 (Utah 
1925), in which the court clearly stated that the covenant against encumbrances was a personal 
covenant "not running with the land . . . ." 240 P. at 458. 
Other authorities support the notion expressed in the Soderberg case that the covenant 
against encumbrances does not run with the land and therefore does not run to remote grantees. 
For example, in 6A R. Powell, The Law of Real Property f900[5] at 81A-150-151 (1993), is 
the following statement of the law: 
In the case of the first triad of covenants — seisin, right to convey, 
and freedom from encumbrances — the covenant speaks as of the 
date of conveyance and is breached, if at all, when the deed is 
delivered. If it is not breached at that time, there is no longer any 
covenant which may be passed to the grantee's successors. If 
there is a breach of covenant, the breach generates a cause of 
action. Because of the common law repugnance to champerty, this 
cause of action historically was not transmissible to the successors 
of the grantee. Thus, it did not run with the land. It had to be 
prosecuted, if at all, by the immediate grantee. Although the 
modern view of champerty is very different from the common law 
view, the general rule concerning the first triad of covenants 
remains the same. Neither the covenants nor a cause of action 
based on their breach will run to the benefit of remote purchasers. 
7 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property states: 
Under the majority rule the covenant against encumbrances is a 
personal one and does not run with the land. It is broken the 
instant it is made, thus vesting in the covenantee a chose of action, 
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which is nonassignable and therefore does not pass to his grantee 
or devisee. The grantee can maintain no action upon it and cannot 
assert it by way of estoppel, since he acquired no interest in it.... 
A covenant against encumbrances is broken on the delivery of the 
deed, if an encumbrance on the land then exists. 
Thompson at §3185 at 303, §3186 at 306. 
All of the authorities agree that the covenant against encumbrances, at least as it involves 
an irremediable encumbrance present at the time of the conveyance, is a personal covenant and 
does not run with the land. As such, only the original grantee has an action based on the 
covenant against encumbrances against the grantor for a breach of the covenant. In this case, 
Doms sued on his own behalf and claimed his deed as a warranty deed from the corporation, 
Domcoy Enterprises. Therefore, if there was a breach of covenant against encumbrances, 
Doms' action was against Domcoy, not against plaintiffs. Only the Doms/McCoy partnership, 
the original grantee under the warranty deed at issue in this case, had a cause of action against 
plaintiffs. The trial court should have dismissed the counterclaim on this basis. 
POINT vn 
DOMS' ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND USE OF THE 
ACCESS EASEMENT PRIOR TO THE PURCHASE OF 
ROSSI HILLS SHOULD HAVE BARRED HIS CLAIM 
OF A VIOLATION OF THE COVENANT AGAINST 
ENCUMBRANCES. 
Doms knew of the existence of the loop road easement because he traveled on it prior 
to the purchase of Rossi Hills. (R. 7658-61) The road is the only access to Rossi Hills. 
Without the easement, Rossi Hills is landlocked because the prior platted roads had been 
terminated and the fee returned to the adjoining owners by reason of Revised Statutes of Utah 
§1116 (1898). (Addendum 12) Testimony indicated that the platted streets, even if they could 
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be revitalized, could not physically be used in the development of the property. (R. 80, 118-20; 
Addendum 14) Therefore, before the purchase Doms was informed of the backyard 
encumbrances (R. 7667) and the loop road (R. 7667-68) and that any development would be 
dependent on the loop road. (R. 7672) The realtor, Mr. Sloan, identified Exhibit 77 and noted 
that he had seen it or something like it before and that he was aware that the boundaries of the 
property extended into the backyards of several houses on Ontario Avenue. (R. 7666-7) He 
told Doms about each of those encroachments. (R. 7668) Exhibit 77 details with particularity 
the encroachments. The plaintiffs raised this issue in the trial court by objection to findings and 
conclusions. (R. 6864; Addendum 17) 
In Jones v. Grow Investment and Mortgage Co.. 358 P.2d 909 (Utah 1961), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that a private right of way "which diminishes [the value of the property] 
constitutes a breach of the covenant against encumbrances in the deed, regardless of whether a 
grantee has knowledge of its existence or that it was visible and notorious." 358 P.2d at 911. 
However, in a concurring opinion Justice Crockett stated, "If the easement is of such character 
and use as to be open and notorious and the purchaser knows of its existence, he should not be 
permitted to accept the conveyance and then claim a breach of covenant with respect to 
something about which he had full knowledge." 358 P.2d at 912. In Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 
P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1984), the court seemed to reiterate its position when it stated "mere 
knowledge of encumbrances of this nature would not be sufficient to exclude them from the 
operation of the statutory covenant against encumbrances." (Emphasis added.) The easements 
involved in Bergstrom were sewer and utility easements which are not openly apparent. 677 P.2d 
at 1124. 
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In Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 799 P.2d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this court 
followed Bergstrom and held that even if a buyer had knowledge of an irremediable but 
nonapparent easement, the covenant against encumbrances would be violated. 799 P.2d at 725. 
Both the Bergstrom and Breuer-Harrison courts based their holding on Utah Code Ann. §57-1-12 
(1990) which specifies the effect of a warranty deed. However, in Breuer-Harrison. Judge Orme 
expressed the position that irremediable but apparent encumbrances should not fall within the 
purview of the statute. Judge Orme noted that such an exception had not been adequately 
addressed by previous case law and reasoned that such an exception should be made because: 
If a purchaser has knowledge of an encumbrance that cannot be 
removed and enters into a contract calling for conveyance free and 
clear, the entire contract is an exercise in futility unless the 
operative provision be taken to exclude such an encumbrance. 
Otherwise, the purchaser has entered into a contract requiring the 
vendor to do the impossible, which would be nonsensical. 
799 P.2d at 732-33 (Orme, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).7 Judge Orme noted 
that this seemed to be the general rule. LI 
7
 The basis for Judge Orme's view can be discerned from Jones in which the court 
stated: 
Some of these cases are decided upon the theory that, whenever the actual 
physical conditions of the realty are apparent, and are in their nature 
permanent and irremediable, such conditions are within the contemplation of 
the parties when contracting, and are therefore not included in a general 
covenant against encumbrances. 
There seems to be a tendency toward the proposition that certain visible 
public easements, such as highways and railroad rights of way, in open and 
notorious use at the time of the conveyance, do not breach a covenant against 
encumbrances. 
358 P.2d at 910-11 (footnotes omitted). 
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Other authorities support the position advanced by Judge Orme. For example, 2 
G.Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property §433 at 700-01 (1980 Repl.) 
states: 
. . . one purchasing property with knowledge of an existing 
easement takes subject . . . if the easement is visible, the 
purchaser takes subject to it . . . purchasers of servient premises 
have been held to take subject to such easements as tile drain, 
encroaching structures, water rights, and bill boards. 
and 
An easement whether public or private, will not constitute 
a breach of a covenant against encumbrances where it obviously 
and notoriously affects the physical condition of the land at the 
time it is sold. 
Section 3186 at 309. In Tabet Lumber Co.. Inc. v. Golightlv. 457 P.2d 374 (N.M. 1969), the 
New Mexico Supreme Court analyzed the then-extant cases and concluded that only Utah follows 
the so-called New York rule which finds open, irremediable easements to be violations of the 
covenant against encumbrances. 457 P.2d at 376. The New Mexico court concluded that the 
better reasoned and more widely followed approach holds that open, apparent, irremediable 
encumbrances (both public and private) are excepted from the covenant against encumbrances. 
457 P.2d at 375-76. 
In this case, Doms knew, used and planned to use of the right-of-way of which he 
complained. A gross injustice would result if Doms obtained the fruits of an easement (the only 
access to the property) that he knew existed and also recovered damages because of the existence 
of that easement. The conclusion is irresistible that if the visible encumbrance damaged the 
estate, that fact was taken into account in fixing the price and Doms has obtained all he 
bargained for and all that he paid for. 
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As Judge Orme noted, it is nonsensical to allow a person, knowing he is buying property 
with an open and obvious easement, to purchase the property and then immediately sue the seller 
for the defect of which the buyer had knowledge. This is not fair; it is not equitable; and it is 
not good law. This court now has a chance to review the law and conform it to the general and 
logical pattern of law. The court should take this opportunity to restate the law correctly so that 
a technical trap is not available against a seller of real estate. 
POINT Vffl 
THE AMOUNT DUE THE ESTATE OF D. C. ANDERSON 
WAS SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED EVEN THOUGH DOMS' 
CLAIM WAS BARRED BY THE NON-CLAIM STATUTE. 
Although the court took judicial notice of the fact that the Estate of D. C. Anderson had 
been probated, duly published notice to creditors and no claim had been filed and stated further 
that judgment could not be entered against the personal representative (R. 7988; Addendum 15), 
the trial court determined the amount of damages and, in essence, assessed damages against the 
estate. The effect of the court's ruling was to reduce the amount due the estate from Doms even 
though his claim against the estate was barred. 
The non-claim statute in the State of Utah is Utah Code Ann. §75-3-803 (1993). The 
1975 revision was in effect at the time of this case. That provision states: 
All claims against a decedent's estate . . . whether due or to 
become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, 
founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis . . . are barred 
against the estate, . . . unless presented as follows: 
(a) Within three months after the date of the first 
publication . . . 
The Utah Supreme Court has reviewed the effect of this provision in relation to a 
counterclaim to an action by the personal representative who was suing on a promissory note. 
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The counterclaim requested setoff. The court stated in Rockhill v. Creer. 189 P. 668, 674 (Utah 
1920), "Since no claim was ever presented against the estate to the respondents, no action by 
way of counterclaim can be maintained." This case is cited with approval and is in line with 
the majority of jurisdictions in the United States in B. O'Byrne, Annotation, Presentation of 
Claim to Executor or Administrator as Prerequisite of Its Availability as Counterclaim or Setoff. 
36 ALR 3d 693, 711-13 (1971). The Utah Supreme Court also reviewed this statute in relation 
to contingent claims in Halloran - Judge Trust Co. v. Heath. 258 P. 342 (Utah 1927). The court 
stated, "We cannot avoid the conclusion that the statute is susceptible of no other interpretation 
than that contingent claims must be presented to the executor or administrator within the time 
required by law and that the plaintiff herein is barred by failure to present its claims in time." 
258 P. at 349. 
The full amount due the estate of D. C. Anderson as a one-half owner of the promissory 
note must be paid without any deduction, setoff or other charge. Further, the estate was entitled 
to all attorney's fees and costs expended in this action. 
POINT IX 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY JOINED ELLEN 
ANDERSON AND JEANNE SCOTT AS INVOLUNTARY 
PLAINTIFFS. 
Plaintiffs' original action in this case was for foreclosure of a trust deed. Neither Mrs. 
Anderson nor Mrs. Scott had any interest in the trust deed note or the trust deed. Doms moved 
to join Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. Scott as involuntary plaintiffs because he claimed each "had an 
interest in the Trust Deed Note" and each would be "personally liable for sums repaid to" the 
defendant if the trial court granted rescission. (R. 98) Eventually, the trial court held that Mrs. 
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Anderson and Mrs. Scott should be joined as involuntary plaintiffs because, pursuant to Rule 19 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, each was a necessary party "because in their absence 
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties as they are grantors on the 
Warranty Deed which transferred the property which is the subject of the above-entitled lawsuit 
. . . ." (R. 249) Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson contend that their joinder by the trial court was 
contrary to Rule 19 and that their joinder as plaintiffs allowed Doms to proceed with a 
counterclaim which should have been barred by the statute of limitations had they been properly 
joined as third party defendants. 
In Landes v. Capital City Bank. 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court 
described the analysis which a trial court should undertake pursuant to Rule 19 before joining 
an involuntary party. The court stated that a trial court should first determine whether a party 
is "necessary" pursuant to Rule 19(a). 795 P.2d at 1130. In order to determine if a party is 
necessary under Rule 19(a), a trial court must consider the two general factors listed in the rule. 
First, a trial court may determine that a party is necessary if "in his absence complete relief 
cannot be accorded among those already parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1) (Addendum 20). 
The trial court may also determine that a party is necessary if, 
He claims an interest relating to the subject of this action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as 
a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that 
interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to 
a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2). The supreme court stated that if a trial court finds that a party is 
necessary according to either of these criteria, "Rule 19 provides that the parties 'shall be 
joined.'" 795 P.2d at 1131. Therefore, under the language of the rule, if a party is necessary 
39 
and joinder is feasible, then joinder is mandatory. If joinder is not feasible, then the trial court 
is to proceed to the second part of the Rule 19 analysis and determine whether the party is 
indispensable. Id. Finally, and importantly, the supreme court stated that in performing the 
Rule 19 analysis, the trial court "should discuss specific facts and reasoning that leads to the 
conclusion that a party is or is not necessary under Rule 19(a) or indispensable under Rule 
19(b)." 795P.2dat 1130. 
In this case the trial court held that Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson were "necessary" 
parties to the action because "in their absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those 
already parties . . . ." However, in reaching this conclusion the trial court did not cite specific 
facts and/or reasoning as required by Landes that led to the conclusion that Mrs. Scott and Mrs. 
Anderson were necessary under Rule 19(a). For this reason alone, this court should reverse the 
holding of the trial court. 
The facts reveal that neither Mrs. Scott nor Mrs. Anderson were necessary pursuant to 
Rule 19(a). Doms alleges that both Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson had "a personal interest in 
the Trust Deed Note . . . ." (R. 98) However, an examination of the trust deed note indicates 
that this is plainly false. The trust deed note was not executed in favor of either Mrs. Scott or 
Mrs. Anderson; indeed, neither is mentioned in the trust deed note. 
Doms asserted that Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson were necessary plaintiffs because in 
their absence "complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties," pursuant to Rule 
19(a)(1). Under Rule 19(a)(1) a party is necessary only if in his absence complete relief cannot 
be accorded. Doms sought rescission of the entire "contract of conveyance." (R. 98) However, 
plaintiffs' original action was an action for foreclosure under the trust deed note. The only 
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parties to this note were Mr. Anderson and Mr. Scott and Doms and McCoy. Therefore, if 
Doms had prevailed in plaintiffs' action against him, relief could have been afforded to Doms 
under the trust deed note against Mr. Anderson and Mr. Scott without the involvement of Mrs. 
Scott and Mrs. Anderson. 
In Young v. Buchanan, 259 P.2d 836 (Utah 1953), the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
to be joined as an involuntary plaintiff, a person "must have some interest, affirmative or 
negative, which is beneficial or detrimental to the interest of the party desiring to so join the 
recalcitrant person." 259 P.2d at 878. Furthermore, the court noted that the inability of a 
potential involuntary plaintiff to bring an action against the defendant also indicated that the 
person could not be joined as an involuntary plaintiff. Id. The lack of a contractual relationship 
between the defendant and the potential involuntary plaintiff is another factor indicating that a 
person is not an involuntary plaintiff. 
In this case, neither Mrs. Scott nor Mrs. Anderson had any interest, either affirmative 
or negative, which was beneficial or detrimental to Doms under the trust deed note which was 
the basis for the initial action. Neither Mrs. Scott nor Mrs. Anderson could have brought an 
action against Doms under that document. No contractual relationship existed under that 
document between Doms and either Mrs. Scott or Mrs. Anderson. Therefore, neither should 
have been joined as an involuntary plaintiff. 
Because neither Mrs. Scott nor Mrs. Anderson had any contractual relationship with 
Doms nor interest in the trust deed note, Rule 19(a)(2) is also inapplicable. In essence, that rule 
prevents multiple adjudications on the same claim. However, because Mrs. Scott and Mrs. 
Anderson had no interest in the trust deed note, they could not have filed an action against Doms 
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and therefore Doms should have been prevented from bringing them into the action as 
involuntary plaintiffs. 
Finally, if Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. Scott should have been joined at all, they should 
have been joined as third party defendants on Doms' separate and distinct claim for rescission. 
Doms alleged that Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson were necessary because if the court granted 
rescission and awarded interest, costs and attorneys fees with regard to sums paid to purchase 
the property and obtain a deed, both Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson would be "personally liable 
for sums to be repaid." (R. 98) Both Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson signed the warranty deed 
for Rossi Hills, even though only Mrs. Anderson's signature was required on the warranty deed. 
Therefore, Doms' only claim against them was as signatories to the warranty deed, not under 
the trust deed note as claimed in Doms' motion. However, as Doms must have realized, he 
could not join Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson as third party defendants because his claim against 
them would have been barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, Doms surreptitiously 
joined Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson in order to circumvent the rules for proper joinder. 
POINT X 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING ITS 
METHODOLOGY FOR FORECLOSURE IN LIEU OF THAT 
PROVIDED BY THE CONTRACT AND THE STATUTE. 
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-23 (1990) provides for two methods of foreclosure of a trust deed. 
The first method is the standard method of trust deed foreclosure as provided in paragraphs 14 
and 15 of the Trust Deed. (Exhibit 6) The second method found in paragraph 16 of the Trust 
Deed states that, "beneficiaries shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby 
immediately due and payable and to foreclose this trust deed in the manner provided by law for 
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the foreclosure of mortgages on real property. . . . " The statute gives the trust deed beneficiary 
the option of which method to use. The election by the plaintiffs to foreclose in a manner 
provided for foreclosure of mortgages is authorized by both the trust deed and the statute and 
was approved in Security Title Company v. Pavless Builders Supply, 407 P.2d 141 (Utah 1965) 
which noted that the obligor could not object to the attorneys fees resulting from the judicial 
foreclosure. 
Doms' default has been previously discussed. The court erred when it substituted its 
judgment as to the method of foreclosure for that provided by the contract between the parties 
and the statute. The district court should be directed to allow the plaintiffs to proceed with 
special execution and sheriff's sale as provided by the statute and the trust deed and without 
complicating this foreclosure with any problems that may arise from the separate action against 
the grantors under the warranty deed. 
POINT XI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY MODIFIED THE 
TERMS OF THE TRUST DEED NOTE AND AWARDED 
DAMAGES AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS WHICH SHOULD 
NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED. 
Doms' counterclaim requested only rescission and/or damages for lost profits and/or 
fraud. (R. 237-242) Nothing in the counterclaim requested modification of the terms of any of 
the instruments. However, several of the trial court's conclusions of law had the effect of 
modifying the terms of the trust note. For example, the trial court concluded that plaintiffs had 
a duty to eliminate any encumbrances before giving the warranty deed (R. 6891; Addendum 16; 
paragraph 17 and 18 of Conclusions of Law); and that the defendant's measure of damages for 
breach of covenants against encumbrances related to the date of the warranty deed. (R. 6891; 
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Addendum 16; paragraph 20 of conclusions of Law) The latter ruling by the trial court resulted 
in the trial court's allowing Doms to set off thousands of dollars in interest against the trust deed 
note to which he was not entitled. Furthermore, in allowing the setoff against the trust deed 
note the trial court ignored its own conclusion concerning the separateness of the transactions. 
Plaintiffs objected to the trial court's proposed conclusions. (R. 6919) The trial court overruled 
plaintiffs' objections and incorporated these conclusions. 
In conclusion No. 6 (R. 6890; Addendum 16), the trial court concluded that the warranty 
deed and the trust deed and trust deed note did not constitute a single transaction. The court 
also concluded that the trust deed and trust deed note were not part of the contract to purchase 
the property and were documents executed to secure the payment of the property "and have no 
bearing upon whether the property is free and clear of any encumbrances." (R. 6890; 
Addendum, 16; Conclusions of Law #9) However, the court contradicted these conclusions by 
allowing Doms to set off the damages incurred for the breach of covenant against encumbrances 
against the trust deed note. (R. 6891; Addendum 17, paragraph 20) Once it concluded that the 
financing of the property was separate from the purchase of the property, the trial court 
improperly changed the financing agreement by setting off the amount of damages against the 
financing agreement and thus revising the amount due and the interest chargeable under the 
financing agreement. 
The trial court's conclusion that plaintiff had an obligation to remove encumbrances 
before the deed was conveyed to Doms and McCoy is also erroneous. No preexisting contract 
existed between plaintiffs and Doms and McCoy. Various earnest money agreements were 
proposed, but they all differed in some significant aspect from the final contract for the purchase 
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of the property. Furthermore, all preliminary negotiations were merged by the execution of the 
deed as the trial court concluded in Conclusion #7. (R. 6890) See, e.g., Dobrunskv v. Isbell. 
740 P.2d 1325, 1326 (Utah 1987) (the deed is the "final repository of the agreement which led 
to its execution.") Logically, a prior agreement to remove encumbrances cannot be breached 
because it is merged into the final deed. The only agreement that is effective is the agreement 
evidenced by the deed. The deed contained a covenant against encumbrances which, if 
breached, would allow an action against plaintiffs. If a breach of a covenant contained in the 
deed occurred, damages may have been an appropriate remedy but the deed covenant does not 
create a contract to eliminate encumbrances. Therefore, the trial court's conclusions No's. 22 
and 23 which adjust the amount due under the trust deed note are erroneous. (R. 6892-93; 
Addendum 16) 
Furthermore, the trial court's adjustment of the interest rate called for in the trust deed 
note was erroneous. Clearly, the terms of the trust deed note had been violated by the failure 
to pay required payments due under the note and by the failure to pay taxes. The note was in 
default and therefore the default interest rate called for in the note, 18%, should have been 
applied from the date of default. However, the trial court ignored the default interest rate and 
allowed interest at the rate of 14%. (R. 6904; Addendum 17; Judgment, paragraph 11) 
Generally, "to warrant a setoff for counterclaim in an action, the demands must be 
mutual, that is, the setoff or counterclaim and the action must be between the same parties in 
the same capacity or right, and there must be mutuality as to the quality of the right." 20 Am 
Jur 2d Counterclaim. Recoupment, §74 at 291-92 (1965). The general rule is stated in Johnson 
v. Citv of Aberdeen. 266 P. 707, 709 (Wash. 1928): 
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But it is the rule that demands, to be the subject of set-off, 
must be mutual between the parties; that is to say, the demands 
must be due to and from the same parties in the same capacity, 
and be of such nature that had the defendants sued upon the set-
off, the plaintiff could claim his cause of action in that the suit was 
a setoff. 
See also, Western Securities v. Spiro. 221 P. 856 (Utah 1923); Workman Motor Co. v. Pacific 
Finance Corp.. 26 P.2d 961 (Utah 1933). 
In this case, mutuality simply did not exist. For example, Doms' counterclaim is made 
against four plaintiffs whereas the initial complaint involved only two plaintiffs. Furthermore, 
the district court determined that the sale and the financing involved two different, separate 
transactions, therefore, setoff was not appropriate and should not have been permitted. See also 
Spratt v. Security Bank of Buffalo. Wyoming. 654 P.2d 130 (Wyo. 1982). 
By ordering setoff, the trial court actually awarded prejudgment interest which was not 
allowable in this case. The damages in this case, if any, were not ascertainable with 
mathematical precision and therefore should not have been subject to an allowance of 
prejudgment interest. Anesthesiologists Assoc, v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 
28, 33 (UtahCt. App., 1993). 
POINT XII 
THE COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING THE 
PLAINTIFFS ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR ALL WORK 
EXPENDED IN DEFENDING, DIRECTLY OR 
INDIRECTLY, THE VALIDITY OF THE PROMISSORY 
NOTE AND TRUST DEED, INCLUDING THE DEFENSE 
AGAINST RESCISSION WHICH WOULD HAVE 
ELIMINATED THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND TRUST 
DEED. 
The original action by Scott and Anderson was to foreclose a trust deed. Doms added 
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additional plaintiffs and counterclaimed seeking rescission. Clearly, plaintiffs were required to 
defend against the rescission action, otherwise the promissory note and trust deed would have 
been eliminated by the rescission. The trust deed and trust deed note provided for attorneys' 
fees to collect on the note. Plaintiffs now contend, as they did in the trial court, that defense 
of the rescission action was tantamount to defense of the trust deed and trust deed note and that 
attorneys' fees should have been awarded for the successful defense against the rescission action. 
The trial court did not award attorney fees for the defense of the rescission action. (R. 6886; 
Addendum 16; Findings of Fact, #64b) Plaintiffs contend that the fees were incurred in defense 
of the validity of the note and as such the plaintiffs must be compensated for payments made 
under the specific agreement to pay attorneys' fees. To rule otherwise would encourage any 
party who had an obligation under a trust deed note to create as many impediments, whether 
justifiable or otherwise, to the collection of a trust deed note in order to render worthless their 
duty to pay attorney fees. 
A significant portion of plaintiffs' attorney fees resulted from Doms' efforts to avoid his 
obligations under the trust deed and note. Paragraph four of the trust deed (Exhibit 11) 
required Doms to "appear and defend any action or proceedings purporting to affect the security 
hereof, the title to the property . . . ." Paragraph five of the deed required Doms, "to pay at 
least ten days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property . . ." 
Paragraph sixteen stated tha t" . . . beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured 
hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this trust deed in the manner provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property . . . and recover all costs, expenses incident 
thereto including reasonable attorneys' fees . . . " The trust deed note (Exhibit 12) provides, "If 
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this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either 
with or without suit, the undersigned jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses 
of collection, including reasonable attorneys' fees." 
In this case most of the attorneys' fees incurred by the plaintiffs were a direct result of 
the defensive postures undertaken by Doms. Plaintiffs had to reply to and defend against the 
counterclaim. Doms' final amended counterclaim requested rescission and/or damages for lost 
profits and/or damages for fraud. (R. 241) If Doms had prevailed on any of these theories, the 
trust deed and note would have been either diminished in value or worthless. However, Doms 
did not prevail on any of the theories contained in the final counterclaim. 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), is instructive in this instance. 
The court detailed the requirements imposed on plaintiffs counsel by the defendants' 
counterclaim: 
Counsel. . . detailed the efforts he had expended . . emphasizing 
that most of what he did was a direct result of the defensive 
posture undertaken by the Brackens. He had to meet the motion 
to dismiss. He had to reply to the counterclaim. He had to 
defend depositions taken by the Brackens, and he had to take their 
depositions in view of the magnitude of their counterclaim. . . . 
764 P.2d at 987. The court then held that defendants' tactics were responsible for the size of 
plaintiffs attorney's fees: 
First, while the bank's fee is large relative to the amount 
of its claim, it is small relative to the counterclaim interposed by 
the Brackens. The Brackens' litigation strategy converted the 
action from a routine collection action of a magnitude such that 
it might have been brought in circuit court into a brouhaha of 
much larger proportions. 
Second, and more importantly, the fees incurred by the 
bank were increased several-fold over what they should have been 
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by the tactics employed by the Brackens. . . . It was the Brackens 
who asserted unmeritorious counterclaim. . . . The attorney fees 
incurred by the bank were clearly much higher than they should 
have been in this case; but they were higher because of the 
inconsistent and unmeritorious positions taken by the Brackens—not 
because of any extravagance or "overkill" on the bank's part. 
764 P.2d at 991 (emphasis added). 
The present case is comparable to Dixie State Bank. Doms has done everything he 
possibly could to avoid his obligation creating immense discovery, research and trial problems. 
As heretofore outlined, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover for the legal services rendered in this 
matter and to do otherwise would be to encourage useless, unproductive litigation. The district 
court found that the hourly rates charged by the counsel were reasonable (R.6874 et. seq.) but 
determined that the plaintiffs were not entitled to compensation for the time spent in defending 
any of the causes of action contained in the second amended counterclaim (R. 6874 et seq.) and 
awarded only $41,975.00 in attorneys' fees when the plaintiffs were required pay in excess of 
$260,000.00 for prosecution and defense of this action. (R. 6369-6437; exhibits 3P & 5P) 
In Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985), the court stated: 
The total amount of the attorneys fees awarded in this case 
cannot be said to be unreasonable just because it is greater than the 
amount recovered on the contract. The amount of the damages 
awarded in a case does not place a necessary limit on the amount 
of attorneys fees that can be awarded. 
Furthermore, contrary to appellant's contention that 
attorneys fees should be determined on the basis of an equitable 
standard, attorneys fees, when awarded as allowed by law, are 
awarded as a matter of legal right. 
(emphasis added). Recently, in Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
this court stated that a trial commits error if it awards attorney fees more limited in scope than 
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the underlying contractual provision. As indicated in Hoth v. White. 799 P.2d 213, 220 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990), "Where the evidence supporting the reasonableness of requested attorney fees 
is both adequate and entirely undisputed, the court abuses its discretion in awarding less than 
the amount requested. . ." 
Defendants in the financing portion of this transaction contracted to pay the fees incurred 
in collection and defense of title and they should not be heard to complain when they created the 
massive expenses and attorneys fees that were incurred in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this brief, plaintiffs request that that portion of the judgment 
based on Doms' counterclaim be reversed and that the case be remanded to the trial court for 
dismissal of Doms' counterclaim and entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, including an 
award of all requested attorneys' fees. 
DATED this ^7 day of June, 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
A I&VffiGjj/BIELE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants and 
Cross-Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANTS was either hand delivered or mailed by United States Mail, postage prepaid this 
j y day of June, 1993, to the following: 
Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
Craig L. Boorman, Esq. 
LARRY R. KELLER & ASSOCIATES 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Recorded at Request of 
at M. Fee Paid $_ 
by 
RECC-^F03.-;?3-£2 ef 3.V0..M P 




 f.r.T ^ ^y. ^ " " • 
. Dep. Book, 
Mail tax notice to_ Grantee / M. M^Coy 
Page Ref.: _ ,-. 
2850 Ocean Park Boulevard, Suiuo 300 
AHHrpsg Santa Monica, California 90405 
(SPECIAL) 
WARRANTY DEED 
DeWAYNE C. ANDERSON aka D.C. ANDERSCN aka DEWEY D.C. ANDERSON and ELLEN R. 
ANDERSON, h i s w i f e , and DAN SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT , h i s w i f e , grantors 
o f Park Ci ty , Utah f County of Summit f s t a t e o f U tah, hereby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
EUCENE E. DOMS and MICHAEL R. McCOY, a s tenants i n cannon 
0£ Santa Monica, Cal i fornia 
TEN AND NO/100-
(and other good and valuable considerat ions) 
the following described tract of land in Summt 
State of Utah: 
SEE ADDENDUM ATTACHED TO AND MADE A PART HEREOF: 
v*5, tt# t§ EXHIBIT: • 
"50 
grantee 




GRANTOR: - ^ 
GAANTZE: —.= -^^ -
S7A>I"L^ : / . — 
KJK.T TO IHE GENERAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR THE YEAR 1982 AND THEREAFTER, AND 
ANY SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS NOW DUE OR TO BECOME DUE. 
EXCEPTING ALL OIL, GAS AND/OR OIHER MINERALS WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY RESERVED. 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 
M u , A. D. 19 82 
March 
Signed in the Presence of 
10th day of 
STATE OF UTAH, 







My commission expires^ 
iTjSCOJT (Jeanne)" 
De^ IAYNE C. .ANDERSON aka D.C. ANDERSON aka 
ELL£N P. ANDERSON 
* # a v S k March , A. D. 19 8 2 
p*"\DeVfflteNE C. ANDERSON , aka D.C. ANDERSON , aka 
^ E % E N « . ANDERSCN, h i s w i f e , 
within instrument,ijvho duly acknowledged to me that t n e v executed the 
: e - m i s s i o n F.stf ••'-- * >J
 v J 
9-28-82 
Notary Public. 
.Residing in Park Ci ty , Utah 
BLANK £ 101—WARRANTY D I E D — £




PARCEL NO. 1: All of lots 17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31, 
and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to the 
amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the office 
of the Summit County Recorder. 
• 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City Survey, according 
to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the 
office of the Summt County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described 
in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book 
C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and 
Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County, 
Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according to the 
Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in the office of 
the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion 
located within the County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described 
in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book 
C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and 
Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County, 
Utah. 
v
 Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water lines 
over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five feet of the following 
described Lots. 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey according 
to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in the office of the Summit 
County Records. 
B00KM215PAGE44 8 
STATE OF Wra&EttJG • ) 
COUNTY OF MiAxAx^ _) 
On t i e g?^ / t^ -gC_day of ^Ll^,k^~ > A.D., 1982 personally, 
appeared before ate ffiN SCUTT ar^'KSmii'^^IT the signers of the within instronent, 
who duly acknowledged t o me i&t.&^Mfeated the same. 
/ • • • • • . • * * ' . ^ 
My Camtission expires : f * V~ ; ' > f \ \ / 
My Commission expires January 8,1984 \ ^ \ '-f ^ >C&J-£/^U^ &, Q 4 U , L / 
\ \ U3UXJ /;J Notary Public
 ; / ! ~ ~ T" 
V **••. .• , ' '>;^ Residing a t ;
 /ArU/l<ut&^ U.J<OJ mu+<->i 
B00KM215 PAGE44"9; 
ADDENDUM 2 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered 
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
$l?4f250.00 ParkCity, .Utah. 
March 10, 
, 19- 82 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
D.C. ANDERSON as to an undivided one-half interest and DAN SCOTT as to an 
undivided 1/2 interest 
0 ^ H ^ ^ ^ ^ N ($..194/250.00 
FOURTEEN together with interest from date at the rate of.. 
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
..per cent ( f %) per annum on 
TTO THOUSAND IWO HUNDRED SIXTY SIX AND 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25) towards 
interest only on the 10th day of April, 1982, and a like amount to interest 
on the 10th day of each and every month thereafter to and Including January 
10, 1985. 
The entire unpaid principal, together with interest is due on January 25, 1985. 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal Any 
l installment not paid when due si 
cent (.18~.Q.%) per annum until paid. 
such shall bear interest thereafter at the rate o f . .„ . . .^™?: . per 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued inttitst due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with 
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand 
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other pro-
visions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
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ADDENDUM 3 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
Space Above This Line For Recorder's Use 
TRUST DEED 
With Assignment of Rents 
10th THIS TRUST DEED, made this . . . 1 U . ? \ day of A* 1 ™ , 19 
between * ^ ? ? ; . 3 . . . . L P f ? . . . ^ 
82 
as TRUSTOR, 
whose address is 2 8 5 0 0 c e a n P a r k B l v d . , S u i t e 300, San t a Monica, C a l i f . , 90405 
(Strwt and numbtr) (City) (StaU) 
^ * ^ . . 9 ? ^ . . ^ , as TRUSTEE,* and 
?>«0 • _ .^ ^^rTP^fr*^ _'^ .1*. .^ S? .f^ T?. .V^ Tl^ r^ J^ r^^ 01 .^1. .S?6^ *^ —^w=aJ.^  i n t n r a s t and QrNtf 9CCTT a s to «n 
^ j M ^ . . ^ . . ^ ^ 3 ^ ^ , as BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in &**&% 
County, State of Utah: 
t,t V 
KMT22L NO. 1 : 
Pk.TC£L \K>. 2: 




All of Lots 17,13,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,23,29,30,31 
an! 32, Ulock 5C, I'arJc City Survey, according to tha amnded 
plat thereof, a* filad and of wxxA in the offio« of the 
Siarrlt Cc*x\tj :iaooruer, 
•11 cf iczz 17 ayuT. 10, Jlcvk 3(\ V*& City 'Vin' \ *r^nlirtg 
t : . is.* -m- V«1 Oiit. " ^ r r o i % ;r. r 4 I V V i ; f>4' ** onr". 1- *h« 
• • f ^ - " <'r: r \ r - M : ^ " • > ; T - w V * - >\xr*-.*tX'; t-V*tvfT»T» 
any portion looatad vdthin t±« railroad rights of %*y » 
ceocriboi la tl^nc certain docunaita tooardsd em Sfttry NO. 
317f, in Dock C «t Png» 401, Entry No. 13316 in Boc* H «t 
Page 326, and Entry NO. 13610 in Book R at Page 373, records 
of SizxxzdLt Crxrrty, Utah. 
All of lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according to tha 
tasrtiad Plat tharaof, as f l la i and of record in the office of 
tho Submit Courty Feooctter, cwaapting th^rafron any portion 
located within the railroad rights of way as daeadbeu in 
these certain docinrrts iBuunSad as artry NO. 8176 in Book C 
at Page 401, Sntry Ho. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and 2ntry 
No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Srimtt County, Utah* 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of 
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoved with said property, or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the nght, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro-
194 ,250 .00 j v 
missory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ , made by 
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner nnd with interest as therein 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of 
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided. 
•NOTE: Trustee must be a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank, building and loan association or savinp 
and loan association authorized to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in 
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah. 
— »••»»* ' " ^ i u t t u , T K U S T O R A G R E E S 
1. T o keep said property in cood condition and r epa i r not to remove or demolish a m building thereon to 
complete or restore promptly and in good and workman l ike m a n n e r a m building which max he constructed 
damaged or destroyed thereon, to romplv with all l a « s covenants .inoW«Mrictio t l> . .(leeim- s.n,| propertv not 
to commit or |>ormit waste thereof, not to commit , suffer o r permi t anv act upon said property m violation of l a* tr 
do all o ther a r t s which from the charac te r or use of said pro|x*rtv mav Iw rca*nnahl\ necessary the specific 
enumera t ions herein not excluding' the general : and. if the loan secured herehv or anv part Hereof is being ob-
tained for the purpose of financing construction of u n p n n r n i . - n N on sa r i pro|N>rly Trus tor lurtln-r agrees-
(a) To commence construction prompt ly and to pursue same with reasonable diligence to completion 
m accordance wiih plans and qK-cificatiotis sat isfactory to Beneficiary, and 
(b) T o allow Beneficiary to inspect said p rope r ty at all t imes dur ing construction 
Trus t ee . U|>on presentation to it of an affidavit s igmsl l»y Beneficiary, setting forth facts slwmin^ a default 
by Trus to r under this numbered pa ragraph , is au thor i zed to accept as t rue and conclusive ail fatt^ and state-
ments therein, and to act thereon .hereunder. 
2. T o p r o v i l r and mainta in insurance of such type or types and amounts as lieneliciarv mav require, nn 
the improvements now existing or l ierealter erected or placed on said propcrtx Su< h insurance -hall he carr ied 
in companies approved l»v Iteneficiarv with Joss payable clau-.es m | . ( \or <•» ami m I'-rui a. . ep iable lo l l e n e l n i a r v 
In event of loss. Trus to r shall give irume<liale notice to l l e n e l n i a r v who mav m.tk. proof ,,| |..«.> .IIHI . a. h inMir. imr 
company concerned is herehv author ized and directed to make pavnietii lor MH II IOS- ihrectlv to It. neficiary 
instead of to Trustor and Bciieliciarv jointly and the in>uranee proceeds, or anv part thereof. mav In- applied 
by Beneficiary, at its option, to redut lion of the indebtedness herehv »ecured or to the restoration <»r repair ot 
the proper ty damaged 
.1 T o deliver to. pay for and mainta in with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured herehv is paid in full, 
such evidence of title as Beneficiary mav require , including abstracts oi title or jM»hcies oi title insurance and 
any extensions or renewals thereof or supp lement s thereto 
4 To appear in ami defend any actum or pr<»ceeding purj>orlmg to aflecl MM security hereof, the title to 
said property, or the rights or tMiwers of Beneficiary or Trusl«*e; and should Beneficiary or T r u s t e e elect to 
also appear in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and exj>cnses. including cost of evi-
dence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee 
,^jR T o pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessment* affecting said property, including 
ail assessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or 
used in connection with said property, to pay. when due. all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest, 
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs, 
fees, and expenses of this T r u s t 
6. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act »a herein provided, then Beneficiary or 
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing 
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may 
deem necessary to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said 
property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay. purchase, contest, or compromise a n y 
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in ex-
ercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem 
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees. 
7. T o pay immediately and without demand a!) sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, 
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum until paid, and the repay* 
ment thereof shall be secured hereby. 
I T IS M U T U A L L Y A G R E E D T H A T : 
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason o( any public improvement 
or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner. Beneficiary shall be 
entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled mt its option 
to commence, appear in and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compro-
mise or sett lement in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights 
of action mnd proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property, 
are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deducting therefrom all it* expenses, including attorney's fees, 
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any 
compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require. 
9. At a n y time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and pre-
sentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation a n d 
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, 
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said property, (b) join in granting any ease-
ment or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed 
or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey. without warranty, all or any part of said property The grantee in 
any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein of any 
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's 
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
10. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all 
rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property 
located thereon Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the per-
formance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties, 
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable If Trustor shall default as aforesaid, 
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without 
taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or 
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from t ime to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any 
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. 
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to 
be. an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a 
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in 
person, by a g e n t or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of 
Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby 
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or 
otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less 
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness 
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
12. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collecton of such rents, issues, and 
profits, or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or 
damage of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any 
default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
43 T h e failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as 
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other 
or subsequent default 
14 Time is of the essence hereof Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured here-
by or in the performance of sny agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become d u e 
arid payable at the option of Beneficiary In the event of such default. Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee 
to execute a written notice of default and of election t o cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligabona 
hereof and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or 
parcel thereof is situated Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing 
expenditures secured hereby. 
on i r u i w r , •uau men »«ra piv»|rcn.jr uu uic uaic anu at uir lime anu fjivir ursnn»iwi in Mm i i u n « ui »••*.«..«*^* « 
a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to 
direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public 
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the tune of 
sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to 
time until it shall be completed and, in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration 
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale u postponed 
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the 
same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed con-
veying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the 
Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Bene-
ficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and 
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's 
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; 
(3) alt sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per annum from date 
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persona 
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County 
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place. 
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums 
secured hereby immediately due and payable and fore close this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceed-
ing all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be 
fixed by the court 
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County 
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, s substitution of trustee. From 
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority 
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, 
devisees, adminstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and 
several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured 
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public 
record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other 
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor. Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless 
brought by Trustee. 
20. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah 
21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale 
hereunder be mailed to him at the addreas hereinbefore set forth. 
Signature of Trustor 
MICHAEL R. MnCOT 
(If Trustor an Individual) 
STATE OF UTAH, 
COUNTY OF&imdt »• 
On the Wtfc day of Jiarch
 t ^.D. 19...*?., personally 
appeared before me &KENE. . LOMS..TO..^ChA^. R,..rtoQDK 
the signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that .^ .he..Y. executed the 
same. 
Notary Public residing at: 
My C o m m o n Exp.res:
 SQ1Z ^ ^ ^ ^ r j t a h 
(If Trustor a Corporation) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
On the day of
 t A . D . 19 , personally 
appeared before me
 t who being by me duly sworn, 
says that he is the of 
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authonty of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors) and said acknowledged 
to me that said corporation executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public residing at: 
REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE 
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full) 
TO: TRUSTEE. 
The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness securea 
by the within Trust Deed. Said note, together with all other indebtedness secured by said Trust 
Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby requested and directed, on payment 
to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel said note above 
mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed delivered to you 
herewith, together with the said Trust Deed, and to reconvey, without warranty, to the parties 
designated by the terms of said Trust Deed, all the estate now held by you thereunder. 
Dated 19 
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W A R R A N T Y D E E D 
MICHAEL R MC COY and EUGENE E. DOMS , grantors 
of Salt Lake ,State of Utah, 
hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC. 
of Salt Lake , County of Salt Lake 
for the sum of TEN 
• grantee 
,State of Utah, 
DOLLARS , 
the following described tract of land in Summit County, State of Utah, 
to-vit: 
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, 
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in 
the office of the-Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City 
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting 
therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights of way 
as described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 
817C in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 
326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit 
County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, 
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in 
the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described in 
those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at 
Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry No. 
13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah. 
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water 
lines over the Southerly Five feet and Northerly five feet of the 
following described lots. 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey 
according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder. 
of said grantor 
of 
th i s ^ P d a y of £ w - v , 1 9 * ^ 
JOCK dlOMtCJO 
^49£? 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) S3. 
County of "5 • C • ) . 
On the *2o dayt of. &**"£*"*?' + . y ;^**** . 7 . 
p e r s o n a l l y appeared before'me ^^Z^^C^^r^^ +* ^v^k—A* fav^T^jXi''1 
the s i g n e r * .pf. the above, instrument, s*foo duly acknqwie4§ed tg nte"'Oy. 
that vheVA executed the same. / J^—-N. * . * < * ' " . ' ' ': . 
* * ^ ••/;•"•. - """•' 0'-/"/ 




STATE OF UTAH ) 
County cf Summit ) 
I. Aten Spr'rgg3. County Reoordor in and kx Summit County. State of Utah, 
do btfieby certify thai the attachod aforegoing « a fuB, truo and con-ect copy 
of ilial certain 2 ^ ^ * ^ J £ T Aj>U^^ 
which anpoars of record in my office In Book ^ 7 ^ . Page J>S"<3~~ 
beJng Cntry No. ^ ^-//^ £ J>-
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. I have hereunto cM my hand and affixed my 
official 53a!. this / ^ A t e y of U^^yc^^^/fff 
Sum.n.l CocrMyHecofdoc (J 
ADDENDUM 5 
CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION 
OF 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC. 
/ , DA VIDS.MONSON. Lieutenant Governor of theState of Utah, hereby 
certify that duplicate originals of Articles of Incorporation for the 
incorporation of 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES , I N C . 
duly signed and verified pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Business 
Corporation Act% have been received in my office and are found to conform 
to law. 
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the authority vested in me by law. I hereby 
issue this Certificate of Incorporation of 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC. 
and attach hereto a duplicate original of the Articles of Incorporation. 
FILE # 0 9 5 1 5 6 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF. I have hereunto 
set my hand and affixed the Great Seal of the 
Slate of Utah, at Salt Lake City. fAw?.?*!? day 
of October _ jg 81 
I.IKl ThMVT <;<>\ KKVIM 
D in lh#e offtce of the lieulenan? Gy>yr\or 
' Slate ofJUtah»n the . 
'
 A 0 1 9
-4^-- ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION 
S^  MONSON 
ovemor 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISER, INC. 
Fees >y _ t /# •" t o 
CO 
c 
We, the undersigned, being natural persons of the 
age of 21 years or more, desiring to form a corporation pur-
suant to the provisions of the Utah Business Corporation A&t 
and the acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto, S§o 
hereby sign the following articles and certify that: 
FIRST: The name of the corporation (hereinafter 
called the corporation) is DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC. 
SECOND: The period of duration of the corporation 
is perpetual. 
THIRD: The purposes for which the corporation is 
formed are as follows: 
Real estate development and property management. 
To manufacture, process, purchase, sell and 
generally to trade and deal in and with goods, 
wares and merchandise of every kind, nature and 
description, and to engage and participate in any 
mercantile, industrial or trading business of any 
kind or character whatsoever. 
To apply for, register, obtain, purchase, 
lease, take licenses in respect of or otherwise 
acguire, and to hold, own, use, operate, devel-
op, enjoy, turn to account, grant licenses and 
immunities in respect of, manufacture under and 
to introduce, sell, assign, mortgage, pledge or 
otherwise dispose of, and, in any manner deal 
with and contract with reference to: 
(a) inventions, devices, formulae, 
processes and any improvements and modi-
fications thereof; 
(b) letters patent, patent rights, 
patented processes, copyrights, designs 
and similar rights, trade-marks, trade 
symbols and other indications of origin 
and ownership granted by or recognized 
under the laws of the United States of 
America or„jpf any state or subdivision 
thereof/ or of any foreign country or sub-
division thereof# and all rights connected 
therewith or appertaining thereunto; 
(c) franchises/ licenses/ grants 
and concessions. 
To make# enter into# perform and carry out 
contracts of every kind and description with any 
person, firm# association/ corporation or gov-
ernment or subdivision thereof* 
To acquire by purchase/ exchange or other-
wise, all/ or any part of# or any interest in# 
the properties/ assets, business and good will 
of any one or more persons/ firms# associations 
or corporations heretofore or hereafter engaged 
in any business for which a corporation may now 
or hereafter be organized under the Utah Busi-
ness Corporation Act; to pay for the same in 
cash/ property or its own or other securities; 
to hold/ operate/ reorganize, liquidate, sell 
or in any manner dispose of the whole or any 
part thereof; and in connection therewith, to 
assume or guarantee performance of any liabil-
ities, obligations or contracts of such persons, 
firms, associations or corporations, and to con-
duct the whole or any part of any business thus 
acquired* 
To the extent permitted to corporations or-
ganized under the Utah Business Corporation Act, 
to organize or cause to be organized under the 
lews of the State of Utah, or of any other State 
of the United States of America, or of the District 
of Columbia, or of any territory, dependency, col-
ony or possession of the United States of America, 
or of any foreign country, a corporation or corpo-
rations for the purpose of transacting, promoting 
or carrying on any or all of the objects or pur-
poses for which the corporation is organized, and 
to dissolve, wind up, liquidate, merge or consol-
idate any such corporation or corporations or to 
cause the same to be dissolved, wound up, liqui-
dated, merged or consolidated. 
To such extent as a corporation organized 
under the Utah Business Corporation Act may 
now or hereafter lawfully do, to dof either 
as principal/ agent/ and in any other lawful 
capacity/ and either alone or in connection 
with other corporations, firms or individuals, 
all and everything necessary, suitable, con-
venient or proper for, or in connection with, 
or incident to, the accomplishment of any of 
the purposes or the attainment of any one or 
more of the objects herein enumerated, or de-
signed directly or indirectly to promote the 
interests of the corporation or to enhance the 
value of its properties; and in general to do 
any and all things and exercise any and all 
powers, rights and privileges which a corpora-
tion may now or hereafter be organized to do 
or to exercise under the Utah Business Corpora-
tion Act or under any act amendatory thereof, 
supplemental thereto or substituted therefor. 
To have all other powers granted to cor-
porations organized .pursuant to the Utah Busi-
ness Corporation Act. 
The foregoing provisions of this Article THIRD shall 
be construed both as purposes and powers and each as an inde-
pendent purpose and power. The foregoing enumeration of spe-
cific purposes and powers shall not be held to limit or re-
strict in any manner the purposes and powers of the corpora-
tion, and the purposes and powers herein specified shall, ex-
cept when otherwise provided in this Article THIRD, be in no 
wise limited or restricted by reference to, or inference from, 
the terms of any provision of this or any other Article of 
these Articles of Incorporation; provided, that nothing here-
in contained shall be construed as authorizing the corporation 
to engage in any enterprise, business, pursuit, or occupation 
prohibited to corporations organized under the Utah Business 
Corporation Act; and provided, further, that the corporation 
shall not carry on any business or exercise any power in any 
state, territory or country which under the laws thereof the 
corporation may not lawfully carry on or exercise. 
FOURTH: The aggregate number of shares which the 
corporation shall have authority to issue is Fifty Thousand 
(50,000), all of which are without par value and are of the 
same class and are to be Common shares. Any and all shares 
without par value may be issued for such consideration 
expressed in dollars as may be fixed from time to time by the 
Board of Directors. 
FIFTH; The corporation will not commence business 
until consideration of the value of at least one thousand 
dollars has been received for the issuance of its shares. 
SIXTH: Each share of the corporation shall entitle 
the holder thereof to a preemptive right, for a period of 
thirty days, to subscribe for, purchase, or otherwise acquire 
any shares of the same class of the corporation or any equity 
and/or voting shares of any class of the corporation which 
the corporation proposes to issue or any rights or options 
which the corporation proposes to grant for the purchase of 
shares of the same class of the corporation or of equity 
and/or voting shares of any class of the corporation or for 
the purchase of any shares, bonds, securities, or obligations 
of the corporation which are convertible into or exchangeable 
for, or which carry any rights, to subscribe for, purchase, or 
otherwise acquire shares of the same class of the corporation 
or equity and/or voting shares of any class of the corporation, 
whether now or hereafter authorized or created, whether having 
unissued or treasury status, and whether the proposed issue, 
reissue, transfer, or grant is for cash, property, or any other 
lawful consideration; and after the expiration of said thirty 
days# any and all of such shares, rights, options, bonds, se-
curities or obligations of the corporation may be issued, re-
issued, transferred, or granted by the Board of Directors, as 
the case may be, to such persons, firms, corporations and as-
sociations, and for such lawful consideration, and on such 
terms, as the Board of Directors in its discretion may de-
termine. As used herein, the terms "equity shares" and "vo-
ting shares" shall mean, respectively, shares which confer 
unlimited dividend rights and shares which confer unlimited 
voting rights in the election of one or more directors. 
SEVENTH; At a meeting expressly called for the pur-
pose, the entire Board of Directors or any individual director 
may be removed from office with or without cause by a vote of 
shareholders holding a majority of the outstanding shares, en-
titled to vote at an election of directors. If any or all di-
rectors are so removed, new directors may be elected at the 
same meeting. 
Shareholders entitled to vote for the election of 
directors shall not be entitled to cumulative voting. 
The Board of Directors, by resolution adopted by a 
majority of the number of directors fixed by the By-Laws, may 
designate two or more directors to constitute a committee or 
committees, which committee or committees, to the extent pro-
vided in such resolution shall have and may exercise all of 
the authority of the Board of Directors in the management of 
the corporation. 
In lieu of setting forth provisions in these Articles 
of Incorporation in respect of restrictions on the transfer of 
shares of the corporation, such provisions may be set forth in 
the By-Laws of the corporation or in a written agreement or 
written agreements of the parties involved. 
The Board of Directors may mortgage or pledge all or 
any part of the property of the corporation; and, in such event, 
the mortgage or pledge of all or substantially all of the prop-
erty or assets of the corporation, with or without good will, 
shall be deemed to be made in the usual and regular course of 
business of the corporation. 
E7GHTH; The address of the initial registered office 
of the corporation in the State of Utah is #10 Exchange Place, 
Suite 1000, Salt Lake City 84111; and the name of the initial 
registered agent of the corporation in Utah at such address is 
Jerry Kinghorn. 
NINTH; The number of directors constituting the 
initial Board of Directors of the corporation is four* 
Thereafter, the number of directors from time to time shall 
be such as shall be fixed in the By-Laws; provided, however, 
that such number shall never be less than the minimum number 
prescribed by the Utah Business Corporation Act. 
The name and the address of each of the persons who 
are to serve as directors of the corporation until the first 
annual meeting of shareholders or until their successors be 
elected and qualify are: 
NAMES ADDRESSES 
P.O. Box 3614 
Mission Viejo, California 92690 
Eugene E. Doms 
Monica Doms 
Michael R. Mccoy 
Marguerite Mccoy 
TENTH; The name and the address of each incorporator 
ADDRESSES 
P.O. Box 3614 
Mission Viejo, California 92690 
12650 Meadowlark Avenue 
Granada Hills, California 91344 
12650 Meadowlark Avenue 
Granada Hills, California 91344 
are: 
NAMES 
Desolee V. Ocampo 
Marion R. Diamond 
5225 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1000 
Los Angeles, California 90036 
5225 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1000 
Los Angeles, California 90036 
Mary Hamboyan 5225 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1000 
Los Angeles, California 90036 
ELEVENTH: From time to time any of the provisions of 
these Articles of Incorporation may be amended, altered or re-
pealed, and other provisions authorized by the laws of the State 
of Utah at the time in force may be added or inserted in the 
manner and at the time prescribed by said laws, and all rights 
at any time conferred upon the shareholders of the corporation 
by these Articles of Incorporation are granted subject to the 
provisions of this Article ELEVENTH. 
Signed in duplicate on October 14, 1981. 
Desolee V. Oqampo, Incorporator 
Marion R. Diamond, Incorporator 
Mary Haihboyan, Incorporator 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
) SS.: 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ) 
I, EMILY PRIOR, a Notary Public for California 
hereby certify that on the 14th day of October, 1981, 
personally appeared before me DESOLEE V. OCAMPO, MARION 
R. DIAMOND, MARY HAMBOYAN who being by roe first duly sworn, 
severally declared that they are the persons who signed the 
foregoing document as incorporators, and that the statements 
therein contained are true. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand 
and seal this 14th day of October, A.D. 1981. 
OFFICIAL SEAL 
EMILY PRIOR 
NOTARY PUBLIC — CALIFORNIA 
PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN 
LOS ANCEL£S COUNTY 
My Commission Expires September 18, 1984 
^ W V ^ ^ ^ N ^ f i / w ^ ^ i w » y < w » y y » y y y ^ 
ublic 
My commission expires 
ADDENDUM 6 
WAIVER OF NOTICE AND CONSENT TO HOLDING 
OF FIRST MEETING OF DIRECTORS OF 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC. 
A California Corporation 
We, the undersigned, being all of the Initial Directors 
named in the Articles of Incorporation of the above named 
corporation and desiring to hold the first meeting of the 
Board of Directors of said Corporation for the purpose of 
completing the organization of its affairs, DO HEREBY waive 
notice and consent to the holding of said meeting at 12650 
Meadowlark Ave., Granada Hills, California 91344 on the 5th 
day of November, 1981 at Ten O'clock A.M. 
Said meeting shall be held for the purpose of adopting 
bylaws, electing officers, adopting a form of corporate seal 
and share certificate, selecting an accounting year, issuing 
stock, and transacting such other business as maybe brought 
before said meeting. Any business transacted at said 
meeting shall be as valid and legal and of the same force 
and effect as though said meeting were held after notice 
duly given. 
WITNESS our signatures this 5th day of November, 1981. 
MONICA DOMS 
MARGUERITE MCCOY $ 
MINUTES OF FIRST MEETING OF 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC. 
A Utah Corporation 
The undersigned, being the Incorporator(s) named in the 
Articles of Incorporation of the above-named Utah 
Corporation duly formed by filing of said Articles of 
Incorporation in the office of the Utah Lieutenant Governor 
on the 30th day of October, 1981, and desiring to hold the 
first organizational meeting for the purpose of completing 
the organization of its affairs, held such meeting at 
12650 Meadowlark Ave., Granada Hills, CA 91344 
on the 5th day of November, 1981, at Ten Ofclock A.M. of 
said day. 
Present at this meeting were: MICHAEL R. MCCOY, EUGENE 
E. DOMS, MARGUERITE MCCOY and MONICA DOMS being the initial 
Directors named in the Articles of Incorporation. 
On motion and by unanimous vote, MICHAEL R. MCCOY was 
elected temporary Chairman, and EUGENE E. DOMS was elected 
temporary Secretary of the meeting. 
WAIVER OF NOTICE 
The Chairman announced that the meeting was held 
pursuant to written waiver of notice and consent signed by 
the Incorporator(s) of the corporation named as such in the 
Articles of Incorporation such waiver and consent was 
presented to the meeting and upon motion duly made, seconded 
and unanimously carried, was made a part of this meeting in 
the Book of Minutes of the corporation. 
FILING OF ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION 
The Chairman stated that the original articles of 
incorporation of the corporation had been filed in the 
office of the Utah Lieutenant Governor on October 30, 1981. 
He presented to the meeting a certified copy of said 
articles of incorporation showing filings in the Book of 
Minutes of the Corporation. 
BY-LAWS 
The matter of the adoption of By-laws for the 
regulation of the affairs of the corporation was next 
considered. The temporary secretary presented to the 
meeting a form of By-laws which were duly considered and 
discussed. On motion duly made and unanimously carried, 
following resolutions were adopted: 
the 
RESOLVED: That the By-laws presented to this meeting 
and discussed thereat be, and the same hereby are, 
adopted as and for By-laws of this corporation. 
RESOLVED FURTHER: That the temporary secretary of 
this corporation be and hereby is authorized and 
directed to execute a certificate of the adoption of 
said by-laws and to insert said By-laws as so certified 
in the Book of Minutes of this corporation, and to see 
that a copy of said By-laws, similarly certified, is 
kept at the principal office for the transaction of 
business of this corporation. 
ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 
The temporary Chairman stated that the number of Directors 
required by the BY-LAWS adopted by the Corporation had been 
named in the Articles of Incorporation and advised that these 
individuals become the initial Directors for the first fiscal 
year of the Corporation or until their successors are elected 
and qualify. 
RESOLVED: That MICHAEL R. MCCOY, EUGENE E. DOMS, MONICA 
DOMS and MARGUERITE MCCOY, continue as Directors for 
the first fiscal year of the Corporation or until their 
successors are elected and qualify. 
ELECTION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS 
The meeting then proceeded to the election of a 
President, a Secretary, and a chief Financial Officer. The 
following were duly elected to the offices indicated after 





MICHAEL R. MCCOY, salary unknown 
EUGENE E. DOMS, salary unknown 
EUGENE E. DMOS, salary unknown 
- 2 -
Each officer so elected being present accepted his office, 
and thereafter the President presided at the meeting as 
Chairman and the Secretary acted as Secreatry of the 
meeting. 
ADOPTION OF SHARE CERTIFICATE 
The secretary presented to the meeting a proposed form 
of share certificate for use by the corporation. On motion 
duly made seconded, and unanimously carried, said form of 
share certificate was approved and adopted and the Secretary 
was instructed to insert a copy thereof in the Book of 
Minutes immediately following the minutes of the meeting. 
PAYMENT OF CORPORATION EXPENSES 
In order to provide for the payment of the expenses of 
incorporation and organization of the corporation, on motion 
duly made, seconded, and unanimously carried, the following 
resolution was adopted: 
RESOLVED: that the President and the Chief Financial 
Officer of this corporation be, and they hereby are, 
authorized and directed to pay the expenses of the 
incorporation and organization of this corporation. 
LOCATION OF PRINCIPAL OFFICE 
After some discussion, the location of the principal 
office of the corporation was fixed pursuant to the 
following resolution unanimously adopted, upon motion duly 
made and seconded: 
RESOLVED: That 12650 Meadow lark Ave., City of Granada 
Hills, County of Los Angeles, State of California, be 
and the same hereby is, designated and fixed as the 
location of the principal office for the transcation of 
business of this corporation, until changed by 
subsequent resolution of the Board of Directors. 
ACCOUNTING YEAR 
The Chairman suggested that the meeting consider the 
adoption of an accounting year, either fiscal or calendar, 
On motion duly made, seconded and unanimously carried, the 
following resolution was adopted: 
RESOLVED: That this Corporation adopt an accounting 
year as follows: 
- 3 -
DATE ACCOUNTING YEAR BEGINS: November 1st 
DATE ACCOUNTING YEAR ENDS: October 31st 
OFFICERS AUTHORIZED TO CONTRACT 
To authorize the officers to contract and obligate the 
corporation, in the ordinary course of business, the 
following resolution was, upon motion duly made, seconded 
and carried, adopted: 
RESOLVES: That the following officers be, and the same 
hereby are authorized to sign contracts and obligations 
on behalf of the corporation: 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY, President 
EUGENE E. DOMS, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary 
ISSUANCE OF SHARES UNDER A CLOSE CORPORATION EXEMPTION 
The Chairman announced that resolution concerning the 
issuance of corporate stock would be considered next* He 
advised the Board that the issuance of shares must be 
qualified by permit unless an exemption is available, A 
"close" corporation exemption has been provided by Section 
5102 (h) of the California Corporations Code. In order for 
he issuance to qualify for this exemption, an opinion of 
^ounsel must be forwarded to the Commissioner's office. In 
order to obtain such an opinion, counsel must be satisfied 
that certain facts are found to exist and certain conditions 
are imposed on the issuance. 
After some discussion, it was deemed to be in the best 
interests of the corporation to utilize said exemption and 
upon motion duly made, seconded and carried, it was 
RESOLVED: That immediately after the sale and 
issuance of the shares hereinafter proposed to be 
issued, the issuer will have only one class of stock 
outstanding, which will be owned beneficially by no 
more than ten persons, and all of the certificates 
evidencing such stock will contain the legend required 
by Section 260.102.6 of the California Administrative 
Code. 
RESOLVED FURTHER: That the offer and sale of this 
stock will not be accompanied by the publication of any 
advertisement, that no selling expenses will be given, 
paid or incurred in connection therewith, and that no 
promotional consideration will be given, paid or 





RESOLVED FURTHER: That the consideration received or 
to be received by the issuer for the stock to be issued 
consisted or will consist of one of the kinds described 
in Section 25102(h) which is described as shown on the 
page next following. 
RESOLVED FURTHER: That prior to the issuance of said 
shares, the secretary shall first obtain an opinion of 
counsel that the issuance is qualified for the 
exemption provided for by Section 25102(h) and that the 
opinion has been executed and either filed or mailed to 
the Commissioner^ Office for filing, with proper 
affidavit of service by mail retained by counsel and 
supplied to the issuer within ten (10) business days 
after receipt by issuer of the consideration paid for 
the securities being issued, 
RESOLVED FURTHER: That upon receipt of the 
consideration described herein, if not already 
received, the President and Secretary of this 
corporation shall issue the following described shares 
to the following named persons for the consideration 
described herein: 
NAME NUMBER OF SHARES CONSIDERATION 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY AND 
MARGUERITE MCCOY 10,000 $75,000,00 
EUGENE E. DOMS AND 
MONICA DomS 10,000 $75,000.00 
ISSUANCE OF SHARE UNDER INTERNAL REVENUE SECTION 1244 
The following plan is hereby adopted to control and 
regulate the issuance of the shares of capital stock of the 
above named corporation. It is the purpose of this plan to 
qualify the stock issued hereunder under Section 1244 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. 
1. Qualification as a Small Business Corporation 
(a) The amount of stock proposed to be issued 
under this plan plus the aggregate of money 
and other property received by the 
corporation for its stock as a contribution 
to capital and as a paid-in surplus does not 
exceed $500,000; and 
(b) The equity capital of the corporation, 
including the aggregate amount which may be 
offered under this plan does not exceed 
$1,000,000; and 
- 5 -
(c) The corporation has not heretofore received 
any gross receipts from any sources, and 
contemplates that in the future more than 50% 
of its aggregate gross receipts will be from 
sources other than royalties, rents, 
dividends, interest, annuities, and sales or 
exchanges of stocks or securities. 
(d) This plan is adopted before and 
contemporaneously with the investment of 
funds and attainment of shareholders* status 
by the investors. 
2. Plan 
(a) Stock shall be issued only pursuant to this 
plan and shall be issued for the same price 
per share and only for money or cancellation 
of indebtedness or other property (other than 
stock or securities) as provided in Internal 
Revenue Code Section 1244. 
(b) The aggregate amount of stock which may be 
offered under this plan is as follows: 
NUMBER OF SHARES PRICE PER SHARE TOTAL 
20,000 $7.50 $150,000.00 
(c) Such stock shall be offered for a period 
ending not later than two years after the 
date which this plan is adopted or within 
such other period as may be provided in 
Section 1244 by amendment thereto. 




There being no further business to come before the 
meeting, upon motion duly made, seconded and unanimously 





STATE OF UTAH 
;: DEPOSITIOI 
i EXHIBIT' 
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COM-
MERCIAL CODE CERTIFIES THAT according to the records of t h i s o f f i c e , A r t i c l es 
of Incorporation were f i led with t h i s office on October 30, 1981 for D0MCOY 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah corporation. Said corporation was INVOLUNTARILY DISSOLVED 
on December 51, 1986 for fa i lu re to f i l e an Annual Report, 
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Page RfJKMlT COlMT ktCORDER 
rry R. Ke l l e r , 257 faffl S f ^ \ \<\ 
10, Sal t Lake Ci ty , UT 84T11 
W A R R A N T Y D E E D 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC. grantor 
of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby 
CONVEYS and WARRANTS to 
EUGENE E. DOMS grantee 
of Mission Vie^o, California for the sum of 
TEN and 00/100 DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Summit County, 
State of Utah: 
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, 
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record 
in the office of the Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City 
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting 
therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights of 
way as described in those certain documents recorded as Entry 
No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at 
Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records 
of Summit County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, 
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record 
in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting there-
from any portion located within the railroad rights of way as 
described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 
8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 
326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of 
Summit County, Utah. 
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water 
lines over the Southerly Five feet and Northerly five feet of the 
following described lots: 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey 
according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in 
the office of the Summit County recorder. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor, thisi*_ day of A^2^L_' 1988. 
Signed in the presence of: 
Jean M Henry 
Mission Viejo National_Bank_ 
Mission Viejo, CA 92691 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a 
Corporation by/* p 
i/lh^&zL--
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
) SS . 
COUNTY OF ORANGE ) 
EU6ENE>£. DOMS", Secretary/ 
Treasurer and Authorized Officer 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 26th 
day of August , 19_88, by ?^ er^ _E_^ >oms_ 
Secretary/Treasurer and Authorized Officer of Domcoy Enterprises, 
I n c . omrui ttAi 
JEAN M HENRY 
NOTART PUBLIC-CAL FORNA 
ORANGE COUNT* 
My Comm £i P ^ 27 199? 
(*, /// 2^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC Jean M W r y 
My Commission E x p i r e s 4-27-92 R e s i d i n g in 2ltT3---(iuJi}XlSJi. 
100' .. 491.x4G6 F 
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ADDENDA ITEM # 9 
EXTRACT OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON APRIL 17, 1990. 





We want to make a motion that the defendant elect his remedy at this 
time, whether he is going after rescission or after damages. And I think 
that he has an obligation to make that election. 
I thought that election was made. You're going to rescind, are you not. 
We are, your Honor, we have three causes of action on our second 
amended complaint we are also alleging fraud and breach of contract. I 
don't think it is required that we elect our remedy before the trial starts. 
Our position is that rescission is an appropriate remedy. However, should 
the court determine that rescission is not an appropriate remedy, then we 




Well, I have no problem with that. 
Thank you. 
This is a bench trial. I'll give you an opportunity to put on your case and 
then I'll make a determination. 
EXTRACT OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON APRIL 21, 1990 
ELECTION OF REMEDIES 
PAGE 007759 
The Court: You can't have it both ways, you want a rescission and you want in the 
alternative. On the other hand, you want this court to proceed on 
damages and on the other hand, I ruled against you so you want it both 
ways. You can't have it both ways. 
ADDENDUM 10 
ADDENDA ITEM #10 
EXTRACT OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON APRIL 17, 1990. 





We want to make a motion that the defendant elect his remedy at this 
time, whether he is going after rescission or after damages. And I think 
that he has an obligation to make that election. 
I thought that election was made. You're going to rescind, are you not. 
We are, your Honor, we have three causes of action on our second 
amended complaint we are also alleging fraud and breach of contract. I 
don't think it is required that we elect our remedy before the trial starts. 
Our position is that rescission is an appropriate remedy. However, should 
the court determine that rescission is not an appropriate remedy, then we 




Well, I have no problem with that. 
Thank you. 
This is a bench trial. I'll give you an opportunity to put on your case and 
then I'll make a determination. 
EXTRACT OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON APRIL 21, 1990 
ELECTION OF REMEDIES 
PAGE 007759 
The Court: You can't have it both ways, you want a rescission and you want in the 
alternative. On the other hand, you want this court to proceed on 
damages and on the other hand, I ruled against you so you want it both 
ways. You can't have it both ways. 
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ANDERSON PIECE OF PROPERTY; IS THAT RIGHT? 
THE WITNESS: YES. WE DID NOT HAVE A FORMAL 
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT. 
THE COURT: BUT HE WAS YOUR PARTNER? 
THE WITNESS: YES. 
Q. (BY MR. KELLER) AND NOW, MR. DOMS, LET ME 
JUST CLARIFY THIS, IF I MAY. THIS DEED WAS ISSUED TO 
MR. AND MRS. MCCOY AS TENANTS IN COMMON, IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. WHICH MEANS EACH OF YOU OWNED 50 PERCENT OF 
THE PROPERTY, IS THAT--
MR. BIELE: OBJECTION TO THE LEGAL 
CHARACTERIZATION OF IT. IT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF AND THIS 
COURT CAN INTERPRET THAT--
i THE COURT: THE CRITICAL ISSUE IS THAT THEY 
' WERE PARTNERS AT THE TIME. THEY PUT THIS TRANSACTION 
t TOGETHER, SO HE IS BOUND BY THE ACTS OF HIS PARTNER. 
) MR. KELLER: YOUR HONOR, I DISAGREE WITH 
) THAT. 
L THE COURT: HE JUST TESTIFIED TO THAT. 
2 MR. KELLER: WELL, WHAT WE WISH TO ARGUE TO 
3 YOU, YOUR HONOR, IS THAT THEY MAY HAVE BEEN GENERAL 
4 PARTNERS IN THE ACQUISITION OF THIS PROPERTY, BUT 
5 PARTNERS ARE NOT AUTOMATICALLY BOUND BY THE OTHER 
007328 538 
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ADDENDA # 1 2 
PKVISKO STAVUTK," ul | i ' | / " l l " l l 
TITLE 
H K i i i W . 
- ^ ^ F i ' L 
25, 
A . o, 
GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
1114. Defined. In all counties of this state, all roads, streets, alleys, 
lanes, courts, places, trails, and bridges laid out or erected as such by the public 
or dedicated or abandoned to the public, or made such in actions for the partition 
of real property, "are public highways. [C. L. §§ 2065-9*. 
Cal. Pol. C. 12618*. Mont. Pol. C. { 2600*. for highways, the court is Dot prepared to say that 
Dedication of street*, etc., I 2014. Highways de- an acceptance may not be inferred under some 
lined, } 2498. circumstances from the action and use of the public 
There being in Utah territory no statute requir* generally, without any action of the body charged 
ing any formal acceptance by officers or agent* in with the repair of public roads. Wilson v. Hull, 7 
charge of public roads, of land dedicated by owners U. 90; 24 P. 799. 
1115. W h e n deemed dedica ted . A highway shall be deemed to have 
been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continu-
ously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years,- [C. L. § 2066*. 
The exteDt of the dedication is determined by highway is a part Burrows v. Guest, 5 l \ 91; 11 
all the circumstances, not only by the part actually P. 847. Wilson T. Hull, 7 U. 90; 24 P. 799. White-
used, but also the width of the highways in the sides v. Green, 13 U. 341; 44 P. 1032. 
vicinity and of the system of which the particular 
1116. C o n t i n u e un t i l abandoned . All highways once established must 
continue to be highways until abandoned by order of the board of county com-
missioners of the county in which they are situated, by operation of lawlwor by judgment of a court jof^competent jurisdiction; 0 r t * * i r f , ^ ^ l * T g j ^ 
vojrigd f c ^ V p ^ c ^ l ^ l l v e y e a r s c e a ^ 1 ? r f ^ l i i g h w B y % .[C. i T | 2070*. 
Cal. Pol. C. { 2619*. Mont. Pol. C. { 2601*. ' 
1117. W i d t h of p u b l i c and p r i v a t e w a v s . The width of" all public 
highways, except bridges, alleys, lanes, and trails, shall be at least sixty-six feet. 
The width of all private highways and by-roads, except bridges, shall be at least 
twenty feet; provided, that nothing in this title shall be so construed as to increase 
or diminish the width of eitlier kind of highway already established or used as 
such. 
Cal. Pol. C. | 2630*. Mont, Pol. C. J 2802*. 
1118. Fo r fe i tu re of franchise. i > *• mse 01 au\ .««i.. 
bridge, trail, turnpike, or of any plank or < riiad has expired by 
limitation, forfeiture, or non-user, the san " id 
no claim shall be valid against the pub or 
material comprising such bridge, trail, turnpike. j.iar.K ur *<K:CII roa*. L 
§ 2069*. 
Cal. Pol. C. 2 2619*. 
1119. L i m i t e d h i g h w a y s . Where roads or streets are laid out tin ought 
improved lands, and such lands are not protected by fences along the lines of the 
roads or streets passing through them, such roads or streets may, by the board of 
county commissioners of the county, be declared to be limited highways. A 
HIGHWAYS—GENERAL PROVISIONS. 319 
notice to that effect shall be posted at each end of such limited highways, and 
any person who shall wilfully drive any bands or herds of cattle, horses, sheep, 
or hogs over such roads or streets other than during the time that the abutting 
lands are thrown open to the public by the owners thereof for grazing purposes, 
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. [C. L. § 2067. 
1120. Public and private rights in h ighways . By taking or accept-
ing land for a highway, the public acquires only the right of way and incidents 
necessary to enjoying and maintaining it. A transfer of land bounded by a 
highway passes the title of the person whose estate is transferred, to the center 
of the highway, [C. L. § 2071. 
Gal. Pol. C. } 2631*; Mont. Pol. C. g 2G20":. continue to make any use thereof not incompatible 
The easement-acquired by the public in n public *ith the public easement. Whitesides v. Green, 
highway vest* in it the mere right of passage, aDd 13 U. 341; 44 P. 1032. 
does not divest the owner of the fee, and he may 
1121. H i g h w a y s in cit ies and towns. Where public highways extend 
through any incorporated town or city they shall conform to the direction and 
grade and be subject to all regulations of other street4* in such town or citv. [C. 
L. § 2082*. 
1122. P lats of h i g h w a y s to be filed. It shall be the duty of the 
board of county commissioners in each county immediately to determine all 
public highways existing in its county, and to prepare in duplicate, plats and 
specific descriptions of the same and of such other highways as such board may 
from time to rime locate upon public lands, one copy of which shall be kept on 
file in the office of the county clerk, and the other, said board shall cause to 
be filed in the office of the state board of land commissioners. 
Duty of county surveyor as to highways, etc., ty 639, 644. 
1123. Reservat ion of h i g h w a y s from state patents . Whenever the 
state shall issue its patent for any lands, the same shall be made subject to 
the easement or nght of the public to use all such highways as are described on the 
plate and descriptions filed in pursuance of the last preceding section; and in 
each ca>e the patent shall, as far as possible, contain a specific and detailed res-
ervation of such highways for public use. 
1124. U. S. Patents . H igh w ays . Claim for damages . Whenever 
any person shall aoquire title from the United States to any land in this state 
over which there shall at such time extend any public highway that shall not 
theretofore have been duly platted, and that shall not have been continuously 
used as such for a perux} of ten ye^rs theretofore, he shall, within three months 
after receipt of his patent, assert his claim in writing for damages to the board of 
county com mission ei*s of the county in >\hich the land is situated; and said 
board shall have an additional period of three months in which to begin proceed-
ings to condemn the land according to law. Such highway shall continue open 
as a public highway during said periods; but in case no action is begun within 
the period above stated by the board of county commissioners, said highway 
shall be deemed to be abandoned by the public. In case of a failure by such 
person so acquiring title to public lands to assert his claim for damages as afore-
said, for three months from the time he shall have received a patent to such 
lands, he shall thereafter be barred from asserting or recovering any damages by 
reason of such public highway, and the same shall remain open. 
X. Dak. (1895) I 1078*. See R. S. of U. S. J 2477. 
1125. S i d e w a l k s on h i g h w a y s . Any owner or occupant of land may 
construct a sidewalk on the highway along the line of his land, subject, however, 
to such regulations as may be prescribed by the board of county commissioners. 
Any person driving or riding on such sidewalk with horse or team without per-
mission of the owner of such sidewalk, is liable to such owner for all damage he 
may suffer thereby. [C. L. § 20SO*. 
Cal. Pol. C. § 2632* Mont Pol. C. \ 2621*. 
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1 HAVING BEEN USED AS A PUBLIC ROAD? 
2 A. I DON'T BELIEVE IT EVER WAS. 
3 Q. ARE THERE ANY POWER LINES ON MCHENRY 
4 AVENUE? 
5 A. NO. 
6 Q. WITH RESPECT TO USING MCHENRY AVENUE AS A 
7 RIGHT-OF-WAY, HAVE YOU HAD ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE 
8 PARK CITY ENGINEER AS TO WHETHER IT COULD BE USED AS A 
9 RIGHT-OF-WAY AND PUBLIC STREET? 
10 A. I HAVE TALKED TO THE PARK CITY ENGINEER AND 
11 I-- WE BOTH BASICALLY AGREE BECAUSE OF THE CUT OF THE 
12 RAILROAD GRID, THE BANK COMES UP ABOUT 16 FEET RIGHT 
13 THERE, EVEN THOUGH IT'S DROPPING DOWN, THE 
14 CORRESPONDING GRADE WOULD BE ABOUT HERE ON THE MAP, YOU 
15 WOULD HAVE TO LITERALLY DIG THROUGH THIS PORTION BEFORE 
16 YOU DAYLIGHTED AND WERE ON THAT GRADE. SO HE AND I 
17 WOULD AGREE THAT THAT'S-- JUST BECAUSE THAT WAS WHERE 
18 THE MCHENRY RIGHT-OF-WAY WAS PLATTED, THAT IS NOT 
19 NECESSARILY THE BEST PLACE TOPOGRAPHICALLY SPEAKING TO 
20 BUILD A ROAD. 
21 Q. AND DID YOU AGREE THAT COULD BE UTILIZED 
22 ECONOMICALLY AS A PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY? 
23 MR. KELLER: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. TO THE 
24 EXTENT THAT THAT WITNESS HAS AN OPINION, OF COURSE, IS 







NEVER BEEN OFFICIALLY ABANDONED. 
KELLER: 
COURT: 
WE ADMIT THIS 
ADMISSION? 
MR. KELLER: 






SO WHAT IS YOUR ARGUMENT ABOUT 
? WHAT IS THE OBJECTION TO THE 
I DON'T SEE THAT IT'S RELEVANT 
IN THE LAWSUIT. WE'RE DIVIDING 
WHETHER MCHENRY AVENUE WAS ABANDONED 
AT THE TIME IS TOTALLY IMMATERIAL. 
THE COURT: BUT AT THE PRESENT TIME, 
MCHENRY AVENUE, IS THAT VESTED IN PARK 




THE COURT: IS IT VESTED IN DOMS AND MCCOY. 
MR. KELLER: NO. WHOEVER OWNS BLOCK 62, YOUR 
HONOR. 
MR. MCINTOSH: WE DON'T KNOW WHO IT'S VESTED 
IN. 
THE COURT: NO ONE KNOWS WHO IT'S VESTED IN. 
MR. BIELE: AND ONE HALF IS VESTED--
THE COURT: WAIT. WE HAVE TO FOLLOW THE--
MR. BIELE: MCHENRY DISAPPEARS AS A ROAD 
BECAUSE IT WASN'T USED FOR FIVE YEARS AND WAS PLATTED 
MORE THAN FIVE YEARS BEFORE THE 1911 MAP; THEREFORE, 
THE PROPERTY OWNERS ON THE ADJOINING SIDE TO THE MIDDLE 
OF MCHENRY— MR. DOMS OWNS ONE HALF INTEREST IN THIS 
008126 370 
PROPERTY AND WE-- I GUESS MR. DOMS OWNS MAYBE A 
LITTLE--
THE COURT: MORE INTEREST IN IT NOW. I DON'T 
KNOW. SO YOUR CLIENTS WARRANT HALF INTEREST OF MCHENRY 
TO THEIR GRANTEE; IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE TELLING ME? 
MR. BIELE: WE WARRANTED THE LOTS THAT WENT 
DOWN, WHICH TAKES ONE HALF--
THE COURT: MY QUESTION WAS, BASED-- WHAT 
YOU'RE TELLING ME IS THAT MCHENRY AVENUE HAS BEEN, FOR 
ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, VACATED; YOUR CLIENTS OWN HALF 
AND AT THE TIME THEY CONVEYED THE GROUNDS TO DOMS, 
DOMCOY, THEY GOT ONE HALF OF MCHENRY? 
MR. BIELE: YES. 
THE COURT: NOW, WHAT--
MR. KELLER: YOUR HONOR, THAT IS ABSOLUTELY 
NOT TRUE. MY CLIENTS DON'T HAVE ANY OF MCHENRY. OUR 
CLIENT'S PROPERTY BORDERS ON WHERE MCHENRY AVENUE WOULD 
BE AT THE PRESENT TIME, AND YOU CAN SEE FROM THE 
SURVEY, THE SURVEY IS RIGHT ALONG--
THE COURT: THAT'S WHAT I SAY. MCHENRY--
MR. KELLER: SO OUR CLIENTS DON'T GET ANY 
PORTION OF MCHENRY AVENUE, AND MR. DECKERT SUGGESTED 
THAT HE WOULD NEVER RECOMMEND A DEVELOPER TO BUILD ON 
THIS ROAD UNTIL SOMETHING IS DONE--




























MR. BIELE: IN ANSWER TO THE COURT'S 
QUESTION, NO, THE DEED THAT WE GAVE THEM DOESN'T SAY 
TOGETHER WITH A ONE HALF. 
THE COURT: FINE. THAT'S A L L -
MR. KELLER: I HEARD HIM SAY--
THE COURT: JUST A MINUTE NOW. 
MR. KELLER: — HE DEEDED HALF MCHENRY--
TBE COURT: NOW, MR. WALL. 
MR. WALL: YOU MAY RECALL, YOUR HONOR, THAT 
ADDRESSED THIS VERY BRIEFLY WHEN I REFERRED THE COURT 
TO THE CASE OF NORTH TEMPLE INVESTMENT COMPANY. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. WALL: AND IT WAS A CASE VERY MUCH ON 
POINT WITH THE ISSUE THAT WE'RE HERE DEALING WITH, A 
SITUATION WHY NORTH TEMPLE INVESTMENT COMPANY, WHO WAS 
MY CLIENT, ACQUIRED AN ENTIRE TRACT THAT HAD BEEN 
PLATTED. THE STREETS BAD NEVER BEEN DEVELOPED OR USED 
AND THE PLAT BORE A DATE VERY SIMILAR TO THE ONE WE'RE 
HERE DEALING WITH. SO THAT PRIOR TO 1911 THERE HAD 
BEEN FIVE YEARS OF NONUSE. THE CITY ATTEMPTED TO 
ASSERT A CLAIM TO THE ROADWAY WITHIN THAT SUBDIVISION, 
PLATTED BUT NOT DEVELOPED. 
TBE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. WALL: TBROUGH TBE COMPENSATION THAT WAS 




HAD NOT J 
THE LANDOWNER, NORTH TEMPLE, TOOK THE POSITION 
A MATTER OF LAW UPON THE FACT THAT THE STREETS 
BEEN DEVELOPED FOR FIVE YEARS PRIOR TO THE 1911 








FOR THE LOTS, BUT THE STREETS, ON THE THEORY j 
TITLE TO THE CENTER OF THE STREET VESTS IN ' 
LOT OWNERS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. WALL: NOW, THAT IS THE CONCEPT HERE AND 
WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE, GIVEN THE PLAT IN 
, IS THAT MCHENRY AVENUE BY OPERATION OF LAW, 
OF IT WENT TO THE ABUTTING-- WHOEVER THE OWNER 
TO BE OF LOT 57. CONSEQUENTLY, WHETHER IT WAS 
IN THE DEED OR NOT, IT INURES TO THE BENEFIT OF THAT 
OWNER, AND CONSEQUENTLY BY REASON OF THE FIVE YEARS OF 
NONUSE, MCHENRY DOES NOT EXIST, DID NOT EXIST AT THE 
TIME CRITICAL TO THIS CASE. 
HAS BEEN 
THE COURT: RIGHT. THE FACT REMAINS THERE 
NO JUDICIAL DETERMINATION TO THAT FACT. THERE 
IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO INDICATE THAT THE--
MR. WALL: THAT'S THE FINE POINT, YOUR HONOR, 
AND THE POINT I'M MAKING--
THE COURT: THAT'S GENERALLY WHAT HAPPENED IN 











YES, YOU DID. 
AND WHAT HAPPENED, HAPPENED. 
THAT'S TRUE. 
BUT THE FACT REMAINS HERE--
WELL-- IF I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING--
MR. 
OLD LAW AGAIN 
THE 
MR. 
BIELE: DID THE COURT WANT TO READ THE 
AT THIS TIME? 
COURT: 
WALL: 







I READ THAT. I READ THAT. 
I THINK THAT IS THE UNDISPUTED 
I THINK YOU'RE ON THE RIGHT TRACK. 
I DON'T QUESTION THAT. THAT'S 
'S WHAT HAPPENED-- BUT SOMEHOW OR 
REPRESENT A TITLE COMPANY. WOULD THEY 
INSURE THAT PIECE OF 
GRANTEES ARE NOW THE 
CLEAR? 
MR. WALL: 
OUT, THEY WOULD. 
THE COURT: 
PROPERTY SAYING THAT THESE 
OWNERS AND THEY OWN IT FREE AND 
I THINK, GIVEN THE SCENARIO I LAID 
HE'S SHAKING HIS HEAD. THAT 
DOESN'T HELP THE RECORD. 
MR. KELLER: 
MR. LARSON SHOOK HIS 
THE COURT: 
: MAY THE RECORD REFLECT 
HEAD. 
(LAUGHTER.) 
OKAY. I UNDERSTOOD. AS FAR AS 
(W8131 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate 
of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN 
ANDERSON, personally, DAN 
SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. McCOY and 
EUGENE E. DOMS, 
Defendants. 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate 
of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN 
ANDERSON, personally, DAN 
SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Third Party Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 8339 
This case was tried on April 17, 18, 19, 1990, at the 
Summit County Courthouse in Coalville, Utah. The plaintiffs 
ANDERSON V. McCOY PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
were represented by James A. Mcintosh and Irving H. Biele. The 
defendant Doms was represented by Larry R. Keller. Third 
party defendant was represented by Brant H. Wall. The Court 
heard the testimony of witnesses, admitted documentary 
evidence, read the Memorandums filed herein, heard oral 
argument, and took the matter under advisement. 
The Court now being fully advised, makes its ruling. 
The Court finds as follows: 
1. Defendant Doms met with Mike Sloan, a real estate 
agent, in the fall of 1981 to discuss the sale and purchase of 
the Rossie Hills property. 
2. Defendant Doms also met with Dewey Anderson, the 
seller of the property, once before Doms and McCoy purchased 
the property. 
3. Both Sloan and Anderson represented that the property 
was a prime piece of development property and its highest and 
best use would be as an integrated development with the two 
adjoining parcels referred to as block 62 and the Slipper 
Parcels. 
4. The plaintiffs conveyed the property to defendants 
Doms and McCoy on March 10, 1982. 
5. Defendants Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in the 
Slipper parcel in October of 1982. 
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6. The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and McCoy to 
further the integrated development of the three parcels and to 
equalize their position with the developers of the Slipper 
parcel and block 62. 
7. In October of 1982 Doms engaged Mr. Kinghorn, an 
attorney, for the specific purpose of closing the purchase of 
the Slipper parcel and continuing the negotiations with the 
owners of block 62 for the purpose of developing the three 
parcels as an integrated development. 
8. Prior to Doms7 purchase of the Anderson parcel of 
property, Doms was shown a preliminary site plan for the 
development of the three parcels of property prepared by the 
architect: Mr. Kohler 
9. Doms knew or should have known at the time he 
purchased the Anderson parcel and the Slipper parcel that the 
integrated development of the three parcels had failed because 
of the problems with the Anderson parcel and the inability of 
the parties to reach an agreement as to credits for each parcel. 
10. Doms walked the Anderson property with Mr. Sloan in 
the fall of 1981 and knew that there were roads and sheds on 
the property. 
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11. Doms had actual notice of the easement encroachment 
for the first time sometime between October 22, 1981 and 
November 7, 1981 and had further notice during 1982 and up and 
through 1984. 
12. Doms <3id not give notice of his intent to rescind 
until January of 1985• 
13. Doms' purchase of the Slipper parcel, the negotiations 
to develop the three parcels as an integrated development, the 
subsequent negotiations about credits and defining the problems 
with the Anderson parcel, affirm the fact that Doms had 
personal knowledge of the road and encroachments no later than 
October of 1982. 
The issue presented to the Court for decision is whether or 
not laches should apply in this matter. 
The Court has found that Doms knew of the loop road and 
the encroachments as early as the fall of 1981 and was made 
aware of the encroachments and road prior to the purchase of 
the Slipper parcel. Therefore, Doms was bound to take remedial 
action after that time. I£ is unbelievable that Doms^would 
purchase the Anderson parcel and an interest in the Slipper 
parcel without viewing the property and determining why 
Anderson couldn't conclude the integration of the three parcels 
ANDERSON V. McCOY PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
for development. The Court believes that Doms was aware of the 
problems with the credits that would be allocated to each 
parcel and the problems that may be encountered as a result of 
the loop road and encroachments on the Anderson parcel, 
nevertheless, Doms purchased an interest in the Slipper parcel 
in hopes of integrating the three parcels and making his 
investment more profitable. 
The Court is of the opinion that it was not necessary jfor 
Doms to obtain a legal opinion that the loop road was a 
prescriptive easement or the shed and fences had a legal basis 
for being on the Anderson property before he could make his 
tender to rescind. Once Doms knew of the road and the 
encumbrances, he should have taken action within a reasonable 
time to notify the sellers of his intent to rescind or make his 
claim for damages. 
Doms contends that Egeter v. West and North Properties, 758 
P.2d 361 (Ore. App. 1988), is the applicable law to be applied 
to the facts in this case. Egeter stands for the proposition, 
among others that an unmaintained dirt road that showed little 
use and brush and trees had to be moved to drive on it was not 
so open or notorious that purchasers would be chargeable with 
knowledge of its existence. 
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This case is readily distinguishable on the facts because 
there is no question that the road in this case has been used 
and was being used. The aerial photograph of the Anderson 
parcel clearly defines the loop road so that there could be no 
question that the road has been and is still in use. 
The Egeter case is also cited for the rule that the person 
seeking to rescind the contract must do so promptly after 
Obtaining knowledge of the facts constituting the grounds for 
rescission. However, the buyer is not required to act 
immediately to rescind so long as he acts within a reasonable 
time. 
The Court does not agree with Doms' contention that he 
acted within a reasonable time after he obtained knowledge that 
that Loop Road and the encroachments were upon the Anderson 
property. 
Doms knew of the Loop Road and encroachments as early as 
1981 and no later than October of 1982, and yet he did not take 
any action to rescind until January of 1985, and that was by 
way of a settlement offer in lieu of making the $194,000 
payment due on January 25, 1985. 
It was not until plaintiffs7 action to foreclose was filed 
that Doms filed his Amended Counterclaim in June of 1988 
seeking to rescind the warranty deed. 
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The Court concludes that Doms has waited an unreasonable 
amount of time to seek rescission# therefore, rescission is not 
the appropriate remedy in this case. 
The Court refers the parties to plaintiffs7 trial brief 
that supports the Court's conclusion that rescission is not the 
appropriate remedy in this case. 
Dated this 3 6 day of April, 1990. 
J^Cmk A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this 30 day of April, 1990: 
Irving H. Biele 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
3 33 North 3 00 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
James A. Mcintosh 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs 
1399 South 700 East, Suite 14 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Brant H. Wall 
Attorney for Third Party Defendant 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Larry R. Keller 
Attorney for Defendant Doms 
257 East 200 South, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gerald H. Kinghorn, Esq. 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Franklin P. Anderson 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
P.O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
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John A. Rokich, Judge 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON 




MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE 
E. DOMS, 
Defendants 
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON 




SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
Third-party Defendant 
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 8339 
(Judge John A. Rokich) 
CONSOLIDATED HEADING CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as p e r s o n a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the E s t a t e o f 
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and 
PAUL D. VEASY, T r u s t e e , 
P l a i n t i f f s 
v s . 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body c o r p o r a t e : 
and p o l i t i c of the S t a t e of. : 
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in h i s 
o f f i c i a l capac i ty as Summit : 
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS : 
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah : 
corporat ion; VICTOR R. AYERS; : 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a : 
Utah corporat ion; EUGENE E. : 
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS s 
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 
2 , 3 , 4, and 5 , : 
Defendants : 
C i v i l No. 10066 
(Judge John A. Rokich) 
Trial in the above-entitled matter came before the Court April 
17, 18, and 19, 1990, and August 21, 22, 23, and 24, 1990. An 
evidentiary hearing dealing with the issues of attorney fees and 
costs was held on December 31, 1991. At all times, Plaintiffs were 
represented by James A. Mcintosh, Esq., and Irving H. Biele, Esq.. 
Defendant Eugene E. Doms was represented by Larry R. Keller, Esq., 
and Craig L. Boorman, Esq. . Third-Party Defendant, Summit County 
Title Company, was represented by Brant H. Wall, Esq.. After 
hearing the oral testimony of witnesses, reviewing such documentary 
evidence as was admitted, memoranda filed by counsel herein, 
considering the oral argument of counsel, and good cause appearing, 
the Court having heretofore on September 9, 1991, signed certain 
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" and "Judgment;" the 
parties having filed certain motions to amend the said Findings, 
Conclusions, and Judgment; the Court thereafter on May 6, 1992, 
having signed certain documents entitled "Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law," "Amended Judgment," and having further 
signed those certain documents entitled "Supplement to Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law," and "Supplement to Judgment;" which 
supplemental documents pertain primarily to the issue of attorney 
fees and Court costs; the Court desiring to consolidate the said 
amended and supplemental pleadings; hereby enters its "Second 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" as follows: 
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs in this case, as grantors, conveyed to 
Defendant Eugene E. Doms and one Michael R. McCoy, pursuant to a 
form Warranty deed upon which the word "Special" was typed, Lots 
in Block 58 and 59, Park City Survey, State of Utah, and more 
particularly described in Plaintiffs' Exhibit IP as follows: 
PARCEL NO, 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58, 
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat 
thereof, as filed and of record in the office 
of the Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City 
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, 
as filed and of record in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom 
any portion located within the railroad rights 
of way as described in those certain documents 
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, 
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, 
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed 
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and of record in the office of the Summit 
County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of 
way as described in those certain documents 
recorded as Entry No, 8176 in Book C at Page 
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, 
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and 
water lines over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five 
feet of the following described Lots. 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City 
Survey according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Records. 
The property so described shall be referred to hereafter as 
the "Rossie Hills Property." 
2. The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase dated 
November 12, 1981 (see Defendant's Exhibit 63D) , is a valid 
contract for the sale of the Rossie Hills Property, and 
specifically states that the conveyance of said property is to be 
by "Warranty Deed." 
3. All subsequent documents of sale involving the parties 
in this action leading up to the transfer of the Rossie Hills 
Property by the aforementioned Warranty Deed referred to the 
documents of transfer as a "Warranty Deed." 
4. The aforementioned Warranty Deed, executed by all four 
of the Plaintiffs in this matter as grantors did not have the word 
"Special" typed at the top of the document at the time the grantors 
executed said Deed nor was it on the Deed when said Deed was 
delivered to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982. 
5. Said Warranty Deed did not contain any of the language 
which could lead the Court to the conclusion that it may have been 
a "Special Warranty Deed," even if such were officially recognized 
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under Utah law. 
6. Said Warranty deed contained no exceptions or limiting 
language with regard to certain encumbrances and easements which 
shall be hereafter discussed in these Findings. 
7. Access to the Rossie Hills Property at the time Doms and 
McCoy purchased the property was via a graded right-of-way 
extending in a northeasterly direction from the old rail right-of-
way south of Block 59 as shown in Defendant's Exhibit 77D. 
8. After accessing the Rossie Hills property, the roadway 
continued to Lot 21 of Block 58, made a loop through what was 
designated as McHenry Avenue and Lots 24 and 25. This roadway will 
hereafter be designated as the loop road. (See Defendants Exhibit 
77D.) 
9. The loop road which is approximately 10-15 feet wide has 
been in use for in excess of 40 years. 
10. Said loop road has been used openly, notoriously, 
continuously, and adversely by the residents who reside on Ontario 
Avenue and whose rear property borders, or intrudes upon the Rossie 
Hills property, for a period in excess of 40 years as of the date 
of March 23, 1982, the date of delivery of the Warranty Deed by 
grantors to Defendant doms. Such use was for ingress and egress 
to the rear of their property, and for parking. 
11. Along the westerly boundaries of the lots in Block 58 are 
encroachments such as sheds, fences and decks owned and used by 
adjoining property owners to the west. (See Defendant's Exhibit 
77D.) 
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12. The encroachments protrude from 12-16 feet onto the 
Rossie Hills Property. 
13. These encroachments, including the backyard areas 
bordered by said fences, had been used openly, notoriously, 
continuously and adversely for a period in excess of twenty years 
as of March 23, 1982, by the aforementioned property owners, and 
such use continues through present time. 
14. At the time of the delivery of the Deed to the Rossie 
Hills Property, Plaintiffs had knowledge of the aforementioned 
encroachments, either directly or through the knowledge of their 
agent, Mike Sloan. 
15. Plaintiffs made no effort to remove or extinguish the 
aforesaid encumbrances prior to the delivery of the Deed to 
Defendant Doms, or at any time thereafter. 
16. Plaintiffs made no effort to quiet title to the Rossie 
Hills Property and cause McHenry Avenue to be vacated; therefore, 
Plaintiffs made no effort to mitigate Defendant's damages as such 
damages related to these aforementioned encumbrances. 
17. The purchase price for the rossie Hills Property was the 
amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($276,750.00). (See Defendant's Exhibit 69D.) 
18. The Plaintiffs received the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000.00) as earnest money in the aforementioned transaction, 
and a down payment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($72,500.00), leaving a balance due on the purchase price of One 
Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($194,250.00). 
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19. In consideration for the transfer of the Rossie Hills 
property by Warranty Deed, Defendant Doms and one Michael R. McCoy 
executed a Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed dated March 10, 1982. 
(See Plaintiffs1 Exhibits 2P and 3P.) Said Trust Deed Note was in 
the amount of One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars (!$194,250.00) and called for interest payments monthly up 
to and including January 10,1 985. The Note also provided that the 
entire unpaid principal, together with interest, was due on January 
25, 1985. 
20. The amount of each*monthly payment was to be Two Thousand 
Two Hundred Sixty-Six and 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25). 
21. Said Trust Deed Note provided that "each payment shall 
be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the 
reduction of principal." 
22. Plaintiffs received the sum of Seventy-Two Thousand Five 
Hundred Twenty and 25/100 Dollars ($72,520.25) as monthly payments 
pursuant to the aforementioned Trust Deed Note. (See Plaintiffs1 
Exhibit 6P.) 
23. The property conveyed to Eugene E. Doms and Michael R. 
McCoy was located in a platted subdivision. 
24. The Rossie Hills Property as platted showed that the lots 
in Block 58 and 59 were accessible by McHenry Avenue. (See 
Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 99P.) 
25. The recorded plat of the Rossie Hills Property was not 
a true reflection of the actual physical layout of the land because 
of the contour and fact that McHenry Avenue was never constructed 
as a roadway. 
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26. The Rossie Hills Property was purchased for residential 
development. 
27. At the time the Rossie Hills property was purchased, it 
was zoned HR-1, which allowed historical uses and allowed single, 
duplex and tri—plex dwellings to be constructed upon the property. 
28. The utilization of all of the Rossie Hills Property is 
affected by the contour of the land, the loop road, encroachments 
and McHenry Avenue being undeveloped. 
29. Plaintiffs1 appraiser, Mr. Pia, concluded that as of 
March 10, 1982, the value of the Rossie Hills Property subject to 
the loop road and encroachments was around Two Hundred Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($250, 000.00J.. 
30. Defendant Doms1 appraiser, Mr. Webber, concluded that as 
of March 10, 1982, the value of the Rossie Hills property was One 
Hundred Sixty-Six Thousand Dollars ($166,000.00) if the 
encumbrances and loop road can be relocated and One Hundred Ten 
Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($110,700.00) if the loop road and 
encumbrances cannot be relocated. 
31. McHenry Avenue had not been vacated by Park City or by 
a judicial determination. 
32. Plaintiffs did not or could not have conveyed good and 
marketable title to any part of McHenry Avenue at the time of the 
execution of the warranty Deed to Doms and McCoy. 
33. Defendant Doms met with Mike Sloan, a real estate agent, 
in the fall of 1981 to discuss the sale and purchase of the Rossie 
Hills Property. 
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34. Defendant Doms also met with Dewey Anderson, one of the 
sellers of the Rossie Hills Property, once before Doms and McCoy 
purchased the property. 
35. Both Sloan and Anderson represented that the property was 
a prime piece of development property and its highest and best use 
would be as an integrated development with the two adjoining 
parcels referred to as Block 62 and the Slipper parcel. 
36. Defendant Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in the 
Slipper parcel in October of 1982. 
37. The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and McCoy to 
further the integrated development of the three parcels and to 
equalize their position with the developers of the Slipper parcel 
and Block 62. 
38. In October of 1982, Doms engaged Mr. Gerald H. Kinghorn, 
an attorney, for the specific purpose of closing the purchase of 
the Slipper parcel and continuing the negotiations with the owners 
of Block 62 for the purpose of developing the three parcels as an 
integrated development. 
39. Prior to Doms1 purchase of the rossie Hills Property, 
Doms was shown a preliminary site plan for the development of the 
three parcels of property prepared by the architect, Mr. Richard 
Kohler. 
40. Doms knew or should have known at the time he purchased 
the Rossie Hills Property and the Slipper parcel that the 
integrated development of the three parcels had failed because of 
the problems with the Rossie Hills property and the inability of 
the parties to reach an agreement as to credits for each parcel. 
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41. Doms walked the Rossie Hills property with Mr. Sloan in 
the fall of 1981 and knew that there were roads and sheds on the 
property. 
42. Mr. Sloan informed Defendant doms that the encroachments 
would not affect development and an access road to the property 
would be in the same place as the loop road. 
43. Doms had actual notice of the easement encroachments for 
the first time sometime between October 22, 1981, and November 7, 
1981, and had further notice during 1982 and up and through 1984. 
44. Doms did not give notice of his intent to rescind until 
January of 1985, and said notice was by way of a settlement offer 
in lieu of making the One Hundred Ninety Four Thousand Two Hundred 
Fifty Dollar ($194,250.00) payment due on January 25, 1985. Said 
settlement offer in January of 1985 was an offer made to Plaintiffs 
through Defendant Doms1 attorney, Gerald H. Kinghorn, in which 
Defendant Doms offered to deed back the property to Plaintiffs in 
return for Plaintiffs1 cancellation of the aforementioned Trust 
Deed Note. 
45. Plaintiffs did not respond to said settlement offer, but 
rather filed a Complaint to foreclose on the property in June of 
1985. 
46. Doms' purchase of Slipper parcel, the negotiations to 
develop the three parcels as an integrated development, the 
subsequent negotiations about credits and defining the problems 
with the Rossie Hills property, affirm the fact that Doms had 
personal knowledge of the road and encroachments no later than 
October of 1982. 
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47. It was not until Plaintiffs1 action to foreclose was 
filed that Defendant Doms filed his Amended Counterclaim in June 
of 1988 seeking to rescind the Warranty Deed. 
48. Defendant Doms failed to file his claim for damages 
against the Estate of D.C. Anderson within three months after the 
date of the first publication of Notice to Creditors as provided 
in Section 75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
49. The Original Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment signed 
on September 9, 1991, were filed in the office of the Summit County 
Clerk on October 22, 1991, which the court finds is the date of 
Entry. 
50. The Original Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment were not 
"final" because there were several issues to be decided which the 
Court had not included in the said documents, which consisted of 
several items including determination of attorney fees and costs. 
51. The Court does not believe it should interfere with the 
agreements entered into by the client and the attorney for services 
to be rendered when the attorneys, as in this case, have fully 
apprised the clients of the fees and costs at the outset of the 
case. 
52. The attorneys for plaintiffs and defendant have kept 
detailed records of the time spent in the prosecution of this case 
and have billed regularly so that the client was always aware of 
what was transpiring in the case. 
53. The Court's decision as to fees and costs is not to be 
construed as negating the client's obligation to pay the attorneys 
in accordance with the terms of the attorney-client agreement. 
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54. The Court finds that the "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
t o Purchase" which was signed by some of the part ies in November 
1981 was merged into the l a t e r Warranty Deed dated March 10, 1982. 
Espinoza v. Safeco Ti t le Ins . Co. . 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979). 
fa} ?he -said-Warranty-Seed-did not provide for payment 
of at torney fees in an a c t i o n based upon breach of warranties 
contained in the said Deed. 
55. The Court finds tha t purchasers of real e s ta te are not 
e n t i t l e d to attorney fees absent an express agreement providing 
t h e r e f o r e , unless the purchaser commences a separate action against 
t h i r d par t i e s to remove encumbrances. George A. Lowe Co. v. 
Simmons Warehouse Co., 39 Utah 395, 117 Pac. 874 (1911). 
(a) Doms has not commenced a separate action against 
t h i r d p a r t i e s to remove encumbrances. 
56. The Court finds the p l a i n t i f f s 1 complaint in foreclosure 
as w e l l as a l l other actions by the p l a i n t i f f s were not in s t i tu ted 
or prosecuted in bad fa i th . 
57. The Counsel for p l a i n t i f f s and Doms aggressively and 
z e a l o u s l y presented their c a s e s and neither party acted in bad 
f a i t h . 
58. The Court finds tha t Doms i s not e n t i t l e d to attorney 
f e e s . 
59 . The defendant Doms i s not e n t i t l e d to any prejudgment 
i n t e r e s t on the $83,000.00 damages. 
60 . Doms is e n t i t l e d t o the following costs for the 
prosecut ion of his Second Amended Counterclaim: 
(a) Service of process on Jeanne Scott $ 12.00 
(b) Service of process on El len Anderson $ 12.75 
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(c) Service of trial subpoena: Mike Sloan $ 24.75 
(d) Witness fees: Elden and Ella Sorensen $ 34.00 
(e) Recording fee for corrected Sherifffs $ 18.00 
Deed 
(f) The said costs awarded to Doms total $101.50 
61. The issue of plaintiffs being entitled to attorney fees 
and costs can be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs because the 
provisions contained in the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed provided 
that all costs and expenses of collection including reasonable 
attorney fees can be charged against the maker. 
62. The Court finds that counsel for the plaintiffs and 
defendant have expended many hours in the prosecution of this case 
and their time sheets so reflect. 
63. The Court finds that hourly rates charged by counsel for 
plaintiffs and defendant were reasonable. 
64. The Court finds that Plaintiffs* counsel, James A. 
Mcintosh, at page 12 of his affidavit dated December 6, 1991, 
states, "Most of the services rendered were in connection with the 
Second Amended Counterclaim." 
(a) The time spent on collection of the Note and 
foreclosure action by plaintiffs1 counsel was nominal in comparison 
to all the hours expended in this case. 
(b) The Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to 
recover attorney fees for the time spent on the collection of the 
Trust Deed Note and the Trust Deed foreclosure action but not for 
any time spent in defending against any of the causes of action in 
the Second Amended Counterclaim. 
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65. The Court finds the plaintiffs are entitled to attorney 
fees for legal services incurred in the prosecution of the 
collection of the Note foreclosure action, the motion to set aside 
default, to compel sanctions, setting aside the tax sale, 
intermediate appeal and petition for extraordinary writ to the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
66. In addressing the issue of these fees, the Court will 
take into consideration the effect of the attorney fees awarded the 
plaintiffs by Judge Pat B. Brian in the amount of $4,467.60 as a 
condition of setting aside the Default Judgment against Doms. 
67. The Court will also make an award to plaintiffs based 
upon Judge J. Dennis Fredericks ruling that plaintiffs were 
entitled to a reasonable fee for bringing a motion to compel and 
for sanctions before the court. 
68. The criteria for the Court's decision awarding attorney 
fees is set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P. 2d 985 
(Utah 1988). 
69. The Court understands the amount in controversy can be 
a factor in determining a reasonable fee, but the Court is not 
putting much reliance on this factor. 
70. The Court finds the plaintiffs should be awarded attorney 
fees as follows: 
(a) FOR PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL, JAMES A. MCINTQ8H, ESQ,; 
(i) Lawsuit to set aside tax sale $ 5,245.00 
(ii) Petition for intermediate appeal $ 2,730.00 
(iii) Petition for extraordinary writ $ 2,160.00 
(iv) For the foreclosure complaint $12,300.00 
(v) For the motion to compel and for 
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sanctions as per Judge Frederick's 
minute entries $ 4,750.00 
(vi) The total amount to be awarded for 
Mr. Mcintosh's fees is $27,185.00 
(b) FOR PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ, : 
(i) Motion to set aside default $ 4,467.00 
(This amount has already been 
paid by Doms) 
(ii) Lawsuit to set aside tax sale $ 1,050.00 
(iii) Petition for extraordinary writ 
and mandamus $ 2,740.00 
(iv) For the foreclosure complaint $10,000.00 
(v) The total amount to be awarded 
for Mr. Biele's fees is $13,790.00 
71. The Court finds the plaintiffs are entitled to the 
following costs: 
(a) Summit County Clerk -- filing Complaint $ 50.00 
(b) Richie Zabriskie — fee for service 
of Third-Party Summons and Complaint $ 16.50 
(c) Summit County Clerk — filing fee for 
Complaint in Civil No. 10066 $ 75.00 
(d) Richie Zabriskie — fee for service 
of process in Civil No. 10066 on Domcoy 
Enterprises Inc. $ 24.70 
(e) Utah Supreme Court — docketing fee 
for filing Petition for Intermediate 
Appeal $125.00 
(f) Utah Supreme Court — filing fee for 
Petition for Extraordinary Writ of 
Prohibition $ 50.00 
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(g) Summit County Clerk — fee for 
certification of order $ 3*50 
(h) Steve Deckert — witness fee for 
attending trial $ 30.00 
(i) LeRoy J. Pia — witness fee 
to attend trial $ 50.00 
(j) The total amount of the said costs 
to be awarded to the plaintiffs is $358.20 
72. The Trust Deed Note dated March 10, 1982, provides for 
payment of interest in the amount of fourteen percent (14%) per 
annum prior to default, eighteen percent (18%) per annum after 
default. 
BECOND AMENDED CONCL0810N8 OF LAW 
1. The Deed which transferred the Rossie Hills property was 
a Warranty Deed under Utah law and conveyed with it all of the 
statutory warranties and covenants contained in U.C.A. Section 57-
1-12. 
2. The loop road, sheds, fences, backyard areas bordered by 
said fences, and decks are encroachments and constitute 
encumbrances upon the property. 
3. Said encumbrances existed on the Rossie Hills property 
on the date of the delivery of the Deed/ which was March 23, 1982. 
4. Said encumbrances constitute a breach of the statutory 
covenants contained in the Warranty Deed pursuant to U.C.A. Section 
57-1-12. 
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5. The aforesaid statutory covenants contained in the 
Warranty Deed were breached upon the delivery of the Warranty Deed 
to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982. 
6. The Warranty Deed, Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed 
prepared at the same time do not constitute a single contract. 
7. The Court believes that the law applicable to this case 
is: The acceptance of the Deed completes the execution of the 
contract, and the Deed become final and conclusive evidence of the 
contract under which it is executed (84 A.L.R. 1009). 
8. The Court concludes that the Utah case of Reese Howell 
Company v. Brown, 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 684, 689 (1916), sets forth 
the controlling law which must be applied in the instant case 
regarding the issue as to whether or not the Warranty Deed, Note 
and Trust Deed constitutes a single contract. 
9. The fact that a Trust Deed and Note were executed at the 
same time does not make them part of the contract to purchase the 
property. The Trust Deed and Note are documents executed to secure 
the payment of the property, and have no bearing upon whether the 
property is free and clear of encumbrances. 
10. Defendant Doms1 remedy in this case is for a breach of 
the statutory covenants of warranty. 
11. The utilization of the Rossie Hills Property is adversely 
affected by the encroachments and loop road to the extent that the 
value of the property is diminished. 
12. Defendant Doms has been damaged by virtue of Plaintiffs1 
breach. 
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13. Defendant Doms1 damages should be measured as of the date 
of the breach, which is March 23, 1982, the date of the delivery 
of the Deed. 
14. Said damages should be measured with all of the 
encumbrances in place and as they existed on March 23, 1982. 
15. The proper measure of damages under Utah law is the 
difference in the value of the property without any encumbrances 
minus the value of the property with the encumbrances. 
16. The loop road does have a beneficial value for the 
development of the Rossie Hills Property. 
17. Under Utah law, it was the Plaintiffs1 burden and 
obligation to mitigate the damages suffered by Defendant doms 
because Plaintiffs were in breach of the statutory covenants 
contained in the Deed at the time the Deed was delivered. 
18. Plaintiffs had the obligation of quieting title to the 
Rossie Hills property and causing McHenry Avenue to be vacated; and 
if Plaintiffs had done so, Defendant Doms1 damages would have been 
mitigated. 
19. As a result of the encumbrances existing on the Rossie 
Hills Property on March 23, 1982, Defendant Doms has suffered 
damages in the sum of Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00). 
20. Defendant Doms is entitled to an offset against the Two 
Hundred Seventy=Six Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($276,750.00) purchase price of the property, in the amount of 
Eighty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($82,500.00), which 
represents the earnest money payment of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000.00) and the down payment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five 
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Hundred Dollars ($72,500.00). 
21. The remaining balance due after said offset of Eighty-
Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($82,500.00) is One Hundred 
Ninety-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00), which 
represents the principal balance of the Trust Deed Note as of the 
date of the execution of said Note and the Trust Deed. 
22. Defendant Doms is further entitled to an additional 
offset of Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00), which 
represents the damages suffered by Defendant Doms as a result of 
the encumbrances on the property as set forth above. 
23. Therefore, the remaining unpaid balance under the Trust 
Deed Note and Trust Deed was One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($111,250.00) as of March 23, 1982, the date 
of the delivery of the Warranty Deed. 
24. From April 0, 1982 through January 10, 1985, monthly 
interest payments under the Trust Deed Note were received by 
Plaintiffs on an unpaid principal balance of One Hundred Ninety-
Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00), rather than 
One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($111,250.00), which the court has concluded was the unpaid balance 
due under the Trust Deed Note at that time. 
25. under the terms of the Trust Deed Note, the amount 
actually due in monthly interest payments on the un paid principal 
balance of one Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars 
(111,250.00) was Forty-One Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-Three and 
44/100 Dollars ($41,533.44). 
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26. Since Plaintiffs received monthly interest payments in 
the amount of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty and 25/100 
Dollars ($72,520-25), Defendant Doms is further entitled to an 
additional off-set of Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Six and 
81/100 Dollars ($30,986.81), which represents the difference 
between the interest paid on One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) and the interest which was 
actually due on One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($111,250.00) for the same period. 
27. Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due 
under the Trust Deed Note is Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-
Three and 19/100 Dollars ($80,263.19), as of January 25, 1985, the 
date said principal amount was due under the terms of the Trust 
Deed Note. 
28. Inasmuch as Defendant Doms1 damages were not determined 
and a Judgment has not been entered for said damages, Plaintiffs1 
action for a judgment of foreclosure is premature. 
29. Without the necessity of refiling this action to 
foreclose the Trust Deed, the Court will require Plaintiffs to give 
Defendant Doms a Notice of Default and Defendant Doms shall have 
the right to pay the entire amount due under the terms of the Trust 
Deed Note and Trust Deed, together with costs and attorney fees, 
as determined ny the Court, within 90 days from receipt of the 
Notice of Default. The giving of the Notice of Default shall not 
take place until after the Judgment is entered and notice can be 
served on Defendant Doms and/or his attorney. Service on the 
Defendant Doms may be made by mailing the said notice to the 
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Defendant's last known address. 
30. The Court recognizes tha t there are two options by which 
t o forec lose a note and trust deed, administrat ively or j u d i c i a l l y . 
Due t o the circumstances in t h i s case , the fa i lure of P l a i n t i f f s 
t o ascertain damages prior to proceeding with the foreclosure 
a c t i o n , Defendant Doms should be given 90 days1 notice to s a t i s f y 
the Note before Pla int i f f s can proceed with the foreclosure act ion. 
31. Plaint i f fs are e n t i t l e d to in teres t on the unpaid balance 
of Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Three and 19/100 Dollars 
($80,263.19) from January 25, 1985, the date the unpaid principal 
balance was due under the terms of the Trust Deed Note. The 
i n t e r e s t rate to be used in determining the amount due P l a i n t i f f s 
as i n t e r e s t on said unpaid pr inc ipa l balance shal l be fourteen 
percent (14%) per annum. 
32. If Defendant Doms f a i l s t o pay the balance due and owing 
a f t e r not ice , Pla int i f fs s h a l l have Judgment of foreclosure upon 
f i l i n g an affidavit that Defendant Doms has fa i l ed to pay. The 
P l a i n t i f f s wi l l have the s o l e option at the ir d iscret ion to a 
Judgment of foreclosure based e i t h e r on the administrative 
forec losure proceedings s e t forth in Sections 57-1-23 e t . s e g . , 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or the judic ia l foreclosure 
proceedings provided in Sect ions 78-37-1 e t . s e g . . 
33. In regard to the i s s u e of whether or not Defendant Doms 
was e n t i t l e d to rescind the contrac t , the Court concludes that 
Defendant Doms was bound to take remedial action after the Fall of 
1981 which the Court determined t o be the date he was made aware 
of the encroachments and loop road, and which was prior to the 
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purchase of the Slipper parcel. 
34. It was not necessary for Defendant Doms to obtain a legal 
opinion that the loop road was a prescriptive easement or that the 
shed and fences had a legal basis for being on the Rossie Hills 
Property before he could make his tender to rescind. 
35. Once Defendant Doms knew of the road and the 
encumbrances, he should have taken action within a reasonable time 
to notify the sellers of his intent to rescind the transaction. 
36. The Court concludes that the case of Eaeter v. West and 
North Properties, 758 P.2d 361 (Ore. App. 1988), is not applicable 
to this case in that Eqeter stands for the proposition, among 
others, that an unmaintained dirt road that showed little use and 
brush and trees had to be removed to drive on it was not so open 
or notorious that purchasers would be chargeable with knowledge of 
its existence. 
37. Eqeter is readily distinguishable from the facts of the 
instant case because there is not question that the road in this 
case has been used and was being used. 
38. The Egeter case is applicable to the instant case in the 
sense that it stands for the proposition that the person seeking 
to rescind the contract must do so promptly after obtaining 
knowledge of the facts constituting the grounds for rescind so long 
as he acts within a reasonable time. 
39. Defendant Doms did not act within a reasonable time after 
he obtained knowledge that the loop road and the encroachments were 
upon the Rossie Hills Property. 
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40. The Court concludes that Defendant Doms waited an 
unreasonable amount of time to seek rescission; therefore, 
rescission is not the appropriate remedy in this case and is barred 
by the doctrine of laches. 
41. Defendant Doms presented insufficient evidence to carry 
the burden of proof that Plaintiffs committed fraud and 
misrepresentation in this matter. 
42. With regard to Civil No. 10066, and Count I of 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint contained therein, pursuant to Stipulation 
of the parties and a previous Order of the court, the May 27, 1987, 
Tax Sale of the Rossie Hills Property by Summit County should be 
declared to be null and void. 
43. The foregoing Conclusion of Law shall be deemed not to 
affect the Trust Deed dated March 10, 1982, in any adverse manner 
by the said tax sale. The rights, title, liens and interest of the 
Plaintiffs and Defendant Eugene E. Doms and Domcoy Enterprises, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, shall not be deemed to be affected by the 
said tax sale. The Court's previous Order invalidating the tax 
sale does not in and of itself either validate or invalidate any 
subsequent deeds issued regarding the Rossie Hill Property. 
44. The Warranty Deed dated August 26, 1988, in which Domcoy 
Enterprises, Inc., as grantor, conveyed the Rossie Hills Property 
to Defendant Doms, as grantee, is a valid Deed which transferred 
legal title to Defendant Doms. 
45. In regard to Count II of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil 
No. 10066, title to the Rossie Hills Property should be quieted in 
Defendant Doms, subject to Plaintiffs1 right to foreclose as 
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previously set forth in these Conclusions of Law. 
46. In regard to Count III of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil 
NO. 10066, said Count III has been previously dismissed by the 
Court on Motion of Summit County. 
47. In regard to Plaintiffs1 Third-Party Complaint against 
Third-Party Defendant Summit County Title Company in Civil No. 
8339, said Third-Party Complaint has been previously dismissed by 
the Court on Motion of said parties. 
48. Defendant doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim seeking 
damages against Plaintiff Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of D.C. Anderson is barred by the three-month filing 
period limitation for claims against an estate pursuant to Section 
75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, as said section relates 
to the issues of damages. 
49. This Court has in personam jurisdiction over Plaintiff 
Jeanne Scott pursuant to a ruling by the Utah Supreme Court 
contained in an Amended Minute Entry denying Plaintiffs1 Petition 
for an Extraordinary Writ under Rule 65B(B)4, Supreme Court Case 
No. 890269. In said Amended Minute Entry, dated July 31, 1989, the 
Utah Supreme Court denied said Petition for an Extraordinary Writ, 
and ruled that this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff Jeanne 
Scott because she was a grantor on the Warranty Deed, and is a 
proper party to Defendant Doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim under 
Rules 13 and 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
50. Plaintiffs1 remaining objections to the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment dated September 9, 1991, are 
denied. 
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51. The plaintiffs should be awarded attorney fees of 
$27,185.00 for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, James A. 
Mcintosh, Esq. 
52. The plaintiffs should be awarded attorney fees of 
$13,790.00 for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, Irving H. 
Biele, Esq. 
53. The plaintiffs should be awarded $358.20 for costs which 
they have incurred in these proceedings. 
54. The plaintiffs should be awarded interest of fourteen 
percent (14%) per annum on all principal amounts the court has 
determined were due and owing on the Trust Deed Note dated March 
10, 1982, both before and after default. 
55. The defendant Doms should not be awarded any attorney 
fees for services rendered by his counsel in either Civil No. 8339 
or Civil No. 10066. 
56. The defendant Doms should not be awarded any prejudgment 
interest on the $83,000.00 damages described in the original 
Judgment dated September 9, 1991. 
57. The defendant Doms should be awarded $101.50 for costs 
for prosecution of the Second Amended Counterclaim. 
DATED this Ji_ day of June 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
District Court Judge 
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NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
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Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. -- No. 2194 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
A Utah Professional Law Corporation 
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Filed District Court 
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Summit County 
June 23, 1992 
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Rokich, Judge 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON 




MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE 
E. DOMS, 
Defendants 
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal 
representative of the Estate of , 
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON : 
personally, DAN SCOTT and : 
JEANNE SCOTT, : 
Third-party Plaintiffs : 
vs. : 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a : 
Utah corporation, 
Third-party Defendant : 
: SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 8339 
(Judge John A. Rokich) 
CONSOLIDATED HEADING CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and 
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee, 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of 
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his 
official capacity as Summit : 
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS 
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah : 
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS; : 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a : 
Utah corporation; EUGENE E. : 
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS : 
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, : 
2, 3, 4, and 5, : 
Defendants : 
: Civil No. 10066 
(Judge John A. Rokich) 
Based upon the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, entered contemporaneously herein, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. In regard to Civil No. 8339 and Count II of Plaintiffs1 
Complaint in Civil No. 10066, title to the property which is the 
subject of the above-entitled matters is quieted in Defendant 
Eugene E. Doms, subject to the right of Plaintiffs, Ellen Anderson, 
as Personal Representative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson, and Dan 
Scott, to foreclose their Trust Deed against said property as 
hereinafter set forth in this Judgment. Said property is more 
particularly described as follows: 
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58, 
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat 
thereof, as filed and of record in the office 
of the Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City 
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, 
as filed and of record in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom 
any portion located within the railroad rights 
of way as described in those certain docunents 
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, 
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, 
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed 
and of record in the office of the Summit 
County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of 
way as described in those certain documents 
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, 
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and 
water lines over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five 
feet of the following described Lots. 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City 
Survey according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Records. 
2. Plaintiffs' Complaint for foreclosure in Civil No. 8339 
is premature, in as much as Defendant Doms1 damages were not 
determined and a Judgment has not been entered for said damages. 
3. Defendant Doms is awarded Judgment in Civil No. 8339 on 
his Second Amended Counterclaim for danages for breach of 
warranties and covenants against encumbrances contained in the 
Warranty Deed conveying the Rossie Hills property, pursuant to 
U.C.A. Section 57-1-12. 
4. Defendant Doms is awarded damages for said breach of the 
warranties and covenants against encumbrances in the amount of 
Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00). 
-**-
5. The original principal balance due from Defendant Doms 
to Plaintiffs Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of D.C. Anderson, and Dan Scott, on the Trust Deed Note and 
Trust Deed held by said Plaintiffs was One Hundred Ninety-Four 
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00), as of the date 
of the execution of said Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed. 
6. Said amount of One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) due under said Trust Deed Note 
and Trust Deed shall be offset by the Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars 
($83,000.00) which the Court has awarded Defendant Doms as damages 
for breach of the warranties and covenants against encumbrances. 
7. Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due 
from Defendant Doms to said Plaintiffs under the Trust Deed Note 
and Trust Deed was One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($111,250.00) as of March 23, 1982, the date of delivery 
of the Warranty Deed. 
8. Since Plaintiffs received monthly interest payments in 
the amount of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty and 25/100 
Dollars ($72,520.25), Defendant Doms is further entitled to an 
additional off-set of Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Six and 
81/100 Dollars ($30,986.81), which represents the difference 
between the interest paid on One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) and the interest which was 
actually due on One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($111,250.00) for the same period. 
9. Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due 
under the Trust Deed Note is Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-
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Three and 19/100 Dollars ($80,263.19), as of January 25, 1985, the 
date said principal amount was due under the terms of the Trust 
Deed Note. 
10. Without the necessity of refiling this action to 
foreclose the Trust Deed, the Court will require said Plaintiffs 
to give Defendant Doms a Notice of Default and Defendant Doms shall 
have the right to pay the entire amount due under the terms of the 
Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed, together with costs and attorney 
fees, as determined by the Court, within 90 days form receipt of 
the Notice of Default. The giving of the Notice of Default shall 
not take place until after the Judgment is entered and notice can 
be served on Defendant Doms and/or his attorney. Service on the 
Defendant Doms may be made by mailing the said notice to the 
Defendant's last known address. 
11. Said Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the unpaid 
balance of Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Three and 19/100 
Dollars ($80,263.19) from January 25, 1985, the date the unpaid 
principal balance was due under the terms of the Trust Deed Note. 
The interest rate to be used in determining the amount due 
Plaintiffs as interest on said unpaid principal balance shall be 
fourteen percent (14%) per annum. 
12. If Defendant Doms fails to pay the balance due and owing 
after notice, said Plaintiffs shall have Judgment of foreclosure 
upon filing an affidavit that Defendant Doms has failed to pay. 
The Plaintiffs will have the sole option at their discretion to a 
Judgment of foreclosure based either on the administrative 
foreclosure proceedings set forth in Sections 57-1-23 et. seg., 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or the judicial foreclosure 
proceedings provided in Sections 78-37-1 et. seg. . 
13. Defendant Doms is not entitled to the remedy of 
rescission of the transaction conveying the aforementioned property 
because the remedy of rescission is barred by the doctrine of 
laches. 
14. Defendant Doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim, as it 
relates to the remedy of damages, is dismissed as against Plaintiff 
Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of D.C. 
Anderson, as said claim is barred by the three-month filing period 
limitation for claims against an estate pursuant to Section 75-3-
803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
15. Defendant Doms1 causes of action relating to fraud and 
misrepresentation in Civil No. 8339 are dismissed, the Court 
finding no cause therefore. 
16. In regard to Count I of Plaintiffs' Complaint in Civil 
No. 10066, and pursuant to Stipulation of the parties and a 
previous Order of the Court, the May 27, 1987, tax sale of the 
Rossie Hills property by Summit County is declared to be null and 
void. 
17. In regard to Count III of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil 
No. 10066, said Count III has been previously dismissed by the 
Court on Motion of Defendant Summit County. 
18. In regard to Plaintiffs1 Third Party-Complaint against 
Third-Party Defendant Summit County title Company in Civil No. 
8339, said Third-Party Complaint has been previously dismissed by 
the Court on Motion of said parties. 
-A-
19. The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $27,185.00 in attorney 
fees for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, James A. 
Mcintosh, Esq. 
20. The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $13,790.00 in attorney 
fees for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, Irving H. Biele, 
Esq. 
21. The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $358.20 for costs which 
they have incurred in these proceedings. 
22. The plaintiffs are hereby awarded interest at the rate 
of fourteen percent (14%) per annum on all principal amounts which 
this court has determined were due and owing by the defendant Doms 
pursuant to the terms of the Trust Deed Note dated March 10, 1982, 
both before and after default in payment by the said defendant. 
23. The defendant Doms is not entitled to any attorney fees 
for services rendered by his counsel in either Civil No. 8339 or 
Civil No. 10066. 
24. The defendant Eugene E. Doms is not entitled to any 
prejudgment interest on the $83,000.00 damages. 
25. The defendant Doms is hereby awarded $101.50 for costs 
for prosecution of the Second Amended Counterclaim. 
DATED this j£_ day of June 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ffl M\v\ ft ./cjk<+ 
HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
District Court Judge 
ADDENDUM 17 
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IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ. (Bar No. A0317) 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. (Bar No. 2194) 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
1399 South 700 East #14 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate 
Of D. C. ANDERSON; ELLEN 
ANDERSON personally; DAN SCOTT 
and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and EUGENE 
E. DOMS, 
Defendants, 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO 
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND SECOND AMENDED 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 8339 
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal 
representative of the Estate 
of D. C. ANDERSON; ELLEN 
ANDERSON personally; DAN 
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ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and 
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah 
and BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his 
official capacity as Summit 
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS 
REAL ESTATE, INC. a Utah 
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS; 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a 
Utah corporation; EUGENE E. 
DOMS, UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS 
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 2, 
3, 4 and 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 10066 
Plaintiffs hereby enter their objections to those certain 
documents which are entitled, "Second Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law" and "Second Amended Judgment" which 
documents, by Order of the Court, were prepared by the undersigned 
to accommodate the defendant's attorney and incorporate the 
court's most recent rulings and consolidate the separate Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment filed in relation to 
-2-
the primary case and the subsequent Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment prepared in relation to attorneys1 
fees. These objections are made pursuant to Rule 4-504, Rules of 
Judicial Administration, and are based on the official records in 
the case. Plaintiffs specifically state objections and incorpo-
rate objections as follows: 
1. The only equitable cause pled was fcr rescission, 
which cause the court denied. The only cause presently before the 
court is in contract and therefore is not subject to the court's 
equitable dispositions, and judgment should be in dollars as of 
the time of the court's determination of damage. 
2. The court's failure and refusal to apply the laws of 
the State of Utah to the stated facts, all of which is exhibited 
and defined in "Plaintiffs1 Objections to Defendant Domsf Proposed 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amended 
Judgment" as set forth in Plaintiffs1 Memorandum dated May 11, 
1992, which are incorporated herein. 
3. Plaintiffs also refer and incorporate herein their 
Objections to the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Memorandum in support thereof filed on the 5th day of 
March, 1992. 
4. The court at the last hearing indicated it would not 
hear any further oral arguments or discussions of the objections; 
-3-
therefore, plaintiff does not file a request for hearing and oral 
argument. 
£ DATED t h i s --J day o f June , 1992. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
H. BIELE 
3unsel for P l a i n t i f f s 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES, P.C, 
J m. & 
JAMES A. MclNTOSH 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs 
-4-
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
:ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
CAROL A. DeMILL, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Nygaard, Coke & 
Vincent, Co-counsel for Plaintiffs herein, and that she served 
the attached: PLAINTIFFS1 OBJECTIONS TO SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT and 
the MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT thereof upon Defendant's attorney of 
record as follows: 
Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
257 East 200 South S-10 #340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
by causing the same to be hand delivered on this 3rd day of June, 
1992. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of June, 1992, 
My Commission Expires: 
// Notary' Public ~^p 
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT 
fir 
C. -KSEY I 
t I 
yj n Ex; ires I 
.na 22,19*4 I 
State or Utah I 
„A Notary PuMo • C¥Stf*t?%fi90KSEY I 
*Jp3N°rth300Wett I 
toUkeCto Utah84103' 
My Committtai Expires I 
June 22.19^4 i 
State or Utah ! 
(f(*?ll > 
IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ. (Bar No. A0317) 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. (Bar No. 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P. 
1399 South 700 East #14 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2194) 
C. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate 
of D. C. ANDERSON; ELLEN 
ANDERSON personally; DAN SCOTT 
and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and EUGENE 
E. DOMS, 
Defendants, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO 
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND SECOND AMENDED 
JUDGMENT 
Civil NO. 8339 
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal 
representative of the Estate 
of D. C. ANDERSON; ELLEN 
ANDERSON personally; DAN 
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ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and 
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body c o r p o r a t e 
and p o l i t i c of the S t a t e of Utah 
and BLAKE L. FRAZIER, i n h i s 
o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y as Summit 
County A u d i t o r ; GUMP & AYERS 
REAL ESTATE, INC. a Utah 
c o r p o r a t i o n ; VICTOR R. AYERS; 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC. , a 
Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ; EUGENE E. 
DOMS, UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS 
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 2 , 
3 , 4 and 5 , 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
Case No. 10066 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
At a hearing on May 26, 1992, Judge Rokich, at the impre-
cation of counsel for defendant, directed plaintiffs to consoli-
date the heretofore entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment with the Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment into one document and include therein the 
court's most recent rulings, and on May 28, 1992, the same were 
-2-
delivered to Mr. Keller, counsel for defendant. It appears that 
there are no remaining issues to be decided by the court; and 
therefore, the Second Amended Judgment will be a final disposition 




THE COUNTERCLAIM BY THE DEFENDANT PRESENTLY UNDER 
ADJUDICATION IS A CLAIM UNDER THE WARRANTY DEED AND 
THE COVENANT AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES CONTAINED THEREIN 
The only appropriate remedy for violation of a contract 
covenant is damages. This court, contrary to plaintiffs' objec-
tions and contrary to the law of the State of Utah, has fashioned 
a remedy which: (1) modifies the provisions of the Promissory Note 
and Trust Deed; and, (2) modifies the application of principal and 
interest as it is paid on the Promissory Note and Trust Deed; (3) 
modifies the closing statements and application of closing funds 
in order to accomplish its purpose; all of which are contrary to 
the established law in the State of Utah. 
The court's award of damages should be effective at the 
time of the determination thereof by the court and the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment should so reflect. 
POINT II 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND JUDGMENT ARE INCORRECT IN THAT THEY FAIL 
TO SPECIFICALLY FIND THE DEFAULTS OF THE 
DEFENDANTS AND APPROPRIATELY APPLY SAID DEFAULTS 
-3-
The provisions of the Promissory Note required the entire 
Note to be paid by January 25, 1985, and the court has made no 
specific finding that this Note was in default for failure to make 
the January 25, 1985, payment. Further, evidence was adduced and 
showed that the defendants failed to pay taxes and the taxes were 
required to be paid under the terms of the Trust Deed. Failure to 
pay the taxes was a default and the court failed to find that said 
default had existed for the years 1982 and subsequent thereto. 
The Promissory Note provided for interest after default at the 
rate of 18% per annum and the court has failed to apply such 
appropriate percentage to the amounts due under the Promissory 
Note. 
The Judgment must be revised to appropriately reflect the 
defaults and the default interest. 
POINT III 
THE COURT FAILS TO RECOGNIZE AND INCLUDE IN 
ITS FINDINGS THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT AND 
CROSS-CLAIMANT DOMS ACQUIRED ONLY A ONE-HALF 
INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT REAL ESTATE AND RECOGNIZE 
THE HERETOFORE ENTERED JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE AS 
TO THE OTHER ONE-HALF INTEREST IN THE REAL ESTATE 
The deed vesting interest in Mr. Eugene Doms and Michael 
R. McCoy vested the same as tenants in common, an undivided one-
half each. This court heretofore foreclosed the interest of 
Michael R. McCoy and sold the same at sheriff's sale so that the 
court at the present time has jurisdiction only over an undivided 
one-half interest in the real estate and its adjudication can 
-4-
affect only a one-half interest. Further, the court fails to rec-
ognize that each defendant, jointly and severally, promised to pay 
the Promissory Note and each executed the Trust Deed thereby bind-
ing their one-half interest to the security of the Note holder. 
Therefore, any judgment in this case reflecting the reduced value 
of the entire real estate resulting from the encumbrances must be 
modified to reflect the fact that Eugene E. Doms was granted only 
a one-half interest in the real estate and he is entitled to only 
one-half interest in any damages that are determined by the court 
wherein its judgment reflected the reduced value of the real 
estate. 
POINT IV 
RATHER THAN RESTATING IN DETAIL EACH OP ITS PRIOR 
OBJECTIONS TO THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, PLAINTIFF 
REFERS TO AND INCORPORATES HEREIN, AS THOUGH SET FORTH 
AT LENGTH HEREIN, ITS OBJECTIONS HERETOFORE FILED TO 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT, 
NOTING THAT SOME PARAGRAPHS HAVE BEEN RENUMBERED 
BUT THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED THEREIN REMAIN THE SAME 
POINT V 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT 
MUST BE REVISED TO TRULY REFLECT THE FACTS AND 
APPLICABLE LAW 
The revisions necessary are those which in general may be 
described as follows: 
1. To determine that the cause of action of Doms is 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
2. If not barred by the statute of limitations, 
Defendant Doms is entitled to only one-half of the damages that 
-5-
arose by reason of the covenant against encumbrances, and that 
amount must be represented as of the effective date of the court's 
determination and carry a judgment interest from that date 
forward. 
3. The Counterclaimant Doms cannot make a claim under 
the March 10, 1982, deed from the plaintiffs because, (1). Doms had 
no interest in the real estate as he had conveyed all his interest 
therein to Domcoy in August, 1983, and (2) Doms is a remote 
grantee to the March 10, 1982, deed having acquired his interest 
subsequent to filing his counterclaim by deed from Domcoy 
Enterprises, Inc. dated August 26, 1988, and has failed to join 
all prior grantors in his counterclaim. 
4. The Counterclaimant Doms cannot make a claim under 
the August 26, 1988, deed from Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. because, 
(1) Domcoy was a dissolved corporation and did not have power to 
make the conveyance, (2) Doms did not give any consideration for 
the conveyance, and (3) the conveyance violated the provisions of 
§16-10-74 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, as interpreted in 
Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 192 Utah Adv. Rpt. 35 (Ct. App. 1992). 
5. The amount due the estate of D. C. Anderson, 
deceased, by reason of its one-half interest in the Promissory 
Note and Trust Deed cannot be reduced or modified and the defen-
dant must be required to pay to the estate of D. C. Anderson one-
half of the balance of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed, without 
modification, together with interest at 18% per annum from the 
-6-
date of default and attorneys1 fees and costs. 
6. The Findings, Conclusions and Judgment should prop-
erly reflect all of the attorneys' fees incurred by plaintiffs' 
counsel in defense of the title to the property, including, with-
out limitation, the defenses relating to rescission and clearing 
of title and such other matters as were required in order to pro-
tect the res and the interest in the Promissory Note. 
7. To allow the plaintiffs to proceed with a sheriff's 
sale for the undivided one-half interest of the Defendant, Eugene 
E. Doms, for the balance due under the Promissory Note and Trust 
Deed. 
8. Title cannot be quieted in Eugene E. Doms as there 
is no prayer therefor and no evidence of basic derivative title. 
9. No damages arise by reason of known easements and 
encumbrances. This court specifically found Doms made a personal 
inspection of the property between October 22, 1981 and November 
7, 1981, and had actual knowledge of all easements and encum-
brances on the property during that period of time which was 
approximately 4-1/2 months prior to the time the March 10, 1982, 
deed was signed, the plaintiffs are not responsible for any dam-
ages for these open and notorious easements and encumbrances. See 
Tabet Lumber Company, Inc. v. Golightly, 80 NM 442 457 P.2d 374 
1969. See also the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice 
Orme in the case of Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 
(Utah 1990). 
-7-
10. Counterclaimant Doms elected his remedy and failed in 
the trial thereof. Prior to the trial of the case, the court, in 
conference, asked Defendant Doms what was his preferred cause of 
action, whereupon Defendant Doms elected the cause of action on 
rescission. The court thereupon scheduled a trial on the rescis-
sion claim and at the conclusion thereof issued a Memorandum 
Decision denying the remedy. Subsequently, the Defendant Doms 
requested trial on the alternative remedy in contract and, over 
the objection of the plaintiffs, a new and separate trial was 
conducted. The court should find and conclude that Defendant Doms 
elected his remedy, failed therein, and was barred from proceeding 
with the alternative remedy. 
Respectfully submitted this ^J) day of June, 1992. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
H: BIEL^4 ^~ 
Cc^ -(?ak/nsel for Plaintiffs 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES, P.C, 
/ JAMES A. MCINTOSH 
'- Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs 
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IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ. (Bar No. A0317) 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. (Bar No. 2194) 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
1399 South 700 East #14 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate 
Of D. C. ANDERSON; ELLEN 
ANDERSON personally; DAN SCOTT 
and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and EUGENE 
E. DOMS, 
Defendants, 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION UNDER 
RULE 52(a)(b), RULE 59(e) 
AND 60(a) FOR AMENDMENTS 
AND ADDITIONS TO FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND FOR THE ADDITION 
OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO 
CORRECT OVERSIGHTS AND 
OMISSIONS AND TO AMEND THE 
JUDGMENT TO REFLECT THE SAME 
Civil No. 8339 
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal 
representative of the Estate 
of D. C. ANDERSON; ELLEN 
ANDERSON personally; DAN 
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ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and 
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah 
and BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his 
official capacity as Summit 
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS 
REAL ESTATE, INC. a Utah 
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS; 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a 
Utah corporation; EUGENE E. 
DOMS, UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS 
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 2, 
3, 4 and 5, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 10066 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs under Rules 52(a)(b), Rule 59(e) and 
Rule 60(a), and move the court to include rulings and findings in 
relation to facts and law that have been submitted to this court 
and by reason of irregularity or oversight, have been omitted in 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law executed by the court. 
1. (a) Finding of Fact. Domcoy Enterprises, Inc.'s deed 
to defendant, Doms, who owned 50% of the outstanding stock of the 
corporation, which corporation was dissolved prior to the 
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conveyance, was not executed by surviving directors as required by 
law and there were outstanding creditors of the corporation at the 
time the deed was executed. 
(b) Conclusion of Law. An officer of Domcoy 
Enterprises, Inc., after the termination of its existence by the 
State of Utah, did not have the power to convey real estate owned 
by the said corporation to a stockholder owning 50% of the out-
standing stock of the corporation and the deed was void abinitio. 
2. (a) Finding of Fact. Mr. Eugene E. Doms and Mr. 
Michael R. McCoy received title to the property as tenants in com-
mon by reason of a deed dated March 10, 1982. 
(b) Conclusion of Law. The defendant Eugene E. Doms 
was the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the real estate 
at the time he executed the $194,250.00 promissory note dated 
March 10, 1982, in favor of D. C. Anderson as to an undivided 
one-half interest, and Dan Scott as to an undivided one-half 
interest. 
3. (a) Finding of Fact* D. C. Anderson died in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on September 20, 1983, and Ellen Anderson 
was duly appointed the personal representative of his estate on 
November 10, 1983, and is currently acting as such. 
(b) Finding of Fact. Notice to Creditors was duly 
published by the Estate of D. C. Anderson in 198 3 and the defen-
dant and counterclaimant Eugene Doms did not have an interest in 
the property at the time of D. C. Anderson's death or at the time 
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of publication of Notice to Creditors and did not file any claim 
against the estate of D. C. Anderson. 
(c) Conclusion of Law* As between the Estate of Dewey 
(D.C.) Anderson, now deceased, and Eugene E. Doms, the provisions 
of the Promissory Note and the provisions of the Trust Deed cannot 
be changed or modified or in any manner compromised and Eugene E. 
Doms owes the Estate of Dewey (D.C.) Anderson one-half of the 
unpaid principal and interest due on said Promissory Note, 
together with court costs and attorneys1 fees. 
4. (a) Finding of Fact* On the 30th day of August, 1983, 
the defendants, Michael R. McCoy and Eugene E. Doms, transferred 
and conveyed by warranty deed, for full value, all of their inter-
est in the subject property to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, and such deed was recorded on the same day. Further, 
the complaint in the action was filed June 6, 1985, and the Second 
Amended Counterclaim was filed July 5, 1988. 
(b-1) Conclusion of Law* At the time of filing the 
complaint in this action and at the time of filing the second 
amended answer and counterclaim to the complaint, the defendant 
Eugene E. Doms had no interest whatsoever in the real estate which 
is the subject of this action. 
(b-2) Conclusion of Law» The transfer by warranty 
deed executed by Eugene E. Doms and Michael R. McCoy to the corpo-
ration, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., extinguished their rights to 
claim under the deed from the plaintiffs unless their grantee, 
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Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., within the period of the statute of lim-
itations which commenced running on the date of the delivery of 
the deed to the defendants, March 23, 1982, made a claim against 
them. 
5. (a) Finding of Fact* Eugene E. Doms was a director 
and the president of Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. and Michael R. McCoy 
was also an officer and director of Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. on 
and before the date they delivered the deed to the subject proper-
ties to the corporation. Defendants were the organizers of Domcoy 
Enterprises, Inc., and had been its officers and directors from 
the commencement thereof. 
(b) Conclusion of Law* Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. had 
actual and constructive notice by the notice to their officers and 
directors of the promissory note of Eugene E. Doms and Michael R. 
McCoy in favor of the plaintiffs, Dewey (D.C.) Anderson and Dan 
Scott and of the trust deed given as security therefor, and as a 
result, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. took such property subject to the 
provisions of the promissory note and trust deed. 
6. (a) Finding of Fact* The corporate charter of Domcoy 
Enterprises, Inc. was suspended on January 24, 1986, and involun-
tarily dissolved by the Department of Business Regulations, 
Division of Corporations, on December 31, 1986. 
(b) Finding of Fact* On August 26, 1988, recorded 
August 30, 1988, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., a dissolved 
corporation, by warranty deed executed by an officer of the termi-
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nated corporation, purported to transfer the subject property to 
Eugene E. Doms. 
(c) Conclusion of Law. The acquisition on August 26, 
1988, by Eugene E. Doms from Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. of the prop-
erty which is the subject of this action, subsequent to the join-
der of issues, as a matter of law, cannot relate back and vest the 
defendant and counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms, with title to the 
subject property, as of the date of the filing of the complaint or 
as of the date of the filing of the counterclaim in this action. 
7. (a) Finding of Fact. This court in this action, in 
due course, entered a judgment against the defendant Michael R. 
McCoy which caused his undivided one-half interest in the 
property, as a tenant in common, to be duly sold by the Sheriff of 
Summit County at a judicial sale and such sale was duly completed. 
(b) Conclusion of Law. The judicial sale was effec-
tive to transfer an undivided one-half interest, the interest of 
Michael R. McCoy, in the property which is the subject of this 
action to the purchaser at the judicial sale. 
(c) Conclusion of Law. Eugene E. Doms's undivided 
one-half interest in the property is the only real estate now 
involved in this lawsuit. 
8. (a) Finding of Fact. At the time of the institution 
of this action by the plaintiffs, Dewey (D.C.) Anderson Estate and 
Dan Scott, the payments required by the promissory note had not 
been timely made and the defendants had failed to pay the taxes 
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assessed against the subject property• 
(b) Conclusion of Law* At the time of the institu-
tion of the action by the plaintiffs, the defendant Eugene E. Doms 
was in default under the terms of the promissory note and under 
the terms of the trust deed. 
9. (a) Finding of Fact, The plaintiffs, under the pro-
visions of §57-1-23, Utah Code Annotated as amended, elected to 
foreclose the interest represented by the trust deed securing the 
payment of the promissory note as a mortgage, have not withdrawn 
such election, and the defendant Eugene E. Doms was duly notified 
thereof when joined in the action. 
(b) Conclusion of Law* This matter must be concluded 
in accordance with the law pertaining to foreclosure of mortgages 
and the undivided one-half interest of Eugene E. Doms must be sold 
in the manner and form as provided for foreclosure of mortgages. 
10. (a) Finding of Fact* The estate of Dewey D. C. 
Anderson, deceased, owned an undivided one-half interest in the 
promissory note in the amount of $194,250,000, and secured by a 
trust deed describing the D. C. Anderson interest as "D. C. 
Anderson as to an undivided one-half interest, beneficiary." 
(b) Conclusion of Law* The failure of Mr. Eugene E. 
Doms to file any claim against the estate of Dewey (D.C.) 
Anderson, prohibits the court from changing or modifying the 
amount due the estate of D. C. Anderson by the defendant Eugene E. 
Doms or the security interest of the Estate of Dewey (D.C.) 
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Anderson in the subject property. 
11. (a) Finding of Fact* Four grantors granted the title 
to the subject property, one-half interest to Eugene E. Doms and 
one-half interest to Michael R. McCoy, tenants in common, by deed 
dated March 10, 1982, and recorded March 23, 1982. The first 
action for any claim under said warranty deed against the four 
grantors thereof was by a counterclaim dated June 24, 1988, and 
filed July 5, 1988, more than six years after the date of the 
deed. 
(b) Finding of Fact* That the original plaintiffs in 
their action made no claim or reference to the warranty deed, but 
claimed only under rights arising by reason of a promissory note 
and trust deed in favor of the two original plaintiffs. 
(c) Conclusion of Law* An action arising under a 
covenant against encumbrances arises immediately upon the delivery 
of the deed, March 23, 1982, and more than six years expired 
before an action was brought by Eugene E. Doms to join all gran-
tors of the deed and enforce said covenant; therefore, the statute 
of limitations, U.C.A. §76-12-23, had expired and the counterclaim 
must be dismissed. 
12. (a) Finding of Fact* The involuntary plaintiffs, 
Ellen Anderson, personally, and Jeanne Scott, had no interest 
whatsoever in the promissory note and trust deed which were the 
subject of the action filed by the original plaintiffs and over 
six years had expired after the delivery of the deed before they 
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were joined as parties to this lawsuit and then only in an action 
by the defendant Eugene E. Doms under the deed contract, which 
contract was not at issue in the original lawsuit. 
(b) Conclusion of Law* The statute of limitations, 
U.C.A. §76-12-23, is a bar against this action of the defendant, 
Eugene E. Doms, as against the involuntary plaintiffs, Ellen R. 
Anderson and Jeanne Scott. 
(c) Conclusion of Law* The contract action arising by 
reason of a warranty deed between four parties and in favor of the 
defendants is a separate and distinct transaction from the trust 
deed note and trust deed between the two original plaintiffs and 
the two defendants. 
(d) Conclusion of Law* The statute of limitations, 
U.C.A. §76-12-23, is a bar to the action under the warranty deed 
as more than six years have expired after the delivery of the deed 
on March 23, 1982, before an action under the contract provisions 
of the warranty deed was filed by Eugene E. Doms on June 29, 1988. 
13. (a) Finding of Fact* The road described in the plat 
of Block 58, Park City Survey, and denominated on the plat filed 
on November 5, 1880, as McHenry Avenue, has never been used or 
worked as a roadway from the date of the filing of said plat to 
the date of this action. 
(b) Finding of Fact* Section 1116 of Chapter 1 of 
Title 25, Revised Statutes of the State of Utah, 1898, provided 
that, "A road not used or worked for a period of five years ceases 
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to be a highway," and is abandoned and adjacent land owners own to 
the center of the abandoned highway. 
(c) Conclusion of Law* McHenry Avenue, as described 
in the Plat of Block 58, Park City Survey, is an abandoned highway 
and abutting owners own the property to the center of the 
described highway. 
CONCLUSION 
Separate motions and briefs have been submitted in rela-
tion to each of the matters above set forth and are incorporated 
herein by this reference. In order to obtain a final judgment in 
this case, rulings on each of the items above set forth must be 
made and appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law 
incorporated in the court's final Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. Failure to incorporate or rule upon each of the items 
above indicated is an oversight or omission which must be cor-
rected in order to give validity to the judgment rendered and the 
judgment must be modified to reflect the appropriate law and rul-
ing of the court. 
Plaintiffs respectfully request the court to complete the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment so as to prop-
erly reflect the facts and law applicable to this case. 
DATED this _ ] l ^ _ r d a y o f October, 1991. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
JAMESx^ Tl MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P-C. 
(el for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Carol A. DeMill, being first duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed by the law firm of NYGAARD, COKE & 
VINCENT, co-counsel for Plaintiffs herein, and that she mailed a 
copy of the above and foregoing Plaintiffs1 Motion Under Rule 
52(a)(b), Rule 59(e) and 60(a) For Amendments and Additions to 
Findings of Fact and for the Addition of Conclusions of Law to 
Correct Oversignts and Omissions and to Amend the Judgment to 
Reflect the Same, by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an 
envelope, postage prepaid and addressed to the following: 
Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
this 30th day of October, 1991. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30th day of October, 1991. 
Notary P u f c l i c ' y j 
My Commission Expires: Residing/at Salt Lake Count^/ UT 
J 
ADDENDUM 18 
MEMORY TO USE THAT DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE WHEN MR. DOMS 
WANTED TO INSPECT THE PROPERTY? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND AFTER LOOKING AT THAT DOCUMENT, WHAT IS 
THE TIME MR. DOMS TOLD YOU HE WANTED TO INSPECT THE 
PROPERTY WITH YOU? 
A. ON OR BEFORE NOVEMBER 7TH OF 1981. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. AND THE DATE OF THIS DOCUMENT 






WAS ON OR 
MR. KELLER: OBJECTION. 
THE COURT: THE OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED. 
(BY MR. MCINTOSH) DID YOU TAKE MR. DOMS TO 
HILLS PROPERTY ON OR BEFORE NOVEMBER 7TH, 
I COULD NOT SAY THE EXACT DATE. I DON'T 
IT WAS BEFORE NOVEMBER 7TH, BUT I THINK IT 
AROUND THAT TIME. 
MR. MCINTOSH: ALL RIGHT. THAT'S ALL I HAVE, 
YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KELLER; 
Q. 
EXHIBIT 15 
MR. SLOAN, WHERE ON PLAINTIFFS' MARKED 
-- IS YOUR MEMORY REFRESHED AS TO INSPECTION? 
WHERE ON THAT DOCUMENT--
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THAT HAS GOT TO DO WITH THE ONE ISSUE THAT YOU THOUGHT 
YOU WANTED TO HEAR ABOUT--
THE COURT: THE OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED. 
WHETHER HE MADE MONEY ON THOSE OTHER PROJECTS IS 
IMMATERIAL. 
Q. (BY MR. KELLER) MR. SLOAN, IT IS TRUE, IS 
IT NOT, THAT YOU TOOK SEVERAL DEVELOPER INVESTOR TYPE 
PEOPLE UP ON THE ROSSI HILLS PROPERTY AND AS PART OF 
THAT TALKED WITH THEM? 
A. YES. 
Q. HOW MANY? 
A. TO MY KNOWLEDGE ONLY TWO. 
Q. WELL, DIDN'T YOU TESTIFY PREVIOUSLY IN YOUR 
DEPOSITION THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL? 
A. I GUESS MAYBE WE NEED TO DETERMINE WHAT 
"SEVERAL" MEANS. "SEVERAL" CAN MEAN TWO TO ME. I 
MEAN, IF YOU GOT'VE A DEFINITION OF THAT, THEN I NEED 
TO--
Q. SEVERAL TO YOU IS TWO? 
A. MORE THAN ONE. IT'S SEVERAL. 
Q. ANYTHING MORE THAN ONE IS SEVERAL. 
WHO ELSE DID YOU TAKE UP THERE? 
A. WHO ELSE? 
Q. YES. DEVELOPER INVESTOR COMPANIES. 
A. WELL, TO MY RECOLLECTION, I TOOK BRUCE 
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1 A. I DON'T-- I DON'T BELIEVE THAT ANYONE ELSE 
2 WAS WITH ME. 
3 Q. TELL US WHOSE CAR YOU WENT IN. 
4 I A. WE WOULD HAVE GONE IN MY CAR. 
5 Q. YOU REMEMBER THAT FOR CERTAIN? 
6 A. NO, I DON'T. 
7 Q. TELL US WHAT TIME OF DAY IT WAS? 
8 A. I DON'T--
9 Q. TELL US WHAT DAY IT WAS? 
10 A. I CAN'T TELL YOU THAT. 
11 Q. TELL US WHAT YEAR IT WAS? 
12 A. TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION IT WAS 1981. 
13 Q. TELL US WHAT MONTH IT WAS? 
14 A. I CAN'T TELL YOU THAT. 
15 Q. WHEN YOU SAY TO THE BEST OF YOUR 
16 RECOLLECTION, COULD IT HAVE BEEN 1982? 
17 A. NO, I DON'T BELIEVE SO. 
18 Q. HOW MUCH SNOW WAS ON THE GROUND WHEN YOU 
19 WERE UP THERE? 
20 A. I THINK-- AS I TESTIFIED, I DON'T REMEMBER 
21 ANY SNOW ON THE GROUND UP THERE. 
22 Q. WHERE DID YOU PARK YOUR CAR? 
23 A. PARKED THE CAR UP ON THE LITTLE KNOLL. 
24 JUST AS YOU DRIVE UP ONTO THE PROPERTY, THERE'S A STEEP 
25 KNOLL AND THERE'S A FLAT SPOT THERE, RELATIVELY FLAT 
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OF SCRUB OAK, TO GET TO THAT KNOLL? 
A. NO. ACTUALLY THE WAY-- YEAH. I WAS UP 
THERE NOT TOO LONG AGO AND THERE'S NOT A LOT OF SCRUB 
OAK TO CLIMB IN. 
Q. THANK YOU. NOW, MR. SLOAN, YOU WERE AWARE 
OF THE LOOP ROAD THAT WAS ON THE PROPERTY? 
A. I WAS. 






I BELIEVE THAT WE WALKED CLEAR TO THE END 
DO YOU REMEMBER THAT FOR SURE? 
YES. 
Q. NO QUESTION IN YOUR MIND? 
A. NO. 
Q. HOW MUCH SNOW WAS THERE? 
A. THERE WAS NO SNOW. 
Q. NO SNOW? 
A. I DON'T BELIEVE THERE WAS ANY SNOW. 
Q. WHAT MONTH AND DATE? 
MR. WALL: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. ASKED AND 
ANSWERED. 
THE WITNESS: I DON'T KNOW. 
Q. (BY MR. KELLER) DO YOU RECALL WHEN YOU 
FIRST CALLED MR. DOMS IN CALIFORNIA TO TELL HIM ABOUT 
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I DO NOT. 
DO YOU EVEN RECALL THE MONTH OF THE YEAR? 
NO, SIR, I DON'T. 
HOW LONG AFTER YOU CALLED HIM WAS IT THAT 
AN EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED BY ALL PARTIES? 
DO YOU RECALL THAT? 
A. NO, I DON'T. 
Q. ARE YOU AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IN MOST 





I WOULD TAKE EXCEPTION TO THAT. 
YOU DON'T THINK THAT'S RIGHT? 
I DON'T THINK THAT'S RIGHT. 
Q. YOU THINK A CAR CAN BE DRIVEN ON THAT ROAD 
YEAR ROUND? 
A. NO, I DON'T. BUT THEY DO IT. 
Q. WHEN DO YOU THINK A CAR CAN NO LONGER BE 
DRIVEN ON THAT ROAD? 
A. THE 13 YEARS I HAVE BEEN HERE I WOULD SAY 
BETTER THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE TIME YOU COULD DRIVE ON 
THAT ROAD INTO THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER. 
Q. WHAT KIND OF CAR DID YOU HAVE IN 1981 THAT 
YOU DROVE ON THAT ROAD? 
A. WELL, I HAD TWO DIFFERENT CARS THAT I COULD 
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HAVE USED AT THAT TIME. 
Q. WHICH ONE DID YOU USE? 
A. I BELIEVE I USED THE '78 BMW. 
Q. YOU DROVE A BMW UP THAT ROAD? 
A. YES, I DID. 
Q. ISN'T THAT A DIRT ROAD, SORT OF A TRAIL 
MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE? 
A. YES, IT IS. 
Q. AND ISN'T IT VERY STEEP WHEN YOU FIRST 
START GOING UP THAT HILL? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND YOU DROVE YOUR BMW UP IT? 
A. YES, I DID. 
Q. OKAY. NOW, WHEN YOU WERE STANDING ON THE 
KNOLL, WHAT DID YOU AND MR. DOMS TALK ABOUT? 
A. I CAN'T REMEMBER THE EXACT CONVERSATION, 
BUT I KNOW THAT WHAT I BELIEVE I WOULD HAVE TALKED 
ABOUT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE VIEW THAT IS UP THERE, 
BECAUSE IT'S AN OUTSTANDING VIEW. 
Q. OKAY. NOW, I KNOW THERE'S A LOT OF THINGS 
YOU THINK YOU WOULD HAVE DONE. I'M ASKING YOU FOR WHAT 
YOU DID. 
WHAT DID YOU TALK ABOUT WITH THIS MAN, EUGENE 
E. DOMS, WHEN YOU WERE UP ON THAT ROAD, MR. SLOAN? 










DID YOU POINT OUT THE FACT TO HIM THAT THAT 
NOT THE ANDERSON PARCEL ITSELF THAT YOU WERE 
SELL HIM? 
WHICH ROAD ARE WE SPEAKING OF NOW? 
THE ROAD YOU SAY YOU WALKED ALONG WITH HIM. 
ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT THE LOOP ROAD? 
HOW MANY ROADS DID YOU WALK ALONG WITH HIM? 
WELL, WE MAY HAVE WALKED DOWN ON THE ' 
RAILROAD CUT. I DON'T RECALL, BUT I KNOW THAT I DID 




YOU TOLD HIM THE LOOP ROAD 
SURE, I WOULD HAVE. I'M— 
PROPERTY. 
WAS ON THE 
I DON'T RECALL 










YOU FEEL LIKE YOU PROBABLY WOULD HAVE? 
WE WALKED THE ROAD AND I WOULD HAVE TOLD 
WERE ON THE PROPERTY. 
DID YOU TELL HIM THAT THAT ROAD CONSTITUTED 
THE PEOPLE ON ONTARIO AVENUE TO GET TO THEIR 
I DON'T BELIEVE I DID. 
DID YOU TELL HIM THAT ROAD 
SINCE AT LEAST 1941 ON THE PROPERTY? 
A. I'M SURE THAT I DID NOT. 
HAD BEEN THERE 
574 
ANDERSON PARCEL? 
A. I DON'T BELIEVE I HAVE SEEN THAT ONE, NO. 
Q. WERE YOU AWARE AT THE TIME THAT YOU WALKED 
THE ROAD WITH GENE DOMS THAT THE BOUNDARIES OF THIS 
PROPERTY WENT INTO THE BACKYARDS OF SEVERAL OF THE 
HOUSES ON ONTARIO AVENUE? 
A. YES. CAN I LOOK AT THIS ONE? COULD I GET 
UP AND LOOK AT THIS ONE? 
Q. CERTAINLY. 
A. YES. I DON'T RECALL THIS PARTICULAR 
DRAWING, BUT THERE WAS ANOTHER SIMILAR DRAWING THAT I 
SAW. I'M NOT SURE WHEN I SAW IT. IT SHOWED THAT THERE 
WERE A COUPLE OF ENCROACHMENTS ON THESE SHEDS HERE. 
AND THIS BOTTOM PART-- AND I DON'T RECALL THIS PART. I 
DON'T KNOW WHAT THIS IS. 
Q. THIS IS A FOURPLEX TO THE NORTH OF 
SORENSON'S HOUSE,? 
A. I KNOW WHAT PROPERTY THIS IS. I DON'T KNOW 
WHAT THIS IS. 
Q. DID YOU KNOW THE FOURPLEX DECK ENCROACHED 
UPON THE ANDERSON PROPERTY? 
A. NO, I DID NOT. 
Q. DID YOU KNOW THAT SEVERAL FEET OF THE 
SORENSONS' LANDSCAPED YARD ENCROACHED UPON THE ANDERSON 
PROPERTY? 
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MR. WALL: ASKED AND ANSWERED. 
THE COURT: GO AHEAD AND ASK. 
Q. (BY MR. KELLER) DID YOU MAKE ANY 
REPRESENTATION TO MR. DOMS AT ALL THAT THAT DEVELOPMENT 
PARCEL COULD BE DEVELOPED AS A STAND-ALONE PIECE, THAT 
ANDERSON PARCEL? 
A. I DON'T RECALL THAT I DID. I DON'T 
REMEMBER THAT. 
Q. YOU HAVE YOUR DEPOSITION THERE IN FRONT OF 
YOU, MR. SLOAN. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO PICK IT UP AND 









THAT'S LINES TWO THROUGH FIVE? 
: TWO THROUGH FIVE. 
(BY MR. KELLER) IF YOU WANT TO READ 
EARLIER HERE OR AN EARLIER PAGE, OR LATER, 




DOES THAT REFRESH YOUR MEMORY AS TO WHETHER 
OR NOT YOU MADE ANY REPRESENTATION TO MR. DOMS 
REGARDING THE ABILITY 
A STAND-ALONE PARCEL? 
A. YEAH. I ' 
BEST DEVELOPMENT FOR ' 
OF THAT PARCEL TO BE DEVELOPED AS 
FELT, WITHOUT QUESTION, THAT THE 
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Case No. 10066 
It is hornbook law that one must elect to sue in con-
tract or in tort and in the same action both remedies cannot be 
pursued or pursued in alternative. 
In 1 Am.Jur.2d Actions § 32 (1961), it is stated at page 
567 as follows: 
In such circumstances, the plaintiff may choose 
which remedy to pursue, and may maintain his 
action either in tort or on contract. 
The question whether, when, and by whom a tort 
may be waived and an action in contract brought 
for the wrong or injury done is important, not-
withstanding the abolition of distinctions between 
the forms of actions ex contractu and actions ex 
delicto, since the principles of law governing 
these actions remain unchanged. 
Affirming the statement under Actions in 61A Am.Jur.2d 
Pleadings § 385 (1981), it is stated at page 372 as follows: 
Although a plaintiff may in certain circum-
stances waive a tort and sue in contract, if he 
elects to sue in tort he cannot recover in 
contract. Thus, where he sues for fraud, he can-
not recover for money had and received or for 
breach of warranty; . . . Conversely, a party can-
not sue in contract and recover for a tort dis-
closed by the evidence. 
The Utah courts have long recognized that a party must 
elect the remedy. In the case of McKellar Real Estate & 
Investment Co. v. Paxton, 218 P. 128 (Utah 1923), the court, cit-
ing another case, stated: 
"The election of the purchaser to rescind must be 
evidenced by unequivocal act, . . . ." 
"The general rule that the purchaser waives his 
right to rescind by failure to exercise it 
promptly on discovery of the grounds applies where 
the ground relied on is mistake, duress, failure 
to procure the conveyance within the limited time, 
or deficiency in quantity." 
In the case of Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor Co., 253 P. 
196 (Utah 1927), which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," the 
court stated: 
. . . (1) that there must be, in fact, two or more 
coexisting remedies upon which the party has the 
right to elect; (2) the remedies thus open to him 
must be alternative and inconsistent; and (3) he 
must by actually bringing an action or by some 
other decisive act, with knowledge of the facts, 
indicate his choice between these inconsistent 
remedies. . . an election once deliberately made 
by the institution of a suit, by which the remedy 
is sought to be recovered, is final, and his fail-
ure to secure satisfaction by means of the remedy 
which he has adopted furnishes no legal reason to 
permit him to resort to the other, . . . The doc-
trine of an election rests upon the principle that 
one may not take contrary positions, and where he 
has a right to choose one of two modes of redress, 
and the two are so inconsistent that the assertion 
of one involves a negation or repudiation of the 
other, the deliberate and settled choice of one, 
with knowledge or means of knowledge of such facts 
as would authorize a resort to each, will preclude 
him thereafter from going back and electing again. 
The Oregon court In Banc, in the action of McAllister 
v. Charter First Mortgage, Inc., 567 P.2d 539 (Or. 1977), which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B," states: 
It is generally accepted that on a contract to 
purchase property, a dissatisfied purchaser must 
elect to either affirm the contract and sue for 
damages or rescind and ask for the return of the 
purchase money. 
CONCLUSION 
The counterclaimant Doms has obviously elected the rem-
edy of rescission and, therefore, cannot now continue his action 
to seek damages under the contractual provisions contained in the 
Warranty Deed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ? 7 day of April, 1990. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
for Plaintiffs 
IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ. (Bar No. A0317) 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone No. (801) 328-2506 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. (Bar No. 2194) 
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D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and 
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SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate 
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i Case No. 10066 
The Utah law on election of remedies might seem confused 
or contradictory unless the same is reviewed from an historical 
basis. We will summarily and chronologically treat the key cases. 
The key cases are attached for further reference by the court. 
1. 1927: The case of Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor Co., 
253 P. 196 (Utah 1927), recognized that Utah had adopted the 
Election of Remedies Doctrine and set forth the essential elements 
of an election. KEY CASE - See Elements Exhibit 1, page 199. 
2. March 14, 1962: In the case of Smoot v. Lund, 369 
P.2d 933, the Utah Supreme court made some rather general state-
-3-
ments in relation to our Rules of Civil Procedure and referred to 
the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(a) and stated the Rules had 
changed the common law and allowed a party to "join either as 
independent or alternate claims . • . legal or equitable or both. 
. ." A careless reading of this case would indicate that there is 
no longer an Election of Remedies Doctrine in the State of Utah, 
but the subsequent cases indicate that the Doctrine is alive and 
well. This case stands for the principle that the mere act of 
pleading a theory of recovery does not constitute an election of 
remedy and alternative remedies may be pled. 
3. On November 27, 1962, only eight months after the 
Smoot v. Lund decision (supra), the Utah Supreme Court in the case 
of Wallace L. Rosander v. Rex A. Laren, 376 P.2d 146, (Utah) 
stated, "To require a party to make an election between the alter-
native counts or defenses, particularly at the pretrial stage of 
the proceedings, would be to emasculate the rule and render it 
meaningless." This case obviously recognizes that sooner or 
later, if there is an appropriate motion, the moving party must 
make an election. (Exhibit 2.) 
4. On December 13, 1962, nine months after the date, of 
the Smoot decision, the Utah Supreme Court in Gene Wheadon v. 
George B. Pearson, 376 P.2d 946, indicated on page 948, that when 
a party attempted to obtain his entire relief on one claim, "then 
the matter should be laid at rest. He should be denied a second 
attempt at substantially the same objective under a different 
-3-
guise." These two cases indicate that the Utah Supreme Court still 
recognizes the doctrine of election of remedies. (Exhibit 3.) 
5. September 15, 1967, five years after the Smoot 
decision, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Mldvale 
Motors, Inc. v. Saunders, 432 P.2d 37 (Utah) indicated that when a 
party elected to sue for two inconsistent remedies, then on demand 
of the other party an election has to be made and the other party 
has the right during the course of the litigation to demand such 
an election. KEY CASE, Exhibit 4, page 389. 
6. On November 5, 197 9, seventeen years after the Smoot 
case above referred to, the Utah Supreme Court in the case of 
Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., Utah, 603 P.2d 
793, page 796, 797, again addressed the problem of election of 
remedies and indicated that the defense of election of remedies is 
affirmative and must be raised by way of answer, motion or demand. 
Further, in this case Justice Maughan in his dissenting opinion 
even recognized the requirement of election stating, "A litigant 
is not allowed to maintain inconsistent positions in judicial 
proceedings." (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit 5.) 
7. Our sister state, Colorado, in the case of Leo P. 
Doyle v. Howard S. McBee, 420 P.2d 247 (Colo. 1966), the court, in 
a case similar to the instant case, wherein the party had pled for 
rescission and also for damages for breach of a covenant in the 
deed ruled that when the party attempted to prove the case on the 
breach of covenant and failed, then it could not proceed with the 
-4-
claim of rescission. In the present case, the reverse is true. 
The parties proceeded in rescission and failed and now wish to 
proceed in contract and thereafter are barred by their election to 
proceed in rescission (Exhibit 6). The same rule should apply! 
8. The Idaho Court of Appeals, in May, 1986, in Jimmy P. 
Keesee v. Joseph P. Fetzek, 723 P.2d 904 adopted the doctrine of 
quasi estoppel election of remedies and on page 906 stated, "The 
buyer has been unfairly prejudiced, and stands to suffer an uncon-
scionable detriment as a result of the sellers' change in 
position." (Exhibit 7.) 
9. In August of 1984, Colorado again reaffirmed the 
election of remedies doctrine in the case of Gobbitz v. Marquette 
Minerals wherein it stated, "Such an election is necessary since 
to treat the contract as enforceable and to seek specific perform-
ance or damages for breach is Inconsistent with a request for 
rescission." Page 1130. (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit 8.) This 
case reaffirmed the Oregon 1977 decision in McAllister v. Charter 
First Mortgage, 567 P.2d 538 (OR 1977), where the court stated on 
page 54 3, "It is generally accepted that on a contract to purchase 
property, a dissatisfied purchaser must elect to either affirm the 
contract and sue for damages or rescind and ask for the return of 
the purchase money." (Exhibit 9.) 
10. The test that to allow proof of one theory must nec-
essarily disprove or defeat the other - election of remedies - is 
-5-
also recognized in our other sister states and the reference to 
appropriate decisions is as follows: 
Kansas 
Patrons State Bank and Trust Company v. 
Deane H. Shapiro 
528 P.2d 1198, 1204 
Oklahoma 
Agusta S. Slsler v. Ellen Jackson 
460 P.2d 903, 909 
Washington 
Bank of the West v. Wes-Con Development Co., Inc. 
Wash. App. 548 P.2d 563, 567 
Oregon App. 1983 
Arthur Gentemann v. Sunaire Systems, Inc. 
665 P.2d 875 
Arizona App. 
Delbert Fousel, et ux v. 
Ted Walker Mobile Homes, Inc. 
602 P.2d 507 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff made the motion for election of remedies at 
at and before the commencement of the trial. The counterclaimant, 
Mr. Doms, after a conference with the court and other attorneys, 
elected to proceed with his cause of action in rescission and, 
after having presented evidence, rested his case in rescission. 
Pursuant to Utah law, Mr. Doms made his election and the court 
must rule that the Plaintiff cannot now proceed under the theory 
of contract. 
-6-
Respectfully submitted this 
NYG. 
JZ day of %U 
Plaintiffsf Addresses: 
Ellen Anderson 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
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Star Route 
P. 0. Box 65 
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^ 
COKE & VINCENT 
IELE 
s for Plaintiffs 
1990 
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ADDENDUM 20 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by 
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense as-
serted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple-
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall 
so order, specifying the time therefor. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 15, F.R.C.P. 
F A K T IV. 
PARTIES. 
Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant. 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of 
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, 
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract 
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may 
sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit the 
action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or 
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action 
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection 
for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, 
the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall 
have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the 
real party in interest. 
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. A minor or an insane or incompetent 
person who is a party must appear either by a general guardian or by a 
guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court in which the 
action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it 
is deemed by the court in which the action or proceeding is prosecuted expe-
dient to represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the action or 
proceeding, notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian 
and may have appeared by the guardian. In an action in rem it shall not be 
necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might 
be a minor or an incompetent person. 
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by 
a court must be appointed as follows: 
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if 
the minor is of the age of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the 
application of a relative or friend of the minor. 
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if 
the minor is of the age of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after 
the service of the summons, or if under that age or if the minor neglects so 
to apply, then upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor, or 
of any other party to the action. 
(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon 
motion therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some suitable 
person to be guardian ad litem for the minor defendant, unless the defen-
dant or someone in behalf of the defendant within 20 days after service of 
notice of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such 
minor. Service of such notice may be made upon the defendants general 
or testamentary guardian located in the defendant's state; if there is 
none, such notice, together with the summons in the action, shall be 
served in the manner provided for publication of summons upon such 
minor, if over fourteen years of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, by 
such service on the person with whom the minor resides. The guardian ad 
litem for such nonresident minor defendant shall have 20 days after ap-
pointment in which to plead to the action. 
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or 
proceeding, upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or 
incompetent person, or of any other party to the action or proceeding. 
(d) Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two or 
more persons associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a 
partnership or other association, not a corporation, transact such business 
under a common name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or 
not, they may sue or be sued by such common name. Any judgment obtained 
against the association shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the 
same manner as if all had been named parties and had been sued upon their 
joint liability. The separate property of an individual member of the associa-
tion may not be bound by the judgment unless the member is named as a 
party and the court acquires jurisdiction over the member. 
(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a 
nonresident person is associated in and conducts business within the state of 
Utah in one or more places in that person's own name or a common trade 
name, and the business is conducted under the supervision of a manager, 
superintendent or agent the person may be sued in the person's name in any 
action arising out of the conduct of the business. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph 
(d) has been changed to conform to the holding 
in Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 
(Utah 1988), which allows an unincorporated 
association to sue in its own name. The rule 
continues to allow an unincorporated associa-
tion to be sued in its own name The final sen-
tence of paragraph (d) was added to confirm 
that the separate property of an individual 
member of an association may not be bound by 
the judgment unless the member is made a 
party. 
Technical changes in all paragraphs of the 
rule make the terminology gender neutral. In 
part (c) the word "minor" has replaced the 
word "infant," in order to maintain consistency 
with recent changes made in Rule 4(e)(2). In 
Rule 4 an infant is defined as a person under 
the age of 14 years, whereas the intent of Rule 
17(c) is to include persons under the age of 18 
years. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective September 1, 1991, substituted 
"minor" for "infant" throughout Subdivisions 
(b) and (c); in Subdivision (d), substituted "sue 
or be sued" for "be sued" in the heading and 
the first sentence, divided the former language 
into the present first two sentences, in the sec-
ond sentence substituted "the association" for 
"the defendant" and "parties" for "defendants/* 
and added the third sentence; and made stylis-
tic changes throughout the section. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 17, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Guardians, § 75-5-
101 et seq. 
Service of DroceR* IT R C P A 
Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of 
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his 
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter 
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the 
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, mul-
tiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If 
he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he 
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, 
in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue 
and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be 
dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person 
as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court 
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should 
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person 
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the 
court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's ab-
sence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent 
to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or 
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether 
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for non-
joinder. 
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for 
relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as de-
scribed in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons 
why they are not joined. 
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of 
Rule 23. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
16-10-74. Sale or mortgage of assets other than in regular 
course of business. 
A sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition of all, or 
substantially all, the property and assets, with or without the good will, of a 
corporation, if not made in the usual and regular course of its business, may 
be made upon such terms and conditions and for such consideration, which 
may consist in whole or in part of money or property, real or personal, includ-
ing shares of any other corporation, domestic or foreign, as may be authorized 
in the following manner: 
(a) The board of directors shall adopt a resolution recommending such 
sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition and directing 
the submission thereof to a vote at a meeting of shareholders, which may 
be either an annual or a special meeting. 
(b) Written or printed notice shall be given to each shareholder of 
record entitled to vote at such meeting within the time and in the manner 
provided in this act for the giving of notice of meetings of shareholders, 
and, whether the meeting be an annual or a special meeting, shall state 
that the purpose, or one of the purposes, of such meeting is to consider the 
proposed sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition. 
(c) At such meeting the shareholders may authorize such sale, lease, 
exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition and may fix, or may 
authorize the board of directors to fix, any or all of the terms and condi-
tions thereof and the consideration to be received by the corporation 
therefor. Each outstanding share of the corporation shall be entitled to 
vote thereon, whether or not entitled to vote thereon by the provisions of 
the articles of incorporation. Such authorization shall require the affir-
mative vote of the holders of at least a majority of the outstanding shares 
of the corporation, unless any class of shares is entitled to vote as a class 
thereon, in which event authorization shall require the affirmative vote 
of the holders of at least a majority of the outstanding shares of each class 
of shares entitled to vote as a class thereon and of the total outstanding 
shares. 
(d) After such authorization by a vote of shareholders, the board of 
directors nevertheless, in its discretion, may abandon such sale, lease, 
exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition of assets, subject to the 
rights of third parties under any contracts relating thereto, without fur-
ther action or approval by shareholders. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, * 74. 
75-3-803. Limitations on presentation of claims. 
(1) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of 
the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision of it, whether 
due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, 
founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other 
statute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the personal representa-
tive, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented within the 
earlier of the following dates: 
<a) one year after the decedent's death; or 
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 75-3-801(2) for creditors 
who are given actual notice, and where notice is published, within the 
time provided in Subsection 75-3-801(1) for all claims barred by publica-
tion. 
(2) In all events, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent's 
domicile are also barred in this state. 
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the death 
of the decedent, including claims of the state and any of its subdivisions, 
whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliqui-
dated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis are barred against the 
estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the dece-
dent, unless presented as follows: 
(a) a claim based on a contract with the personal representative within 
three months after performance by the personal representative is due; or 
(b) any other claim within the later of three months after it arises, or 
the time specified in Subsection (l)(a). 
(4) Nothing in this section affects or prevents: 
(a) any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or other lien upon 
property of the estate; 
(b) to the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to 
establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which 
he is protected by liability insurance; or 
(c) collection of compensation for services rendered and reimbursement 
for expenses advanced by the personal representative or by the attorney 
or accountant for the personal representative of the estate. 
History: C. 1953, 75-3-803, enacted by L. guage and rewrote Subsections (l)(a) and (b); 
1975, ch. 150, 5 4; 1992, ch. 179, ft 7. added new Subsection (2); redesignated former 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- Subsections (2) and (3) as present Subsections 
ment, effective July 1, 1992, substituted (3) and (4); substituted "the later of three 
*within the earlier of the following dates" for months after it arises, or the time specified in 
"as follows" at the end of the introductory Ian- Subsection (l)(a)w for "three months after it 
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LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
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257 Towers, Suite 340 
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Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
Clerk oi Summit County 
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THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OoOoo 
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal 
representative for the estate 
Of D.C. ANDERSON and DAN SCOTT, 
Plaintiff, 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY AND EUGENE 
DOMS, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
Case No. 8339 
-ooOoo-
On or about May 10, 1988 the Honorable Pat B. Brian, 
Third District Judge, entered a qualified order setting aside 
default judgment as to the Defendant Eugene E. Doms. Said 
Order entered by the Court was qualified with the following 
conditions to be met by Defendant Eugene E. Doms: 
1. Defendant, on or before June 1, 1988 pay the 
Plaintiff by certified or cashier's check the amount of the 
fees as indicated by the original affidavit for attorney's 
fees and the supplemental affidavit for attorney's fees. 
000076 
2. On or before June 1, a*88,
 n o w ooun^l «tv*ll to* 
obtained to represent the Defendant, who shall file an 
appearance in this case coincidently with the withdrawal of 
Mr. Kinghorn. 
Defendant Eugene E. Doms, hereby certifies to the Court 
that the above conditions have been met as of this date, June 
1, 1988 in that (1) an official check issued by Wells Fargo 
and Company has been tendered to Mr. Irving Biele of Biele, 
Haslam and Hatch representing the amount ordered by the Court 
for payment of attorney's fees; and (2) Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
has entered his appearance of counsel on behalf of Defendant 
Eugene E. Doms as of June 1, 1988. 
Defendant Doms understands that this Certificate of 
Compliance triggers the actual date the default judgment is 
set aside, and therefore Defendant's answer and counterclaim 
are officially accepted by the Court. Defendant Doms 
understands that all attorneys involved in the case should 
work from this date in complying with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
DATED this ) day of June, 1988. 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Certificate of Compliance, first class 
postage prepaid, this / day of June, 1988 to: 
Irving Biele 
Biele, Haslam and Hatch 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Gerald Kinghorn 
9 Exchange Place, #1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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